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Editor’s Note
Fall 2020
The ferocity of Covid-19 has struck worldwide this year. In the process, all of humanity
has been affected. Civilizations and societies, and nations large and small, have
responded to the challenge, some with more success than others.
One result of the arrival on Earth of this horrible pandemic, a recurrence of an ancient
human problem, has been that it naturally prompts scholars to ponder the impact on
civilizations of such tragedy.
So, to gauge this titanic event, the Comparative Civilizations Review asked several
prominent writers, members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations, all of whom have long been professionally and academically concerned
with aspects of this topic, to comment. Here are eight fascinating analyses, each of
which has been brutally and artificially restricted by the editor to just a few hundred
words.
Finally, this Editor’s Note concludes with an on-point university syllabus on Covid-19
and Pitirim Sorokin, a perfect primer for teaching this topic. It was prepared by Prof.
David Wilkinson. A scholarly article on the history of pandemics, especially written
for this issue by journal editor Dr. Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov, follows.
Readers who wish to contribute their views are invited to submit and we will run the
comments in our next issue.
In the meantime, stay safe, one and all!
Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief
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Prof. David Rosner, president of the ISCSC from 2013 to 2016, has weighed in on
how humanity adjusts to pandemics from the philosophical perspective:
Human beings need to “make sense” out of the world, but our world is sometimes
unintelligible.
We “make sense” out of the world through holding certain fundamental
assumptions, based on past experiences, which help us both navigate the present
and predict the future. Psychologists have discussed this as “the assumptive
world.”1
Catastrophes such as pandemics suddenly upend these very presuppositions. When
our basic presuppositions about reality are abruptly challenged, civilizations (and
especially their leaders) need to exhibit the following two qualities (though there
may be more):
1. The humility to understand that the human race is ultimately a blip on the screen
in an infinite universe, and that our lives are fundamentally contingent and
uncertain. We are not always in control of reality and we will need to find ways
to adjust when our lives change in a sudden and radical way.
2. The flexibility to try to find new ways of seeing and being (e.g., the positing of
new assumptions) with which to reorient ourselves (individually and
collectively) to the new, often painful, realities. Civilizations that can do this
endure, while those that cannot collapse.

1

See Jeffrey Kauffman (ed.), The Loss of the Assumptive World: A Theory of Trauma and Loss
(NY: Brunner-Routledge 2002) and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions (NY: Free
Press, 2002).
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Prof. John Grayzel, an anthropologist, attorney, and veteran official at the Agency for
International Development, who also serves on the current ISCSC Board of Directors,
examines civilizations and this epidemic as he views the broad sweep of human history
from the perspective of the “Great Man Theory of History”:
There is no question that pandemics can shake up a seemingly stable set of
circumstances and, in that way, affect history.
However, I think we would be hard pressed to actually attribute to pandemics
significant causality in terms of making a difference in the direction of the evolution
of specific civilizations.
As serious as they might be, I would say the evidence is that pandemics (or more
specifically the resulting "die-off" they have caused) only exacerbate the influence
of the most prevailing factors. This is because their actual effect is mediated by
extant social, political, economic, demographic, and religious/psychological
parameters.
The exception may be Polynesian civilization.
For thousands of years smallpox was a repetitive scourge for much of humanity,
but Polynesian civilization constituted probably the only civilization that a
pandemic actually ended. In the case of Polynesia, the relatively small population,
and its relatively thin distribution across a large area of bounded islands, made the
die-off unusually swift, repetitive (each time a new European ship visited), and
catastrophic—and without ample opportunity for rapid regeneration.
In the Americas, disease also decimated the indigenous populations, but what it did
to the independent civilizations located in North, Central, and South America was
the result of purposeful political and economic policies of the new European rulers.
What is different today with the Covid-19 pandemic is that its most pathological
effect is not being visited upon any particular group or society but on the process
of globalization itself. The struggle of individual nations to protect themselves
from outside carriers, as well as competition among them to access limited available
medical resources, has generated a retreat from what has otherwise been an
evolving global civilization.
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Ironically, this is most attributable to a single person, the current President of the
United States, Donald Trump.
Had the current situation occurred under any of President Trump's predecessors,
they would have used the circumstances to reinforce American leadership within
the institutions of international organizations and thereby actually advanced the
world's acceleration towards global governance.
In this sense, President Trump has proven that the "Great Man Theory of History"
has validity and that he may well turn out to be a figure of truly causative historic
importance. The Covid-19 virus pandemic has exacerbated the deleterious effect
of Trump's behavior from merely being highly disruptive to the normal operations
of the institutions of American democracy to being disastrous regarding the entire
world's movement towards global governance of common concerns.
Because of the challenges his authoritarian behavior posed to American
Presidential authority, General Douglas MacArthur was called the "American
Caesar." For the damage President Trump has visited upon the behavioral integrity
of the Western World in the face of the clear and common threat of Covid-19, he
may well become known as the "American Commodus the Monster."2

2

The Roman emperor Lucius Aurelius Commodus (161-192 CE) came to power in 180 CE when his
father, the philosopher emperor Marcus Aurelius, died during what is known as the Antonine Plague
(probably smallpox) that decimated the Mediterranean world from 165-180 CE. Gibbons writes that
"every sentiment of virtue and humanity was extinct in (his) mind."*
His licentiousness, cowardice and disdain for Roman institutions was described by the Roman
historian Cassius Dio. He wrote: "Moreover, a pestilence occurred, the greatest of any of which I have
knowledge;.... not alone in the city, but throughout almost the entire empire. ... Now the death of these
victims passed unheeded, for Commodus was a greater curse to the Romans than any pestilence or any
crime."**
*Gibbons, Edward. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, abridged edition. Greenwich,
Connecticut: Brompton Books Corporation, 1979. See page 38.
**Dio, Cassius. Roman History. Vol. IX. Epitome of Book LXXIII. Loeb Classical Library Edition,
1927. See page 103. You have to scroll to the page bottom to see the footnote.
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Prof. Michael Andregg, a scholar of biology and long-time activist for global peace
and international amity, is the Vice President of the ISCSC and a veteran member of
the Board of Directors of our organization. Here is his view of the civilizational
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic:
We have already determined that global civilization is experiencing a flurry of
interrelated crises that challenge many things we hold dear, in extremis, human
survival.
Therefore, many biologists around the world interpret the latest pandemic as a
warning shot across the bow of human civilization and all the smaller civilizations
that it embraces.
In aggregate, we are slowly destroying the living system of the earth that sustains
all civilizations. Many scientists have reported on the folly of that for at least two
generations. Mostly they have been ignored. Derivative symptoms, like climate
change or the “sixth great extinction” get worse each year despite these warnings,
while the forces of denial are much better funded than the forces for positive
change.
The simplest farmers know that only fools fool with Mother Nature. Collective
elite leaders do not seem to understand this experience-formed observation despite
their lofty educations. So, every year we destroy more virgin forests and eat more
exotic animals from the wild — like bats and chimpanzees. Nature threw us Ebola
(origins in chimpanzees) not once but fourteen times. It keeps coming back and
will eventually escape containment if we keep begging it to. Nature threw us SARS
and MERS, both coronavirus variants, and we contained them too … barely.
Now, Covid-19 comes with the ideal combination for viral predators of high
transmissibility with low enough lethality that undetected “asymptomatic” carriers
spread it faster than most testing and remediation can follow.
Scholars might revisit civilizational classics like “Collapse,” by Jared Diamond
(2005), “The Collapse of Complex Societies,” by Joseph Tainter (1988), or “The
Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations,” edited by Norman Yoffee and
George Cowgill (1988).
They show how often ancient elites had ample warning of impending crises but
chose to ignore them for short-sighted reasons.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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Dr. Andrew Targowski, president of the ISCSC from 2007 to 2013, provides a
futurist’s perspective on Covid-19:
Pandemic 2020, triggered by the coronavirus,
reminds us that life on Earth has been evolving
for 3.5 billion years from a virus, which is just a
deficient bacterium.
We humans in the last 6000 years are trying to
be rational and civilized but we are not good
enough to be immune to a pandemic. It is a loud
voice of nature that is advising us today that we
have a long way ahead to be healthier and wiser
than a virus.
The Spanish Flu of 1918-1919 killed about 40
million people, those who did not pay attention to keeping distance and avoiding
the crowds. In Pandemic 2020, we repeat the same mistakes.
However, some people in some American cities—those who are demonstrating
widely these days — are trying to mitigate the political aspect of civilization,
making it more friendly for everybody. Hence, Pandemic 2020 looks to be a wakeup call, appearing as it has simultaneously with calls to implement social justice, as
life should be.
But at what cost?
Not killing 40 million by the virus but bankrupting 40 million small businesses by
irrational behavior?
Are we wise enough to not repeat the Bolshevik Revolution? It took more than 70
years to learn about its outcomes and to correct them for the sake of about 200
million victims.
Is our civilization politically wise? Or should we keep developing civilization
another 6000+ years, having in mind that the sky is the limit?
Is it possible? If not, what to do wisely now? What is lacking — technology,
knowledge or wisdom, or conscious and willful leadership?
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25
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Prof. John Berteaux, a philosopher from the School of Humanities and
Communication at California State University Monterey Bay and a new member of the
Board of the ISCSC, has given wonderful presentations over the years at the annual
meetings of the organization.
Below he presents a view of the quality and actual community-based meaning of
freedom in an age of Covid-19:
In discussions of how the state should react to the current pandemic, one
controversial issue has involved whether it should force citizens to wear masks
when in public. As a matter of fact, from New Orleans, Louisiana to Turlock,
California, and from Aurora, Colorado to San Antonio, Texas, individuals asked to
put on a mask have occasionally turned violent.
In a recent New York Times article, Economist Paul Krugman suggests “a cult of
selfishness is killing America.”
On the one hand, many argue that laws requiring citizens to wear masks infringe
on their freedom, their self-determination. Indeed, liberalism is characterized as
“an attitude toward life and life’s problems that values freedom, for individuals,
minorities, and nations.” Yet, given the severity of the Covid-19 pandemic, others
insist everyone should be forced to wear a mask in public spaces.
In fact, philosophers Charles Taylor, Alison Jagger, and Michael Sandel suggest
we often misconstrue our capacity for self-determination and neglect the social
preconditions under which that capacity can be meaningfully exercised.
They remind us that freedom or self-determination is not abstract. It is a social and
political construct.
Our self-determination is expressed from within a community, and that requires we
seek a balance between it and our shared social responsibility. Destroy the
community and we destroy a vital precondition for the expression of our freedom.
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Dr. Tseegai Isaac, a professor of History and Political Science at the Missouri
University of Science and Technology, long-time member of the ISCSC and an editor
of this journal for over a decade, sketches the stark and tragic history marking the
encounter of pandemics with the Ethiopian civilization.
He observes as follows:
Ethiopia is celebrated for its ancient biblical civilization. Its political traditions for
centuries blended Old and New Testament tenets, creating templates for daily social
and religious life.
Ethiopia may nurture pride in its lengthy history and civilization, but its political
and social experiences have also been ravaged with the advent of famine,
pestilences, and pandemics.
The causes for the onset of Ethiopia’s frequent pandemics can be traced to two
factors: wars and post-crisis upheavals.
The first pandemic in Ethiopia, as noted in the liturgical chronicles, was recorded
by church scribes. This was in the early years, when the Fatimid Dynasty was
consolidating rule over Egypt. The fervency of jihad reached its highest ascendance
there. From Egypt, however, the Fatimid branched out, driving forcefully to extend
Islam over the neighboring territories of Sudan, North Africa, and Ethiopia.
This influence affected Ethiopia via the region that is known as Eritrea today.
Fatimid’s religious propagators were sent to convert the Christian Baja tribes living
in Eritrea. When the fervency of this jihad that had been raging for over two
centuries reached Eritrea, the result was a blockade of the Ethiopian Empire’s sea
access.
Muslim forces from the North pushed the Christian population ever southward as
they occupied the Red Sea coast ports.
“As a result of these wars, the Abyssinian kings gradually lost control of northern
Tigre (northern Ethiopia and today’s Eritrea) and the coastal areas” (Luther, E. W.
1958:13).
Thus, the history of the Ethiopian civilization has been a long-term clash between
the status quo faith of Christianity and the expansionist faith of Islam.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25
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The determination to Islamize Ethiopia has been unrelenting throughout Ethiopian
history.
With every jihad, wars have taken place; one repeated result of these has been that
the Ethiopian highlands have experienced famine and pestilence. The population
was decimated over and over again, and villages left empty. Corpses have been
scattered by the roadsides for hyenas, rats, and vermin to feed on them.
One tragic result has been that between 1225 CE and 1880 CE, over 35 famine and
pandemic scourges have attacked Ethiopia. Finally, however, there arrived in
Ethiopia the severity of the 1880s famines, with various pandemics that followed.
As Hancock writes:
The greatest famine of all occurred towards the end of the [19th] century in the
years 1888-92. Still referred to as “the Great Famine,” this had profound
impacts on Ethiopian society. . . .The Rinderpest Epidemic started in the north,
as the result of the introduction of infected Indian cattle by the Italians who
were at that time annexing Eritrea, and it quickly spread through Tigray, Wollo
and Gonder into Shoa (Hancock, G., 1985: 63).
We may conclude that, with the exception of the 1880s pandemic, a result of
colonial invasion, all of the pandemics and pestilences in the recorded history of
Ethiopia have come subsequent to wars that Samuel Huntington would call
“Clashes of Civilizations.” In this case — Christian civilization vs. Islamic
civilization.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020
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Two experts within the university community have written of the practical effects of
the current pandemic on life in academe.
Connie Lamb has long been the patron of this journal as well as Editor. It is because
of her work that Brigham Young University has made possible the online version of
the Comparative Civilizations Review. Currently she serves as Librarian – Social
Sciences for the university and she is also on the Board of the International Society for
the Comparative Study of Civilizations.
She comments on the effect Covid-19 has had on libraries in America and worldwide:
The Coronavirus pandemic put a halt to many normal activities. One of the
institutions heavily impacted by the virus is libraries.
Public libraries across America and other countries shut their doors earlier this year
to prevent the spread of Covid-19. Yet libraries are central to our free society.
Libraries are critical elements in the free exchange of information at the heart of a
democracy.
“Public libraries are the soul of a civilization” (Gautam Parel). They provide space
where people of all ages and income levels can practice lifelong learning. They are
also social spaces for community members. Libraries are the most democratic
institution because they level the intellectual playing field.
Library closures have reduced the influence of this democratic institution in public
life. Libraries have been innovative in creating options and supporting learning as
much as possible, especially using technology. One result is the increased demand
for e-books and access to online resources. But people without computers rely on
library access, so that portends that the knowledge gap will widen. Unique material
found in archives, for example, are not accessible for research.
In an article about reducing library staff in Pakistan’s libraries, Abid Hussain makes
the comment that “it is an established fact that those who shut the door of libraries
will open the door of ignorance.” Thus, remote librarians can do much but not
everything to guide patrons to the information they desire.
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Libraries have been an essential element in major civilizations for millennia.
Knowledgeable and progressive societies need them, and although technology has
improved access, it is librarians who lead the way in organizing and making
knowledge available as well as providing community service.
Let’s hope libraries are not closed much longer.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

17

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 83 [2020], No. 83, Art. 25

12

Number 83, Fall 2020

Prof. Rosemary Gillett-Karam is frequently honored by national educational bodies
as one of the foremost academic experts on the significance of a great American
innovation: community college. She has served as university president and held other
positions as an administrator and a scholar. She also is an editor of this journal.
Here she reports on the effect of the pandemic, and precipitous action by the US
government, on international students attending higher education institutions in the
United States:
The Department of Homeland Security, with its Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVIS) arms,
announced unexpectedly on July 6 of this year that international students studying
in the United States at universities and colleges which were converting to all-online
instruction because of the pandemic would become immediately ineligible to
continue their enrollment in their college or university courses if their own
countries had similar programs available.
They would have to return home precipitously.
Fortunately, following lawsuits that were filed quickly by Harvard and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, then joined by Princeton, Columbia, and
many other universities, this order was rescinded. The new policy had also been
opposed by a coalition of seventeen states and the District of Columbia; these
jurisdictions insisted that the government revert to rules that had been issued in
March and on which the universities and students had already based planning for
the coming year. The earlier edict had given current students in higher education
institutions the flexibility to take classes online for the duration of the Covid-19
pandemic. Apparently, this will now be the case once again.
Nevertheless, the painful nature of the combination of this change in regulations
along with the seriousness of the Covid-19 pandemic and the concomitant need for
students and their universities to proceed with enrollment as the fall semester
approached, could not be gainsaid. When the sudden switch in ICE and SEVIS
regulations happened, international students found themselves confused, forced to
deal with the vagaries of university and college life, especially with a range of
variable and inexact strictures relating to reentry now being made on the fly.
Such dilemmas have led to compelling, but unresolved, discussions for higher
education researchers and for higher education administrators over recent months.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25
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International students constitute roughly six percent of the student body in
American higher education today. They come to these shores from China, India,
South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Vietnam, Germany, Canada, and elsewhere for
both undergraduate and graduate studies. These students bring to their institutions
payments that are at least three to eight times higher than the tuitions paid by
American students.
After the new rules were announced (and before they were rescinded) some US
institutions had already proposed moving foreign nationals to other nearby
compatible academic institutions with on-site courses.
There are two paths to understanding the many complexities of the role of foreign
nationals in the student bodies of contemporary American higher education —
institutional concerns and student concerns. For institutions, there are budgetary
considerations to weigh principally but not exclusively; for students, there are
personal planning and academic concerns. The impact is national.
Just as faculty and staff are being re-geared for online and remote teaching and
learning in the face of the continuing pandemic, they find themselves confronted
with frequent and usually unhelpful surveys, the purpose of which is to determine
the future sustainability of institutions and to measure the impact of foreign
nationals on the support of their programs.
Student concerns, on the other hand, range from the mechanics of transferring to
how to undertake online coursework. Students often report that they are being
shattered physiologically and physically by the anomie being precipitated by these
changes of government, and thus school, policies. Additionally, housing is now
uncertain, food is not always easy to come by, critical medical, dental, nursing, and
science labs are closed, and coursework itself is in question.
Moreover, most foreign students express their own disfavor with the conversions
to online courses, and not just because of language issues. Typical complaints
center on technological inadequacy. Further, almost none of these students indicate
that they have had any input into critical decisions being considered by institutional
administrators as government regulations shift. Efforts by university administrators
to respond to student concerns have been limited and vague.
This bleak situation since the arrival of Covid-19 does not confront the United
States alone. Great Britain expects a three-billion-dollar reduction in revenues and
predicts a two- to three-year disruption of services. Germany has issued through
DAAD (https://ww.daad.de/en/coronavirus) a comprehensive guide to Covid-19
research and international higher education.
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Thus, the financial and service delivery disruptions caused by the virus are
widespread. In part, they flow from unpredictable edicts from the government.
But, additionally, those institutions substantially serving low-income students
already often do so via frequently unreliable technologies; they find that the
changing situation, plus limited student use of technology, impedes the full delivery
of curricula.
In conclusion, the pandemic and its ancillary problems restrict the ability of higher
education to serve national and international students effectively as the new
semester commences.
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Finally, Dr. David Wilkinson, one of the world’s leading scholars of comparative
civilizations, is leading a freshman seminar this fall at the University of California, Los
Angeles, that would surely be of enormous interest to every reader of this journal. Its
purpose is to involve discussion “of a topic of current intellectual importance.”
Now, as readers may know, Dr. Wilkinson is the author of “Sorokin vs. Toynbee on
Civilizations,” in a 1995 work edited by J. Ford, M. Richard and P. Talbutt entitled
Sorokin and Civilization: A Centennial Assessment. So, it is no surprise that his course
is entitled Political Science 19-1: Pitirim Sorokin and Covid-19.
The syllabus begins by observing that in 1942, Pitirim Sorokin published Man and
Society in Calamity. The calamities he discussed were:
•
•
•
•

war,
revolution,
famine, and
pestilence.

Sorokin had personal experience of each: war (World War I); revolution (Russian
Revolution); famine (Soviet famine 1921-1922); and pestilence (typhus in Russia,
Spanish flu in the world).
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Notes Dr. Wilkinson:
In his life, Sorokin was variously a starving peasant orphan, an itinerant icon gilder,
a self-taught bookworm, a political activist, a six-time political prisoner, an
empirical penologist, a quantitative sociologist, a Socialist Revolutionary, a
starving intellectual worker, an involuntary passenger on the Ship of Expelled
Russian Thinkers, a founding comparative civilizationist, a conservative Christian
anarchist, a Tolstoyan believer that “the Kingdom of God is within you,” and an
elected write-in candidate for President of the American Sociological Association.
He continues:
The book Man and Society in Calamity reflects Sorokin’s life experience (the
sections on famine are particularly vivid), his empirical-sociological praxis, and his
Tolstoyan focus on altruistic love as the primary counterstrategy against all
calamity.
In Man and Society in Calamity, Sorokin gave an extremely brief overview of the
artistic, behavioral, cultural, economic, ethical, ideological, political,
psychological, religious, scientific, sociological, and technological consequences
of calamities; and he proposed, again, an extremely brief view of their causes,
remedies, and future.
Covid-19 is, of course, the world’s latest calamity of “pestilence.”
Furthermore, by disrupting supply chains in a globalized world economy, Covid19 also threatens the companion calamity, “famine.” A total of 12,000 people per
day could die from hunger linked to Covid-19 by end of year, potentially more than
the disease, warns Oxfam. This prediction was published on July 9. See:
https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/12000-people-day-could-die-covid-19linked-hunger-end-year-potentially-more-disease
The seminar is shaped as follows:
➢ Week One: Students are to read Calamity, Introduction by Irving Louis
Horowitz (ix-xviii) and Preface by Sorokin (9-10). They are then to post an
essay of 500 words on the question, “Why are you here?”
➢ Week Two: Further reading of Calamity, Part One: The Influence of Calamities
Upon Our Mind. Special attention is to be paid to “Pestilence” (21-2, 30, 45),
while deducing from the general propositions their application to pestilence.
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The students are next asked whether the theories of Sorokin match or mismatch
their personal experiences, including those that are indirect (via conversation or
media review). He inquires: “Would you be inclined to endorse, amend, or replace
Sorokin’s theory of ‘the influence of calamities upon our mind’?”
➢ Week Three: The reading moves on to Part Two: The Influence of Calamities
Upon Our Behavior and Vital Processes.
➢ Week Four: Next, it is Part Three: The Influence of Calamities Upon Social
Mobility and Organization.
➢ Week Five: Students read and write about Chapter IX, Two General Effects of
Calamity Upon Sociocultural Life, and Chapter XV, Dynamics of Ideology in
Calamity.
➢ Week Six: Next, it is Chapter XIII, The Influence of Calamities Upon Science
and Technology, and Chapter XIV, The Influence of Calamities Upon the Fine
Arts.
➢ Week Seven is devoted to reading and discussing Chapter X. How Calamities
Affect the Religious and Ethical Life of Society; Chapter XI, Calamities and
Ethico-religious Processes; and Chapter XII, Sinners and Saints in Calamity.
➢ Week Eight involves reading and written analysis of both Chapter XVI, Causes
of Calamities, and Chapter XVII, The Way Out of Calamity.
➢ Week Nine calls upon students to read and write a discussion of Chapter XVIII,
A Glance into the Future.
➢ For the final session, Week Ten, students are to reconsider Sorokin’s theory of
pestilence, explicit and implicit, through the entire book. What (if anything)
survives unscathed by history? What needs amendment? What needs replacing,
and by what?
Dr. Wilkinson notes that students in their posts are to pursue the following possible
lines of commentary: Request further information; Request clarification; Offer
opinions; Describe comparable experience; Suggest crossroad of another’s posts; and
Suggest outside reading.
He further adds, “Other lines of comment will no doubt come to mind as you proceed
to read one another’s posts.”
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In his syllabus Professor Wilkinson lists the following additional works by Sorokin,
first those of general interest:
Hunger as a Factor in Human Affairs. Petrograd: Kolos, 1922 (in Russian; suppressed
by state censorship). English translation, University of Florida, 1975.
Sociology of Revolution. Philadelphia, 1925.
Social Mobility. New York: Harper, 1927.
Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York 1928.
Social and Cultural Dynamics. A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth,
Ethics, Law and Social Relationships. 4 vols. Volume 1, Fluctuation of Forms Of Art
(Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, Music, Literature, and Criticism);Volume 2,
Fluctuation of Systems of Truth, Ethics, And Law; Volume 3, Fluctuation of Social
Relationships, War, And Revolution; and Volume 4, Basic Problems, Principles, And
Methods. American Book Company, 1938-1941.
The Crisis of Our Age. New York, 1942.
Sociocultural Causality, Time, Space. Duke Univ. Press, 1943.
Russia and the United States. Dutton, 1944.
Society, Culture and Personality. New York, 1947.
The Reconstruction of Humanity. Boston: Beacon, 1948.
Social Philosophies in an Age of Crisis. Boston, 1950.
Altruistic Love: A Study of American “Good Neighbors”: and Christian Saints. Boston:
Beacon, 1950.
Leaves from a Russian Diary, and Thirty Years After. Boston: Beacon, 1950.
The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors and Techniques of Moral
Transformation. Boston: Beacon, 1954.
Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences. Chicago: Regnery, 1956.
Social and Cultural Dynamics: Revised and abridged in one volume by the author.
Boston: Porter Sargent, 1957.
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A Long Journey: The Autobiography of Pitirim A. Sorokin. New Haven, Conn.: College
and University Press, 1963.
Then, he offers students a way to read more Sorokin online. It is at:
https://www.questia.com/library/sociology-and-anthropology/sociologists-andanthropologists/pitirim-sorokin
Next, for pestilence, in general, as a factor in human affairs, he recommends:
Charles Creighton. History of Epidemics in England. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1891, 1894.
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42686
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/43671
Finally, for a look at Conservative Anarchism, he lists:
Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is Within You.
Leo Tolstoy, The Gospel in Brief.
Petr Kropotkin. Mutual Aid.
Albert Jay Nock. Our Enemy the State.
Paul Eltzbacher. Anarchism. (Chapters on Godwin, Proudhon, Tucker, Kropotkin and
Tolstoy)
My conclusion: How lucky can students be to take such a course!!
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Pestilence and Other Calamities in Civilizational Theory:
Sorokin, McNeill, Diamond, and Beyond
Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov
vlad_ai@yahoo.com
Everybody knows that pestilences have a way of recurring in the world; yet somehow
we find it hard to believe in ones that crash down on our heads from a blue sky. —
Albert Camus
Truth unfolds in time through a communal process. — Carroll Quigley
Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution
inevitable. — John F. Kennedy
Abstract
This paper analyses the phenomenon of pestilence through paradigmatic and
methodological lenses of several outstanding social scholars, including Pitirim A.
Sorokin, William H. McNeill, and Jared M. Diamond. All three thinkers have advanced
original, fundamental, and revolutionary paradigms regarding the profound role which
infectious diseases played, are playing, and will continue to play in world history and
culture. The phenomenon of pestilence is studied in the context of other major
calamities. The relevant historic, as well as contemporary macro-level and long-term
sociocultural research, is reviewed. The author advances a number of original concepts,
as well as makes relevant projections into the future.
Keywords: calamity, “civilized diseases,” disease vector, endemic, epidemic, great
sociocultural systems, great socioeconomic systems, infectious diseases, outbreak,
pandemic, plague, pestilence, revolution, social change, zoonotic diseases
Pestilences Through the Ages
One of the most powerful factors behind the turbulent trajectory of human evolution is
the phenomenon of calamity. It played a colossal role in the evolution (and revolutions)
of world history and culture. Countless lives have been ruthlessly affected and
tragically lost during a perpetual struggle of humanity with calamities. Among the most
devastating calamities are pestilence, wars, revolutions and invasions. These calamities
are magnified by fires, famines, hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions, and environmental disasters.
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As Pitirim A. Sorokin authoritatively demonstrates, calamities exert extremely
powerful effects upon human minds, behavior, social organization, and cultural life.
(Sorokin, 1968).
Among other existential threats, an enormous role is played by pestilences – a
mysterious and much feared phenomenon. Often, they kill more people than even the
deadliest of wars. During the American Civil War (1861-1865), for every soldier who
perished from battle wounds, two died of infectious diseases such as dysentery, measles,
small-pox, and malaria. The 1918 Influenza Pandemic alone slayed 50 million people
worldwide – almost three times more than the 17 million, killed by violence during
WWI.
The roots of infectious diseases go back a long way since they have been here for eons,
even before humanity evolved.
William H. McNeill notes: “An amazing variety of animals suffer from one or another
form of tuberculosis. Indeed, on chemical grounds it is commonly believed that the
bacillus became parasitic when all life was still oceanic” (McNeill, 1976:332).
Unsurprisingly, incurable pestilences have been a part of human history for millennia.
They exerted a powerful impact on virtually every aspect of our lives, influenced
outcomes of battles and wars, subdued proud rulers and ruined empires, formed our
everyday habits and ways, and even dictated cultural trends and fashions.
Caused by draught, famine, cold, and other environmental changes, massive prehistoric
migrations spread them in their wake. Epidemics accelerated further as societies
became settled, more complex, and people started to congregate in ever more densely
populated cities. The ancient Romans, Aztecs, and other empire builders created
networks of paved roads for armies and messengers to move quickly around their
realms. The ancient Egyptians, Chinese, and others introduced elaborate systems of
navigational canals. Lakes, rivers, seas, and later, oceans, became humanity’s first
superhighways.
Spurred by wars, technological advances, and proliferation of international trade,
further massive movements followed, with armies, trade caravans, religious
pilgrimages and crusades, as well as expeditions of “exploration and discovery”
traveling far and wide.
One of the results of these advances has been the emergence of what William H.
McNeill termed “civilized” diseases (McNeill, 1976:106), i.e. mostly incurable, and
therefore mysterious epidemics, which periodically devastated lands and, especially,
towns of ancient and medieval societies. Then, steamships and steam-driven
locomotives announced with their powerful whistles and bells the arrival of an era of
mass transportation.
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Introduction of internal combustion, jet, and electric engines turbocharged the spread
of infectious maladies even further. Now, with the advancement of cars and highways,
commercial aviation and rapid land transit, any infectious disease is just one day away
from anybody on the planet.
Through the ages, pestilences fell, as if from the sky, like bolts of lightning. Known as
The Black Death (1346–1353), the bubonic plague epidemic was just the initial stage
of The Second Plague Pandemic. With mortality rate of up to 70 percent, it exerted a
tremendous toll on countless European towns and villages.
The great Italian writer and Renaissance humanist Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375)
describes horrors caused by the bubonic killer in his beloved city of Florence in the year
1348:
There came a deadly pestilence. …It … showed its first signs in men and women
alike by means of swellings either in the groin or under the armpits, some of which
grew to the size of an ordinary apple and others to the size of an egg (more or less),
and the people called them gavoccioli (buboes).
And from the two parts of the body already mentioned, in very little time, the said
deadly gavoccioli began to spread indiscriminately over every part of the body;
then, after this, the symptoms of the illness changed to black or livid spots appearing
on the arms and thighs, and on every part of the body – sometimes there were large
ones and other times a number of little ones scattered all around.
And just as the gavoccioli were originally, and still are, a very definite indication of
impending death, in like manner these spots came to mean the same thing for
whoever contracted them.” (Mark, 2020)
Following those initial signs, plague victims usually developed an acute fever and
started vomiting blood. Most of them died two to seven days after the initial infection.
(Stanska, 2020:5)
Another vicious killer was cholera, known also as the Blue Death. There were no less
than seven cholera pandemics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Between
1817 and the present there has been no fewer than seven cholera pandemics (Hays,
2005: V-VII). When untreated, the mortality rate of this ruthless malady was about
fifty percent. William H. McNeill testifies:
The speed with which cholera killed was profoundly alarming, since perfectly
healthy people could never feel safe from sudden death when the infection was
anywhere near.
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In addition, the symptoms were particularly horrible: radical dehydration meant that
a victim shrank into a wizened caricature of his former self within a few hours,
while ruptured capillaries discolored the skin, turning it black and blue. The effect
was to make mortality uniquely visible: patterns of bodily decay were exacerbated
and accelerated, as in a time-lapse motion picture, to remind all who saw it of
death’s ugly horror and utter inevitability. (McNeill, 1976:261)
A contemporary scholar adds:
Cholera is a horrible disease. At first, the symptoms produce no more than a
surprised look as the bowels empty without any warning. Then surprise changes to
agony as severe cramping pains begin. Copious quantities of liquid, resembling rice
water, pour through the anus. As the pain intensifies, the only small relief is to draw
oneself into a ball, chin held against the knees; the breath whistles softly between
the teeth.
When death occurs at this stage, the body cannot be unrolled, and the victim has to
be buried in the fetal position. Those who do not die from this first attack suffer a
slow and painful decline. The cheeks become hollow, the body liquids surge more
slowly but still remain beyond control, and the watery stools contain fragments of
the intestinal lining. As the hours pass, the skin darkens, the eyes stare vacantly
without comprehension, and then life ends. (Sherman, 2007:33)
For most of humanity’s difficult story, the true causes of infectious diseases were not
precisely known. The invisible is almost impossible to explain, and, therefore, it
remains in a realm of the unknown or the unproven. Through the ages, God’s
punishment for sins has been invoked, miasma, i.e. foul smells or vapors, have been
blamed, innocent cats and dogs exterminated, and inevitably, disenfranchised groups,
such as the Gypsies, the Jews, the immigrants, and the poor were blamed, forcibly
isolated, expelled, and prosecuted.
The process of discovering true causes of pestilences was gradual, onerous, as well as
dangerous, and until very recently, the answers remained elusive. The first inklings
came only in mid-nineteenth century, during the Third Cholera Pandemic (1839-1856).
In 1854, a London physician named John Snow (1813–1858) proposed that cholera was
disseminated by the way of being located next to an open sewer in Soho. Dr. Snow’s
discovery led to the development of water and waste sanitation systems, first in London,
and then around the world, and he is considered one of the founders of the science of
epidemiology.
It is now common knowledge that most infectious diseases are caused by certain
microorganisms, such as pathogenic bacteria and viruses.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

29

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 83 [2020], No. 83, Art. 25

24

Number 83, Fall 2020

Introduction of optical microscopes during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into
medical research led to establishment of microbiology and bacteriology as scientific
disciplines. Even then, only the largest of the pathogenic microorganisms could be
studied, such as, for example, bacteria.
As to viruses, they are on average 100 times smaller than bacteria, and their discovery,
as well as inauguration of the field of virology, had to wait until the invention of the
electron microscope in 1930s. By mid-20th century a significant number of epidemic
diseases caused by these and other microbes have been tamed, and a few of them
altogether eradicated.
The spread of infectious diseases is at times facilitated by disease vectors, i.e., agents
that carry and transmit infectious pathogens (fleas, ticks, mosquitos, etc.). Zoonotic
diseases are the ones that are transmissible from an animal, often an insect, to a human.
An epidemic is a situation in which a disease affects a large number of people within a
community, population, or region.
When a disease becomes a permanent feature in the given circumstances, it is known
as endemic. An outbreak is a sudden surge of infection, for example, an increase in the
number of endemic cases. If it is not quickly controlled, an outbreak may become an
epidemic. Virgin soil epidemic defines a situation in which the affected population has
not been previously exposed to the disease and, therefore, has no immunological
defenses against it.
Especially devastating are pandemics – epidemics that may spread over multiple
regions, countries, or continents.
Reflection of Pestilences in Literature and Visual Art
Through the centuries, a dramatic struggle with the horrifying multi-headed monster
pestilence continued unabated. Due to their uncanny ability to extract a dreadful toll
on humanity, pestilences found an abundant expression in important religious and
historic sources, as well as in significant works of literature and visual art.
We need go no further than John of Patmos’s (circa 6 CE ~100 CE) final book of the
New Testament entitled the Book of Revelation. It features four supernatural beings
charging forth on white, red, black, and pale horses. (Holy Bible, 1989:175). Those
riders are often seen as symbolizing Pestilence, War, Famine, and Death. According to
the Christian apocalyptic teachings, the Four Horsemen are to set a divine apocalypse
upon the world as harbingers of the Last Judgment. In fact, those awesome figures
make their appearance even earlier, for example, in the Old Testament's Book of
Zechariah (Holy Bible, 1989:585-591) and in the Book of Ezekiel (Holy Bible,
1989:515-552), the roots of which go as far back as the sixth century BCE.
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Plagues have served as an ominous background in classic books by Giovanni Boccaccio
(1313-1375), Geoffrey Chaucer (c. 1340s–1400), Daniel Defoe (1660–1731), Mary
Wollstonecraft Shelley (1797–1851), and Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849).
Tuberculosis made its menacing appearance in major works of Charles Dickens (18121870), Ivan Turgenev (1818-1883), Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881), and Erich Maria
Remarque (1898-1970). Albert Camus (1913-1960) situated his novel The Plague
(1947) in the French Algerian city of Oran in the 1940s, even though it was,
conceivably, based on tragic events of the Sixth Cholera Pandemic (1899-1923).
The same disease hovers in the background of the novel Love in the Time of Cholera
(1985) by the Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez (1927–2014). Since his story
unfolds approximately between 1880 and the early 1930s, it most probably reflects on
either a Fifth Cholera Pandemic (1881-1896) or a Sixth Cholera Pandemic (1899-1923).
Various incurable afflictions reflected, at times right before succumbing to them, such
prominent artists as Titian (c. 1488/90[1]–1576), Pieter Bruegel the Elder (c. 1525–
1530–1569), Paulus Furst of Nuremberg (1608 - 1666), Pavel A. Fedotov (1815-1852),
Arnold Böcklin (1827–1901), Egon Schiele (1890–1918), and Edvard Munch (1863–
1944).
Set in Sweden during the Black Death Epidemic (1346-1353), Ingmar Bergman’s
(1918–2007) classic movie The Seventh Seal is a parable about a medieval knight and
his imagined interaction with a personification of Death. Based on Michael M.
Crichton's (1942–2008) novel (1969) is the eponymic film The Andromeda Strain
(1971), as well as more recent movies Outbreak (1995) and Contagion (2011); these
are just a few examples of Hollywood “science fiction” interpretations of epidemics and
pandemics.
Pestilences as a Double-Edged Sword of Destruction and Change
Pestilences, very often in fatal combination with other calamities, complicate or even
outright disrupt social and cultural activities, trade, business, and other conditions and
circumstances of normal life. Before radically decimating Europe in 1346-1353, the
bubonic plague, in conjunction with Mongol invasions, ravaged medieval China on an
apocalyptic scale. McNeill comments:
The combination of war and pestilence wreaked havoc on China’s population. The
best estimates show a decrease from 123 million about 1200 CE (before the Mongol
invasions began) to a mere 65 million in 1393, a generation after the final expulsion
of the Mongols from China.
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Even Mongol ferocity cannot account for such a drastic decrease. Disease assuredly
played a big part in cutting Chinese numbers in half. The bubonic plague, recurring
after its initial ravages at relatively frequent intervals, just as in Europe, is by all
odds the most likely candidate for such a role. (McNeill, 1976: 163)

In much more extreme cases, infectious diseases lead to a complete downfall of
societies, empires, and civilizations. For example, the transfer of infectious diseases to
the Americas and other regions of the worlds, for example, Oceania, during the socalled Age of Discovery (15-17th centuries), decimated most of the local populations,
often irreversibly so. (McNeill, 1976:199-234; Hays, 2005:297-301)
As late as in the nineteenth century things were not much different, even in the most
advanced industrial countries and even among the powerful, rich, and famous. Queen
Victoria’s husband Prince Albert (1819–1861) died at the age of 42 from what appears
to have been typhoid. The Scottish novelist Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832), the English
Romantic poet John Keats (1795–1821), and the English poet and revolutionary Lord
Byron (1788–1824) all perished from the then untreatable tuberculosis.
It was even worse elsewhere. A shaken British diplomat testified about his experiences
in the Brazilian city of Recife in the year 1856, during the Third Cholera Pandemic
(1839-1856):
The town has had all the appearance of a city of the plague, business is at standstill,
the streets deserted, tar barrels burning in them by day, and penitential processions
by night, which carried the mind back to the middle ages, men and women with
torches, covered with sheets and barefooted, groaning, weeping, praying, chanting,
and scourging; the dead carts galloping to and fro with six or eight bodies, by day
and night. (Hays, 2005: 231)
That is why outbreaks and even some epidemics of infectious diseases have been at
times under-reported, covered up, as well as outright concealed by the authorities. In
his (contemporary but published much later) novel entitled “Death in Venice,” Thomas
Mann (1875–1955) reflects on such a "secret" outbreak, presently known as the Cholera
Epidemic in Naples (1910-1911).
Obsessed with obtaining reliable news about the status and progress of the disease,
he went to the city’s cafés and plowed through all the German newspapers, which
had been missing from the hotel lobby during the past few days. (Hays, 2005:373)
Later research revealed that the true Italian toll in 1911 was about 16,000, and in Naples,
a least 2,600. Due to complicated political and business circumstances (Naples was the
main port of departure for the massive immigration flow at the time), this epidemic
completely “disappeared” from almost all official, medical, and mass media records.
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Multiple levels of government (municipal and royal in Italy) in three countries (Italy
itself, Argentina, and the US) were to different degrees involved in the cover-up. (Hays,
2005:369-375)
Exactly 110 years later, those catastrophic blunders have been repeated in Italy and
elsewhere in the world during the coronavirus Covid-19 pandemic. For example, the
Italian city of Bergamo was affected by coronavirus on a massive scale and became the
country’s epicenter for the disease. For various bureaucratic reasons, the areas that
should have been locked down were not, and that augmented the spread of the virus.
(Castelfranco, 2020)
Another, more benign aspect of the phenomenon of pestilence is that it is a very
powerful factor of social and cultural change. The Black Death (1346–1353) and the
subsequent waves of The Second Plague Pandemic (1346-1844) completely altered the
European social structure, as well as the belief systems of many of those who survived
it. (Mark, 2020). McNeill elucidates:
“… the inadequacy of established ecclesiastical rituals and administrative measures
to cope with the unexampled emergency of plague had pervasively unsettling
effects. In the fourteenth century, many priests and monks died; often their
successors were less well trained and faced more quizzical if not openly antagonistic
flocks. God’s justice seemed difficult to find in the way plague spared some, killed
others; and the regular administration of God’s grace through the sacraments (even
when consecrated priests remained available) was an entirely inadequate
psychological counterpoise to the statistical vagaries of lethal infection and sudden
death. Anti-clericalism was of course not new in Christian Europe; after 1346,
however, it became more open and widespread, and provided one of the elements
contributing to Luther’s later success.” (McNeill, 1976: 184-185)
In addition, it is a well-known fact that in the wake of the Black Death epidemic
European societies witnessed remarkable economic, scientific, and technological
advances, as well as a virtual explosion of inventiveness and entrepreneurship. J.N.
Hays notes:
The new supply-demand situation of labor also encouraged greater efficiency of
production. The pre-Black Death economy had little incentive to save on labor
costs; surplus population made labor cheap. The Black Death – and the continuing
demographic pressure of the ongoing pandemic – coincided with a remarkable
period of technological innovation, which likely was not coincidental. (Hays 2005:
49)
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It was during The Second Plague Pandemic (1346-1844) that the Italian perfume maker
Giovanni Maria Farina (1685–1766) introduced in 1709 his famous Eau de Cologne.
The perfume with sweet yet refreshing and stimulating aroma was concocted according
to a highly guarded formula from the aromatic essences of oranges, lemons, grapefruits,
bergamot, flowers, and lavender. Originally very expensive, it was believed to have the
power to ward off the bubonic nemesis.
An even more tantalizing issue is the relation between the plague and the creative genius
of Isaac Newton (1642 –1726/27). Between April 1665 and January 1666, the city of
London suffered a major epidemic of bubonic plague, which killed about 100,000
people, almost a quarter of London's population, in just eighteen months. The Great
Plague of London (1665-1666) was even described by Daniel Defoe (1660–1731) in a
novel entitled A Journal of the Plague Year (1722). This was the last major outbreak
of the Second Plague Pandemic (1346-1844), by then receding in Europe. With the
University of Cambridge closed because of the epidemic, Newton returned to his home
in rural Lincolnshire between June 1665 and April 1667. During that period, he
developed calculus and realized that white light contained the colors of the spectrum.
Newton also conceived of his famous theory of universal gravitation then. (Hays 2005:
129)
Thus, pestilences, as well as other calamities, while viciously attacking society on a
“physical” or “biological” level, are also capable of exerting profound social and
cultural changes. Moreover, their true significance in history, as well as in social and
cultural life of multiple societies was at times hidden behind euphemistic formulations
convenient for the elites. Gradually, a number of prominent historians and social
scholars began a process of uncovering the true significance and the enormous role of
epidemics and pandemics in human history.
Pitirim A. Sorokin: Apocalypse Explained
Russia is no stranger to calamities and hardship. In fact, some of the greatest Russian
literary works reflect or persistently dwell on various cataclysms. The Russian historian
Nikolay M. Karamzin (1766-1826) lived during the Napoleonic Wars, and the scholar’s
unique library perished together with his apartment during the Fire of Moscow in 1812.
Apparently, the historian’s labors on his 12-volume History of the Russian State were
in no small measure motivated by the forthcoming threat of the Napoleon’s almost
million-strong military juggernaut. (Smirnov, 2014:5-6)
In War and Peace Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) presents nothing less than his own
deterministic philosophy of history using the Napoleonic Wars as a dramatic
background (Tolstoy, 1960:588-625). Yet another type of calamity, revolution,
continues to be an endemic feature of Russian historical and cultural landscape.
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In 1993, Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson published a book on Russia’s fate after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. They started it with the words: “The twentieth century
closes as it began, with revolution in Russia …” (Yergin at al., 1995:3)
Sorokin hails from the historic land of Komi people, located north of the 60th parallel.
The climate conditions of this unforgiving but beautiful region approximate those of
Alaska, northern Canada, and even Greenland. Having been born in a Russian-Komi
family of an impoverished itinerant artist, the precocious youth overcame enormous
obstacles to become Russia’s “second Lomonosov.”
In just a few years after arriving penniless at the age of 18 in Saint-Petersburg, the young
genius became not only a prominent scholar and public figure (sociologist, lawyer,
ethnologist, and journalist), but also literally a “second person” in the Provisional
Government (March-July, 1917) of a gigantic state occupying one sixth of the globe.
(Alalykin-Izvekov, 2017:21)
After the October Revolution of 1917 the already widely known scholar and popular
political leader joined the anti-Bolshevik insurrection. On November 30, 1918, he was
thrown into jail in the Russian far-northern town of Ustyug.
There, he almost drank the bitter cup of a political prisoner sentenced to death. If not
execution, then certain death from typhus awaited him in the overcrowded and
pestilence-infested jail (Sorokin, 1963:141-175). This vicious disease killed millions
during World War I (McNeill, 1976:220) and was particularly fatal during the Russian
Revolution (1917) and the Russian Civil War (1917-1923).
However, even in these harrowing conditions, the scholar soberly contemplated an
omnipresent toll of calamities on humanity. In words worthy of the pen of Nicolas de
Condorcet, he noted: “The revolution, this voracious monster, cannot live without
human blood” (Alalykin-Izvekov, 2017: 40). With yet more ordeals to follow, the
American sociologist Michel P. Richard keenly summarized the scholar’s unique career
by saying: “The amazing thing about Sorokin’s life is that he managed to survive it”
(Sorokin, 1991:V).
The American sociologist and Sorokin biographer Barry Johnston notes: “The scientific
value of the work is that it is a factual, analytically driven theory of catastrophic social
change. …. In it, Sorokin explores how hunger, epidemic and war affect the mind and
lead to regression of social behavior and social organization” (Johnston, 1995:168-169).
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Not surprisingly, Sorokin deeply investigated the phenomena of revolution, hunger,
pestilence, and other calamities in such works as Hunger as a Factor (1922), Sociology
of the Revolution (1925), Modern Historical and Social Philosophies (1950), Social
and Cultural Dynamics (1937-41), Society, Culture, Personality (1947), and
Sociological Theories of Today (1966). Especially significant in this regard was
Sorokin’s classic monograph Man and Society in Calamity (1942).
With his unique talent and panoramic scholarly vision, Sorokin investigated the
phenomenon of pestilence as a complicated occurrence closely connected with other
calamities. He was one of the first social scholars to recognize fully that calamities may
also inspire profound thought, boost creativity, promote inventions and discoveries, and
even evoke in a significant number of people their best qualities. Sorokin reminded us
that some of the greatest achievements of human spirit have been created during times
of change and crisis.
The scholar wrote in his monograph Modern Historical and Social Philosophies (1950):
Even in normal times, cogitation about man’s destiny – on the whence and whither,
the how and why, of a given society – is now and then carried on by at least a few
thinkers or scholars. In times of serious crisis these problems suddenly assume
exceptional importance, theoretical as well as practical; for thinkers as well as for
plain folk. An enormous part of the population finds itself uprooted, ruined,
mutilated, and annihilated by the crisis. People’s routine of life is entirely upset;
their habitual adjustments are broken; and large groups of human beings are turned
into a flotsam of displaced and disadjusted persons. …
This means that in times of crisis one should expect an upsurge of cogitation on and
study of the how and why, the whence and whither, of man, society, and humanity.
Most of the significant “philosophies of history,” most of the “intelligible
interpretations of historical events,” and most of the important generalizations about
sociocultural processes have indeed appeared either in the periods of serious crisis,
catastrophe, and transitional disintegration, or immediately before and after such
periods (Sorokin, Modern Historical and Social Philosophies, 1963:3-4).
Later, Thomas S. Kuhn would agree by saying “… crises are a necessary precondition
for tfhe emergence of novel theories” (Kuhn, 1970:77). Not surprisingly, as to the way
out of pestilences, Sorokin, looked far ahead of his times. A true humanist, he wrote:
… side by side with the biological and medical questions, the problem of alleviation
and elimination of epidemics has its no less important social and cultural aspects.
A wise society, desirous of being free from pestilence, would eliminate not only its
biological roots but also the social causes of epidemics; famine, ignorance,
revolution, and war.
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Such a goal requires a society supremely well integrated in scientific, religious,
moral and social respects. Unfortunately, many societies have been, are and
probably will be lacking in this integration and wisdom. Hence, they have been
paying the penalty of the visitation of pestilence with its death toll and will probably
so continue (Sorokin, 1968: 301).
Thus, by expertly studying the effects of war, revolution, famine and pestilence upon
human minds, behavior, social organization and cultural life, Pitirim A. Sorokin
confidently set forth the foundation for a rigorous scientific study of calamities.
William H. McNeill’s tour de force in Plagues and People.
William H. McNeill was a friend, collaborator and biographer of one of the founders of
the field of the comparative study of civilizations, Arnold J. Toynbee—the man who,
according to Time magazine (circa 1947), “found history Ptolemaic and left it
Copernican.” This significant connection may explain the profound depth and
astounding scope of McNeill’s writings. In his compact, competent and elegantly
written volume Plagues and Peoples (1976), he described a dramatic struggle of humans
with infectious diseases through the ages. The book is highly interdisciplinary, yet
fundamental in character.
McNeill methodically followed the development of what he justifiably called civilized
diseases through eons of time and among peoples of a breathtaking diversity of regions.
The book bursts with insightful observations, original thoughts and profound scholarly
judgments. He suggests, for example, that the Indian castes originated, at least in part,
due to the role of infectious diseases (McNeill, 1976:93-94). Epidemics had a major
impact on the spread of Christianity, as well as on the fall of the Western Roman Empire
(McNeill, 1976:121-123). A subsequent shift of civilization away from the
Mediterranean toward the cooler climes of Northern Europe happened not in small part
due to the death-carrying breadth of epidemics (McNeill, 1976: 127-128).
Following in the footsteps of Sorokin’s earlier observations, McNeill rightfully noted
that epidemic diseases usually arrive amongst other calamities, such as invasions,
uprisings, wars, as well as internal conflicts (McNeill, 1976:118-20).
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One of the book’s most fundamental revelations is a realization of the effects of
cataclysmic epidemiological catastrophes which transpired in the Americas and
elsewhere in the world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries CE. Multiple societies,
empires and civilizations collapsed in a large measure due to a combined onslaught of
Eurasian diseases such as plague, malaria, typhus, smallpox, yellow fever, and measles
(McNeill, 1976:181-182).
According to scholarly estimates, the astounding total of 100 million perished due to
the transfer of then incurable infectious diseases to the Americas by the invading
European colonizers (McNeill, 1976:203). Before McNeill’s groundbreaking book,
these apocalyptic calamities were conveniently obscured by various euphemistic and
“umbrella” terms like The Columbian Exchange (Hays, 2005:79), The Seeds of Change
(Hays, 2005:79) and The Virgin Soil Epidemics (Hays, 2005:X).
So, he shares with us his initial insight:
… as part of my self-education for writing The Rise of the West: A History of the
Human Community, I was reading about the Spanish conquest of Mexico. As
everyone knows, Hernando Cortez, starting off with fewer than six hundred men,
conquered the Aztec empire, whose subjects numbered millions. How could such
a tiny handful prevail? How indeed? All the familiar explanations seemed
inadequate. … A casual remark in one of the accounts of Cortez’s conquest …
suggested an answer to such questions, and my new hypothesis gathered plausibility
and significance as I mulled it over and reflected on its implications afterwards.
For on the night when the Aztecs drove Cortez and his men out of Mexico City,1
killing many of them, an epidemic of smallpox was raging in the city (McNeill,
1976:1-2).
Therefore, systematically building on the foundation laid by Pitirim A. Sorokin,
McNeill continued a thorough, rigorously scientific study of profound and perennial
effects of calamities and pestilences on humanity’s arduous story.

1

The dominant city of the Aztec empire was known as the city-state of Tenochtitlan. Contemporary
Mexico City is essentially located where Tenochtitlan formerly stood. (Author’s note).
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Guns, Germs and Steel by Jared M. Diamond
Covering a span of 13,000 years, Jared M. Diamond’s book Guns, Germs, and Steel:
The Fates of Human Societies reveals the main forces behind the eventful story of
humanity on all inhabited continents and even on distant islands. As it is clear from the
title of the book, he identifies as such three major factors — advanced weapons,
infectious diseases, and cutting-edge technologies.
Initially, he focuses on reasons why Eurasians found themselves in an auspicious
position compared with societies in other regions of the world. For example, there were
mostly Eurasian species of wild plants and animals that proved suitable for
domestication, while other lands had few or even none. The settled agricultural life and
food production based on those domesticates led to the development of dense and
stratified human populations, writing and centralized political organizations.
This domestication of certain animal species (i.e., livestock, beasts of burden and pets)
brought humans into close contact with them, creating favorable conditions for zoonotic
infectious diseases (i.e., transmissible between animals and humans). In chapter eleven,
entitled Lethal Gift of Livestock: The Evolution of Germs, he writes:
The major killers of humanity throughout our recent history — smallpox, flu,
tuberculosis, malaria, plague, measles, and cholera — are infectious diseases that
evolved from diseases of animals, even though most of the microbes responsible for
our own epidemic illnesses are paradoxically now almost confined to humans.
Because diseases have been the biggest killers of people, they have also been
decisive shapers of history. Until World War II, more victims of war died of warborne microbes than of battle wounds. All those military histories glorifying great
generals oversimplify the ego-deflating truth: the winners of past wars were not
always the armies with the best generals and weapons but were often merely those
bearing the nastiest germs to transmit to their enemies. (Diamond, 1997:196-197)
While brilliantly elaborating on the Sorokin’s and McNeill’s insights, Diamond also
points to much needed solutions to the exponentially mounting problems of a
globalizing humanity, for example, the alleviation of deleterious effects of infection
diseases by restoration of the historically evolved natural habitats.
Great Cultural Systems vs “Killer Apps”
The British and American historian Niall C. Ferguson confronts the reader of his recent
book Civilization: The West and the Rest with a seemingly perplexing question.
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How did it happen that within a span of just five centuries, a dozen countries of a
particular civilizational identity gained control of three fifths of mankind and of four
fifths of the world’s economy and wealth? As an answer, the thinker invokes six “Killer
Apps”—Competition, Science, Property, Modern Medicine, Consumerism, and Work
Ethic (Ferguson, 2011:13).
In fact, the idea appears to be not as groundbreaking as it seems. Back in 1947, in his
magnum opus entitled Society, Culture, and Personality (1947), Pitirim A. Sorokin
introduced a notion of the “Great Cultural Systems.” He wrote about a direct correlation
between the universal significance of such systems and their relative lifespans:
When we turn to such systems as a given language, a major religion, notable
philosophical, ethical, juridical, aesthetic, scientific, technological, economic, and
political systems, we find that most of them endure for decades or centuries and that
the greatest of them function for a thousand or more years, fluctuating qualitatively
and quantitatively, but maintaining an uninterrupted existence. … The decisive
factor is the greatness of the system itself. The more universal, the more essential
to the survival and creativeness of humanity the meanings, values, and norms of the
system are, the longer its span of life is likely to be. (Sorokin, 1947 :707-709)
This, of course, means, that while societies themselves may collapse and disappear,
their Great Cultural Systems often continue to exist.
Sorokin’s contemporary Arnold J. Toynbee (both scholars were born in 1889) proposed
the concepts of “Challenge and Response” to explain how civilizations rise and fall. By
“challenge” Toynbee means an unpredictable factor that presents a threat to an
organized group of people. A challenge may arise as a result of many circumstances
— for example, overpopulation, resources depletion, or a climate change. Response is
an action taken by the group to deal with the new situation. According to Toynbee, an
adequate response initiated by the group’s creative elite would ensure its survival and
prosperity (Toynbee, 1947:60-79).
In his book The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), the American mythologist Joseph
J. Campbell suggests a notion of the “Ultimate Boons.” The scholar describes the
concept as follows:
A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural
wonder; fabulous forces are there encountered, and a decisive victory is won; the
hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons
on his fellow man. (Campbell 1949: 23)
The ultimate boon may be a limitless bounty, indestructible life, but also valuable
experience, profound insight or revelation, innovation or discovery, and so forth.
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Upon return from his mythical journey, the hero shares those hard-earned ultimate
boons with his people.
This crucial action usually serves a purpose of saving a society (civilization) from
troubles and ensures its further existence and prosperity.
In the 1960s, the American historian Carroll Quigley developed the concept of
Instrument of Expansion. According to this thinker, those provide civilizations with a
mechanism for dynamism and growth (Quigley, 1979:132-145). For example, for the
Classical civilization, which occupied the shores of the Mediterranean Sea from 950
BCE to 550 CE, the Instrument of Expansion was the institution of slavery (Quigley,
1979:269-270). For the first stage of expansion of Western civilization (970-1270 CE),
the Instrument of Expansion was the institution of feudalism (Quigley, 1979:358); for
the second stage (1440-end of the seventeenth century), it was commercial capitalism,
and so forth (Quigley, 1979:367-369).
Essentially, Jarred M. Diamond’s concepts of Guns, Germs, and Steel (Diamond, 1997)
are an elaboration on the same eternal topic. The scholar writes in his 2003 afterword
to his famous book: “… the themes of GGS seem to me to be not only a driving force
in the ancient world but also a ripe area for study in the modern world” (Diamond,
1997:440).
In a less-well-known quote, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington
elevated his famous concept of the Clash of Civilizations to the level of universal values:
In the greater clash, the global “real clash,” between Civilization and barbarism, the
world’s greatest civilizations, with their rich accomplishments in religion, art,
literature, philosophy, science, technology, morality, and compassion, will … hang
together or hang separately (Huntington, 1997:321).
Altogether, what Pitirim A. Sorokin, Arnold J. Toynbee, Joseph J. Campbell, Carrol
Quigley, Jarred M. Diamond, Samuel P. Huntington, Niall C. Ferguson, as well as many
other scholars have proposed is something rather similar. All those concepts reflect on
real or imaginary insights, systems, concepts, ideas, revelations, instruments, and
vehicles that have a potential capacity to benefit humanity.
However, who exactly did they benefit so far? Apparently, as Ferguson convincingly
demonstrates, not everybody. Some, if not most of those Instruments of Expansion and
Killer Apps have been used in an expansionist, conquering, and/or subjugating mode.
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Yet, is not humanity presently in a desperate need of the new Great Sociocultural
Systems and the new Great Socioeconomic Systems, which would provide it with
advanced tools, instruments, and vehicles of overcoming or, at least, alleviating such
existential threats as pestilences and other calamities? In order to accomplish that, they
ought to be based on the universal values, rights, and human needs of a rapidly
globalizing humanity, not on an outdated set of values, rights, and needs of one or
several elite groups. Reflecting universal aspirations of humankind, those powerful
new systems would encompass insights, discoveries, innovations, and creative
breakthroughs in medicine and public health, science and technology, literature and art,
politics and management, education and philosophy, law and religion in a caliber range
of Greek Philosophy, Roman Law, Renaissance Humanism, Enlightenment Ideas,
European Rationalism, Romanticism, and Russian Classical Literature and Musical Art.
For instance, in the medical and public health fields, those great new systems are needed
in a caliber range of such previous discoveries and innovations as vaccination (1796),
anesthesia (1846), pasteurization (1863), water sanitation and waste disposal systems
(mid-nineteenth century), penicillin (1928), and the like.
One of examples of such new systems appears to be a specific type of gene editing,
known as CRISPR Technology. As the term implies, it can be a powerful tool for
“editing” genomes, which can help to destroy targeted infectious pathogens. In fact,
researchers sometimes turn the pathogenic microorganisms’ reproductive mechanisms
against them. (Doudna, 2020; Vidyasagar, 2018)
Obviously, the problem of epidemics and pandemics can be solved only in conjunction
with the resolution of multiple pressing issues such as overcrowding, social, ethnic, and
racial injustice, lack of resources, development of safe water and sanitation systems,
and equal access to medical care.
The alternatives to speedily devising and urgently implementing solutions based on
universal values, rights, and human needs and new Great Sociocultural and
Socioeconomic Systems may be quite grim. A number of contemporary thinkers even
foresee a collapse of contemporary civilization from such calamities as nuclear war,
diseases, resource depletion, economic decline, ecological crisis, or sociopolitical
disintegration (Tainter, 1988:3).
Case Study: The Coronavirus Pandemic
Being an ultimate expression of the massive “civilized” infectious diseases, pandemics
are occurrences of astounding scale, complexity, and significance.
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The grim roster of these monsters includes at minimum a dozen planet-encompassing
pandemics: two influenza pandemics (1889-1890; 1918-1919), three plague pandemics
(541-747; 1346-1844; 1894-?), and seven cholera pandemics (1817-1824; 1827-1835;
1839-1856; 1863-1875; 1881-1896; 1899-1923; 1961-Present), as well the inexorably
unfolding AIDS pandemic (1981-Present) (Hays, 2005).
Starting in 2019, the world saw yet another pandemic unleashing its terrific force on
human communities, cities and societies around the planet.
Sadly, the onset of the coronavirus Covid-19 was met with a sense of condescending
superiority by some governing elites in the US, as well as in a number of other Western
countries. However, not for long. The pandemic tore through the social, economic and
cultural fabric of Western society, as well as other societies, like a massive, vicious and
prolonged biological warfare attack.
As of the end of June 2020, over ten million cases of COVID-19 had been reported in
more than 188 countries, resulting in more than 500,000 deaths. The United States
experienced the highest death toll so far, accounting for more than a quarter of the global
total. (Hollingsworth, J. et al., 2020)
As we have already seen from the example of the cholera epidemic in Naples (19101911), as well as from the coronavirus pandemic-related human catastrophe in Bergamo
(2020), there is nothing new about the government-level arrogance, ignorance and
incompetency. Pitirim A. Sorokin prophetically wrote in 1959, right before the
impending calamity of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962):
“Thus, the question Quis custodiet ipsos custodes (Who shall guard the guardians?)
acquires a truly fateful importance. … the powerful ruling groups have been rather
poor guardians of peace and moral order in the human universe. A large percentage
of rulers have had either mediocre or low intelligence; many have also suffered from
split personality, compulsive-obsessive complexes, aggressiveness, manias,
paranoia, schizophrenia and other mental disorders. Morally, the ruling groups have
been more criminal than the ruled populations.
No wonder, therefore, that this kind of leader has been unable to secure for mankind
any lasting peace or “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” in the preceding
millennia of human history. (Sorokin, 1959:105-106)
President John F. Kennedy was familiar with Sorokin’s ideas (Sorokin, 2008) and,
apparently, learned from them. Perhaps because of that, the world was saved from a
nuclear annihilation back in 1962. However, not all political leaders are equally
considerate, educated, or have the sense of anticipation, as well as compassion and
empathy for human suffering.
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As a consequence of belated measures and mismanagement, the situation in the United
States quickly turned phantasmagoric, surreal. Far from leading others in the fight
against the new global threat, the country quickly became the world’s epicenter of a
ruthless and highly infectious disease. The social measures of containing pandemic,
such as lockdowns, social distancing, and sanitation, could only go so far.
As to the much-awaited vaccine, according to the American epidemiologist Lawrence
Brilliant, creating a worldwide Covid-19 vaccine program would require a prolonged
and sustained international effort (Sample, 2020: 4). Clearly, this would have to wait
for another country’s leadership.
Meanwhile, the unemployment level rose higher in the first three months of the
pandemic than it did in the two years of the Great Recession (2007-2009). By the end
of June of 2020, about 40 million Americans were unemployed — the largest number
since the unemployment insurance system was created in the 1930s. A rush to jumpstart the nation’s economy without proper safety measures in place caused new spikes
of infections. By the end of June 2020, some state governors were reversing course and
tightening restrictions yet again.
More bad news could be in store as a second wave of infections is looming in the fall.
Despite the official “we are all in the same boat” rhetoric, it was almost immediately
apparent that the pandemic is not the “great equalizer” that transcends all social,
cultural, demographic, and economic boundaries.
As George Orwell (1903-1950) sardonically quipped in his allegorical novella Animal
Farm (1945), “some … are more equal than others.” The pandemic has almost
grotesquely amplified existing social, racial, ethnic and economic disparities. Spurred
by the pandemic, social tensions have ensued. With demonstrations against systemic
racism and police brutality spreading far and wide, the Black Lives Matter movement
has rapidly gained support around the world.
Could it be that the unfolding political processes during the summer of 2020 represent
an initial, moderate stage of an impending revolution (Alalykin-Izvekov, Satkiewicz,
2014) ? That would be a perilous path. As Pitirim A. Sorokin reminded us: “A society
… which has been incapable of carrying through adequate reforms but has thrown itself
into the arms of revolution, has to pay the penalty for its sins by the death of a
considerable proportion of its members” (Sorokin, 1967: 412). Obviously, a revolution
during the pandemic could turn out exponentially more deadly.
So far, it appears that American society is moving forward by the way of reforms.
Sweeping changes are being introduced on all levels of society.
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A number of monuments, memorials, and portraits of controversial historical figures
have been removed, and contentious books and films pulled off the shelves. The
process of re-naming schools, streets and other public places and institutions is gaining
momentum. Outdated designs of flags and other symbols are being changed. Private
business companies are discussing relevant changes in policies. Police reform-related
bills are being considered in the US Congress. Substantial changes in educational,
legal, medical and other fields are obviously underway.
Conclusions
One of the most powerful factors behind the turbulent and eventful trajectory of
humanity’s story is the phenomenon of calamity. It played, is playing, and will continue
to play a significant role in the evolution (and revolutions) of the world’s history and
culture.
Calamities exert extremely powerful effects upon the human mind, behavior, social
organization, and cultural life. They seldom arrive alone, often triggering one another
and multiplying each other’s effects. Besides inflicting an enormous toll on
populations, calamities tend to exacerbate existing social, economic, and cultural
problems. Yet while exposing the inner workings of the social system, calamities
present a society in question with opportunity to regroup and address what needs to be
remedied, thus at times opening the way for new, creative and constructive ideas,
concepts, and developments.
Among other great calamities, a colossal role is being played by pestilences. As
societies became settled and more complex, infectious diseases followed them at every
turn. Through the centuries, a dramatic struggle with this horrifying multi-headed
monster figured prominently in some of the most fundamental sources on history and
religion, as well as in a number of prominent works of literature and art. Only recently
and quite gradually has science and medicine achieved a degree of control over some
of the most dangerous infectious diseases. A number of them have been conquered and
even completely eliminated. In no small degree, this helped to prolong the lifespans of
our contemporaries, in some cases to more than twice the duration of our ancestors’
lives.
However, due to the mysteriousness of their origin and mechanisms of proliferation, as
well as the self-centered attitudes of some of the ruling elites, the true role of infectious
diseases in history remained obscure. Only recently, a number of prominent social
scholars offered a number of groundbreaking ideas, concepts, theories and paradigms
which greatly contributed to a better understanding of the phenomenon of pestilence.
Pitirim A. Sorokin, William H. McNeill, Jared M. Diamond and others advanced
original, fundamental, and revolutionary paradigms.
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These have revealed the true patterns and dynamics of proliferation, the important laws
and regularities, as well as the enormous impact of the infectious diseases, as well as
other calamities on human societies.
Our analysis of multiple calamities, including the latest coronavirus Covid-19
pandemic, clearly demonstrates that efficiently confronting existential threats facing
humanity takes a concerted, prolonged, and sustained international effort, involving
enlightened leadership and adequate funds. It can only be done simultaneously with
solving such pressing global problems as social, racial and ethnic injustice, hunger,
poverty, lack of medicine, sanitation, fresh water and other resources, as well as equal
access to medical care.
All these giant tasks would require devising and implementing a number of new Great
Sociocultural Systems and Great Socioeconomic Systems. The alternatives may be
quite grim, since our contemporary civilization may collapse under a combined pressure
of such calamities as diseases, nuclear war, resource depletion, economic decline,
ecological crisis, or sociopolitical disintegration.
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Abstract
William of Rubruck’s account of journeying to Mongolia (1253-55) remained relatively
elusive in scholarly and popular discourses. A Franciscan friar, his mission helped
tentatively acquaint two (literally/figuratively) distant civilizations, Latin Christendom
and the Mongol Empire. We may assess the extent to which a critical reading of
Rubruck can propel knowledge of a Christian Eastward mission. Rubruck’s account
was found to evince a degree of restraint and cosmopolitan curiosity that not only went
against the grain of Christendom’s exceptionalism and expansionism, but also enabled
the pursuit of a rudimentary inter-civilizational dialogue.
Acknowledgements: I thank colleagues at a recent symposium at the University of
Portsmouth for their insightful questions and comments. Thanks go to Easton and Otley
College for the sanctuary in which to prepare this paper, and to the University of East
Anglia Library for furnishing me with the resources and the peace with which to
conduct the study.
Introduction
To what extent can a critical reading of Rubruck propel knowledge of a Christian
Eastward mission? This is the research question animating work for this paper.
Rubruck journeyed to the Mongol1 Empire2 with companion Bartholomew of Cremona
(Charpentier 1935: 255) between 1253 and 1255. That this Franciscan monk from
Flanders (Frankopan 2015: 165) and his account3 largely eluded scholarly and popular
discourses – that it “slipped almost immediately into relative obscurity” (Campbell
1991: 112) – is regrettable.
1

The Mongols of this epoch have been referred to as the Tartars, but I only use the former term in this
investigation. Note, however, that Frankopan identifies in ‘Tartar’ “a reference to Tartarus – the abyss of
torment in classical mythology” (2015: 163).
2
At the time of Rubruck’s journey, the Mongol Empire contained “most of Asia, from the Manchurian
coast in the east, to Persia, Kiev, and Konya in the west” (Watson 2011: 90-91).
3
The account I use here is Jackson and Morgan’s (1990) translation and edition. I refer to Rubruck’s
account as Rubruck (1990). I took the deliberate decision to use Jackson and Morgan; it is a majestic
contemporary work of translation and scholarship that captures Rubruck’s account of his experiences
with real people, in real places, in a manner that engages contemporary audiences. Meticulous attention
is paid to linguistic and contextual accuracy, and Jackson and Morgan do not shy away from defending
their translation and scholarship against others’ inaccuracies. They discuss, in their copious introduction,
the relative (de)merits of earlier translations, and surpass expectations in justifying their contribution.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25
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Whilst first-person travel narratives did not prevail until the seventeenth century,
Rubruck explored experiential ethnographic and literary modalities4 four centuries
earlier, in the central Middle Ages,5 voicing “keen self-discovery in his sights and
feelings” (Montalbano 2015: 598).
But why the obscurity? Firstly, Rubruck was eclipsed by such ‘celebrity’ explorers as
Marco Polo, after whom the Ovis Poli sheep was named, despite already being
identified and documented by Rubruck (Jackson 2016). Secondly, Rubruck was as
elusive as his manuscript: his only description is his ‘very large size’, and one can only
speculate what ultimately became of him (Jackson and Morgan 1990). Such ambiguity
makes him and his account suitable objects for (re)investigation.
Rubruck was brought to my attention during archival work for a previous publication,
wherein I traced a broader history of exploratory incursions into Central Asia. That
investigation identified a good corpus of work on Marco Polo (Akbari et al 2008;
Bergreen 2007; Hudson 1954; Jacoby 2006; Larner 1999; Latham 1958; Man 2009;
Tucci 1954; Vogel 2013; Wood 2018), but relatively brief reference to Rubruck. Yes,
there is coverage in the literature, and I hope to have employed it accordingly. But it
appears that this character on the stage of early ethnography has, for the most part, been
appearing in the shadows of the backdrop, and on the margins of the play.
Work sought the degree to which a critical (re)reading can propel understanding of a
Christian6 Eastward mission. It found that Rubruck went against the grain of
Christendom’s exceptionalism and expansionism, the doctrine that the heathen
‘otherland’ would be brought within the purview of Christendom – encountered,
civilized, converted – through peace or war. Whilst “dominant cultures of Latin
Christendom valorised the settled, the agrarian and the urban, over the roaming, the
nomadic and the cityless” (Phillips 2016: 81), Rubruck studied the Mongols with an
immersive ethnographic embrace of which today’s field researchers would (and should)
be duly proud.
I identified, in Rubruck, a degree of restraint and cosmopolitan curiosity in
contradistinction to the prevalent universalizing imperatives of conquest and mission.

Campbell notes that Rubruck’s account evinced “a freer sense of the importance and authority of firstperson experience and a new interest in such secular topics as other human cultures” (1991: 9).
5
I join Burns in defining the central Middle Ages as that epoch “from 950 (or 1000) to 1300 (or 1350)
…an essentially frontier experience [wherein]…a suddenly urbanized, dangerously overpopulated,
and…religiously energetic society overpoured its boundaries, transforming the world and the actors
themselves” (1989: 313).
6
I join Jackson in orienting my analysis according to “Latin (Catholic) Christendom, embracing not only
Western Europe and Scandinavia but also the ‘crusader states’ in Syria, Palestine and Greece, together
with Poland, Hungary and the present-day Czech Republic – all those territories, in other words, that
owed obedience to the Roman Church and the pope” (2018: 1).
4
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I argue that the use of such restraint and cosmopolitan curiosity set the context in which
intercivilizational (not international)7 dialogue could be pursued.
Four sections substantiate this. The next situates Rubruck in the historical context of
conquest and mission. Thereafter, Rubruck’s account is critically examined in one
section that identifies his restraint and another that observes his cosmopolitan curiosity.
The paper closes by discussing the civilizational purchase of ‘bridging’ two distant
‘otherlands.’
Setting the Scene: Conquest and Mission
The Franciscans were an order of “penitents, living in total poverty and preaching to
their fellow-men to repent and follow Christ” (Jackson and Morgan 1990: 1).
Journeying beyond the order, they relied on charity to support them (Montalbano 2015:
588).
Rubruck, a Franciscan, was tasked with journeying,8 in 1253, from Acre (Biller 2000:
230) in Palestine9 to the Mongol Empire not only for mission but also for reportage to
King Louis IX of France (hereafter Louis). Louis was an interesting character in the
tale of conquest and mission. So devoted was he to his religion, supporting the
Dominicans and Franciscans, that he pondered abdication, eventually striking balance
between religion and kingship.10

I join Brummett in feeling “leery of the attribution of the ‘national’ to the peoples, cultures, and
narratives of the long early modern era. Who exactly did our traveller authors think they were” (2009:
29)?
8
But Rubruck was not alone. The Dominican Andrew of Longjumeau participated in a Papal embassy to
the Mongols in 1247, alongside Ascelin, Simon of St Quentin, and others (Charpentier 1935: 255). One
year beforehand, the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini (hereafter John) observed, in Karakorum, the
enthronement of Güyük Khan (Rubiés 2009: 52). Biller corroborates this, noting that in 1245, “Innocent
IV commissioned the Franciscan John of Pian di Carpine and the Dominicans Andrew of Longjumeau,
Ascelin of Cremona, and Simon of St Quentin to go on missions to the Great Khan, while Louis IX again
commissioned Andrew in 1248” (2000: 230). Phillips insightfully remarks that whilst John and Rubruck
“were travelling at a time when the terrors of the Mongol attacks on Europe were fresh in their minds
and were describing a society that was alien almost beyond imagining, they nonetheless succeeded in
treating the Mongols with sympathetic understanding” (2016: 6; emphasis added).
9
In 1099, following the First Crusade, a Latin Christian kingdom was established in Palestine, chiefly
by French, Flemish and Norman nobles (Linehan et al 2018a: 5). Resultantly, as Phillips notes, “between
1099 and 1291, European colonists held a position of local dominance in Syria and Palestine in the
crusader states of Antioch, Tripoli, and Jerusalem” (2016: 55). At the time of Rubruck’s departure, Louis
had been in the region on crusade (Jackson 2000: 207). For Kedar, Louis’ “four-year stay in Palestine
was mainly motivated by his hope of taking advantage of the Ayyubid-Mameluke struggle in order to
enlarge the rump kingdom of Acre” (1984: 163).
10
Kedar recalls that Geoffroi of Beaulieu, Louis’ confessor on both of his crusades, documented that
when Louis was in Palestine, he had many Saracens baptised and “transported to France, where they and
their families were provided for as long as they lived” (1984: 163).
7
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This task was one in which he “succeeded in the eyes of most of his contemporaries
[deeming] him worthy of sainthood” (Little 1964: 145-146). Louis maintained, from
1245 onwards, “a consistent policy that sought a peaceful, united Christian community”
(Ibid: 130).
That Louis “was seeking information towards a possible military alliance between
Christendom and the Mongols against Islam” (Phillips 2016: 84) indicates that
Rubruck’s mission was imbued with field intelligence prerogatives.
Indeed, at the time of Rubruck’s journey, Christian mission coincided with the Seventh
Crusade (Campbell 1991: 112). This was an era wherein, to deploy Linklater, “[n]ew
social ideals emphasized the virtue of harnessing violence to religious objectives”
(2016: 115). Latham identifies three elements of what he deems the “institution” of
crusade: “First…the crusade [w]as a martial instrument for righting injustices and
combating evil in the world…Second, the crusade was constituted as an instrument of
ecclesiastical statecraft…Finally, the crusades were constituted in the medieval
imagination as an act of piety, penance, and Christian love” (2011: 237; emphasis
original).
This was also an era, then, wherein Civita Dei, “a potentially universal moral/spiritual
community founded on Christian love” (Ibid: 230), was sought. Achieving this ‘City
of God’ was replete with geopolitical fervor: it required “extending the spatial limits of
the community of Christian believers …by evangelizing and Christianizing the peoples
beyond the pale of the Christian world and… expanding the respublica Christiana
beyond its existing frontiers” (Ibid: 230).
But pursuing Civita Dei – seeking this elusive “vision of an all-embracing Christian
society, the City of God on earth” (Dawson 1953: 88) – involved not only crusade but
living out the vita apostolica, a life “dedicated to the saving of souls through preaching”
(Little 1964: 126). It is exactly such expeditionary evangelism for which Rubruck was
concerned.
The foregoing indicates, then, that the temporal locus of my enquiry is pre-Westphalian.
Rubruck journeyed between civilizations. We are dealing here with different
“meanings of sovereignty…[and] forms of geopolitical social organization that arose
before modern statehood” (Teschke, 1998: 325).
This was an era of civilizational exceptionalism and expansionism. On one hand,
Christendom and the Mongol Empire deemed themselves exceptional in their perceived
divine right to mold the world as they saw fit. Each saw their respective worldview as
yielding universal import and universal salvation. On the other hand, and resultantly,
both evinced an expansionism deriving from such convictions.
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The logic was that politico-religious universalisation, on the part of both Christians and
Mongols, resulted from their self-perceived God-given rights to rule. The risk, here, is
that the Mongols – and their shortly-to-be-discussed ultimatums – will be othered and
ostracised as megalomaniac Lebensraum hunters.
Let me be clear: both civilizations were ardent in their expansionism. Louis’ letter to
Cairo, before he commenced crusade against the Sultanate of Egypt, is just as
inflammatory as the Mongol ultimatum we are about to witness: “Were you to swear to
me by every oath, present yourself to the priests and monks, and obediently carry
candles before me to the crosses [good; otherwise] I will come to you and kill you in
that part of your lands which is dearest to you” (in Kedar 1984: 162).
Indeed, Mongol susceptibility to conquest and mission arose as early as 1206, when
their leader was “strong enough to be recognized [as] Chinggis Khan (‘Universal
ruler’)” (Jackson and Morgan 1990: 11). For Montalbano, Chinggis Khan “induced
political strife throughout Eurasia…[h]is ultimate goal [being] to unify the diverse
tribes and conquered people of Mongolia” (2015: 591-592). His was “an almost
constant programme of conquest” (Frankopan 2015: 159) precipitating “a worldview
that stopped nothing short of global domination” (Ibid: 166).
The Mongols were propelled by a homogenizing dynamic seeking to subsume
constituent particularities within a universal whole. Such universalisation surfaces in
Chapter 36 of Rubruck’s account, noting how Mongol ruler Mangu Chan declared at a
feast: “I have dismissed my brothers and have sent them to court danger among foreign
peoples: now it will emerge how you will act when I wish to send you out for the
extension of our state” (Rubruck 1990: 246; emphasis added).
Thirteen years before Rubruck’s departure for Mongolia, by 1240, the Mongols had
already attacked Kiev (Jackson and Morgan 1990: 14).11 Two years before then, in
1238, Muslim rulers from the Middle East had visited England asking for assistance
against the Mongols. Bishop of Winchester, Peter des Roches, stated: “Let us
allow…[them] to devour one another…When we come upon those of Christ’s enemies
who remain, we shall slaughter them…so that the whole world may be subject to one
catholic church, and there may be one shepherd and one flock” (in Ibid: 15).12

Biller notes that in December 1240, Kiev was reduced “to 200 houses and piles of human bones which
later travellers (such as John of Pian di Carpine) could still see” (2000: 229).
12
This coheres with Biller’s observation that, “[i]n St Albans [chronicler] Matthew Paris wrote under the
year 1238 of Saracen [Muslim] emissaries coming to the kings of England and France, with reports about
the Tartars, adding his famous observation on herring prices in Yarmouth, which were driven down
because Frisian and Baltic merchants, terrified by the Tartar threat, had not turned up” (2000: 228-229).
11
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It was in 1241 that the battles of Liegnitz and Mohi witnessed the Mongols defeat
Hungary, Poland and their German allies (Phillips 2016: 42-43; see also Jackson 2018:
1). Liegnitz witnessed the defeat and death of Polish Duke Henry II of Silesia (Jackson
2000: 206), whose head was “paraded on the end of a lance, together with nine sacks
filled with ‘the ears of the dead’” (Frankopan 2015: 163).
By July 1241, Mongol raiding units had reached Neustadt by Vienna, and it was only
the death of Khan Ogotai that led them to withdraw from these western reaches (Biller
2000: 229). In fact, Frankopan deems that occasion one on which Europe was “saved
by a stroke of great fortune…This was not the moment to be chasing troublesome
monarchs through the Balkans. It was time to be at home, watching the [succession]
situation unfurl. And with that, the Mongols took their foot off the throat of Christian
Europe” (2015: 164).
Although the Mongols never fully incorporated Poland and Hungary (Jackson 2000:
206), the turmoil prompted Pope Gregory to sanction crusade against the Mongols
(Jackson and Morgan 1990: 17) and caused Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen to
appeal, inter alia, to Henry III of England “for aid to resist their [the Mongols’]
expected advance into western Europe” (Phillips 2016: 43).
It is in this context that the Mongols were othered in the western civilizational
imagination as barbarians: as people lacking civilization in the sense of (a) environment:
grounded, emplaced, urbane civilization and (b) collective psyche: a ‘civilized’ societal
habitus. The Mongols could “readily be identified with…the image of the barbarian…
distinguished by such features as his lack of an ordered urban or rural existence, his
inability to manufacture and to employ the material artefacts of more advanced
civilizations, and by the absence of a sophisticated spoken and written literary culture…
Barbarism…was particularly ascribed by the members of settled civilizations to
neighbors whose way of life was conspicuously different from the accepted norms.
When the ‘barbarian’ was not simply someone of a different culture but was also
perceived as a threat, the idea became a very emotive one” (Ibid: 49-50; emphasis
added).13
Indeed, the Mongols were the “most familiar” barbarians to thirteenth-century Europe
(Jones 1971: 398), feared to be the dreaded Biblical peoples of Gog and Magog “who,
according to the Book of Revelation, would overrun the civilised world at the end of
time” (Jackson 2000: 209). Gog and Magog were, according to myth, quarantined by
Alexander from civilization behind “stout walls of iron or brass traditionally located in
the Caucasus at the passes of Dariel or Derbend” (Ibid: 399).
For Jones, the “classical criticism of the barbarian…often equated him with the dumb brute…the
retarded, disoriented, irrational infancy of mankind, before man had begun to achieve better things for
himself through his submission to law and the exercise of reason” (1971: 397).
13
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Such popular medieval equations of the Mongols with these heralds of doom were of
politico-religious benefit, serving “not only to identify the various historical challengers
of civilization but also [give] hope for the eventual triumph of Christian civilization
over the forces of Antichrist…satisf[ying] European curiosity about an astonishing and
frightening people…and reassur[ing] medieval man that they occupied a place in the
Christian plan of salvation” (Ibid: 400).
By the time the Mongols withdrew from Eastern Europe in 1242, Pope Innocent IV
despatched three embassies to them, one of Franciscans and two of Dominicans. Such
fusion of cooperation/conflict should not be shocking: Kedar notes that “[i]t fell to Pope
Innocent IV, the erstwhile canon lawyer Sinibaldo dei Fieschi, to formulate the linkage
between Christian warfare and infidel conversion that would become normative” (1984:
159). This linkage embodied the “notion of warfare waged to force open the way for
missionaries” (Ibid: 161).
From this perspective, crusade warfare was the violent force that ‘laid the table’ for
subsequent attempts to win unbelievers’ hearts and minds. It is in this context that
Rubruck was sent not only to preach but to gather field intelligence for dissemination
to Louis.
Rubruck was thus caught amidst centrifugal geopolitical forces pushing out from
Christendom and the Mongol Empire, and towards if not into one another. There was
a ‘clash of civilizations’, to use Huntington’s clichéd but apt lexicon (2002). Both
sought exception and expansion.
Rubruck’s task was to permeate the otherland and capture the people and places that
embodied the Mongols’ outward ‘push’. Rubruck noted that the Mongols “believe the
whole world is longing to make peace with them” (1990: 173).
No better evidence of this ‘push’ is found than the Mongol ultimatum, which gave its
recipient two choices: submit to the Mongols (‘making peace’) or risk invasion and
prepare for war. The logic was bipolar: the world had been bestowed on the Mongols
“by the Eternal Heaven (Tenggeri), and all other rulers – whether they recognized the
fact or not – were their subjects. Pliant submission…was consequently mere recognition
of a duty” (Jackson and Morgan 1990: 25).14
Christendom’s response was that Mongol conversion “would either follow or (even
better) precede any successful agreement” between the civilizations (Rubiés 2009: 95).
Note Frankopan’s finding that “[t]he Mongols cultivated such fears carefully, for the reality was that
Genghis Khan used violence selectively and deliberately. The sack of one city was calculated to
encourage others to submit peacefully and quickly; theatrically gruesome deaths were used to persuade
other rulers that it was better to negotiate than to offer resistance…Peaceful submission was rewarded;
resistance was punished brutally” (2015: 160).
14
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Christendom’s propensity for such logic becomes more comprehensible, from a
pragmatic angle, when one considers the Mongol ultimatum that Rubruck relayed to
Louis in Chapter 36:15
“In Heaven there is only one eternal God; on earth there is only one lord…From the
moment they hear my order [to submit to the Mongol Empire] and understand it,
but place no credence in it and wish to make war against us, you will hear and see
that though they have eyes they shall be without sight; and when they would hold
anything they shall have no hands; and when they would walk they shall have no
feet” (1990: 248).
Striking is how the rhetoric here is similar to Louis’ above. Both Christendom and the
Mongols were rhetorically crusading in the sense that they were giving (potential)
adversaries two options: submit and come within my jurisdictional purview, or prepare
for war. I do not claim that Rubruck stimulated Rubiés’ ‘successful agreement’, or that
he overcame such exceptionalism and expansionism. What I do claim, however, is that
his account goes against the grain of such universalization and set the context in which
intercivilizational dialogue could be pursued.
Work for this paper observed restraint in his dealings with the Mongols and
cosmopolitan curiosity surrounding the politico-religious culture in which he found
himself. As Khanmohamadi puts it, Rubruck “adapts to his environment in ways that
he probably never imagined he would” (2008: 112). Rubruck’s ethnographic immersion
in the otherland enabled him to have “bridged” Christendom and the Mongols, weaving
one tentative thread of east/west convergence (Montalbano 2015: 590). His embrace of
the otherland afforded one of “the first important ethnographies of the East written in
medieval Europe, preceding Marco Polo by decades” (Rubiés 2009: 96).
And to deem Rubruck’s narrative an ethnography is neither exaggeration nor academic
folly: within his account are “records [of] having actually met and conversed with – and
feared, and quarrelled with, and warmed to – individuals” (Jackson 1987: 92; emphasis
added).
But before we proceed any further, caveats are due. In narrowing my sights on
Rubruck’s diplomatic traits – his restraint, his attentiveness to others and the otherland,
I am consciously avoiding the trap of deeming him a diplomat per se.
Seven chapters beforehand, Rubruck paints a violent portrait of Mongol sentiment: “Mangu had a very
strong bow made…His instructions to the [Mongol] whom he was to send…were as follows: ‘You will
go to the king of the French…and you will present him with these things…If he wants peace with us, we
shall conquer on the one hand from the Saracens the territory as far as his, and we grant him on the other
the remaining land to the west. If not, you will bring back to us the bow and arrows, and tell him that
with bows like this we shoot far and hit hard” (Rubruck 1990: 185-186).
15
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That he was not party to a formal embassy, he indeed confirmed in a sermon in
Constantinople (Watson 2011: 93). Scholars have lamented (a) omissions of Rubruck’s
religious work and (b) inaccurate portraits of him as an ambassador (Jackson 1987: 95).
One might forget, for instance, Rubruck’s chief objective of attending and proselytizing
in the camp of Mongol prince Sartaq, rumoured Christian (Jackson 2016: 273). One
might also forget Rubruck’s intention to bring “spiritual comfort” to a group of
Germans enslaved by the Mongols during the latter’s invasion of Hungary in 1241-1242
(Ibid: 273).
Such obfuscations are not my intention. I will resist the tendency “to portray these
journeys mutually exclusively, as either diplomatic or evangelistic” (Ho 2012: 947). I
heed Ho’s injunction to avoid old “missionary vs diplomat” debates (Ibid: 948). It is
worth reaffirming that Rubruck bore “a letter16 of introduction from the French king, in
which Louis asked that he be allowed to stay and preach the Gospel” (Jackson and
Morgan 1990: 43). As I began this paper, so too I close this section: Rubruck was
despatched by Louis – a pious politicker, to both spread the Word and to record, for
conquest and crusade purposes, his observations of an otherland that had, by the time
of his departure, already curried intrigue and fear.
Self-Restraint
Work for this paper identified deliberate restraint in Rubruck’s account. This bolstered
him against Mongol iterations of superiority and hostility. Whilst restraint surfaces in
his coverage of such incivilities as drinking, plight and extortion, they are most palpable
in his discretely geopolitico-religious dealings. I will address each in turn.
Concerning drinking, Rubruck draws incivility distinctions between Mongol incivility
and Christian presuppositions of civility. Crucially, he avoided universalising Christian
ethics and imposing them on the otherland. He observes, for instance, that when the
Mongols “want to challenge someone to drink, they seize him by the ears, tugging them
vigorously to make him open his gullet, and clap and dance in front of him” (1990: 77).
This remains a discretely ethnographic observation, rather than an iteration of disgust
or ethical opposition.
In Chapter 28, he recounts being offered alcohol at the Imperial court. His reply was
diplomatic: “‘My lord…we are not men who look to drink to fulfil their desire: we shall
be satisfied with whatever you please” (Ibid: 179). There is a sense of courtesy here:
Rubruck neither wished to offend his hosts, nor indulge in vice.
16

Such a document bears resemblance to the letters issued by local bishops affirming their approval of
friars’ missions, “which would have added to the crusade preacher’s authority and safety” (Maier 1994:
104). Maier identifies evidence of such affirmations a decade before Louis’ letter to Rubruck, in August
1243, when “Bishop Henry of Constance issued a safe conduct for Franciscan crusade preachers against
the Mongols” (Ibid: 104).
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He was mindful of the need to adapt to the customs of the otherland, but equally
cognisant to his Franciscan prerogatives.
In the following chapter, he recalls the chief wife’s visit to the court, whose participation
in a drinking ritual again receives ethnographic treatment rather than ethical judgement:
“[D]rink was brought – rice ale, red wine…and comos. The lady held the full cup…and
on her knees asked for a blessing. The priests all chanted17 in a loud voice, while she
drained the cup. My colleague and I were also obliged to sing at another juncture when
she wanted to drink…The lady was by [the end of her visit] drunk, and climbed into her
cart, to the chanting and wailing of the priests, and went on her way” (Ibid: 191).
Rubruck observes affinity, here, between religious practice (priests’ chanting) and
Imperial drinking. Implicit is a sanctity: the chief wife received ‘a blessing’ as she
‘drained’ her cup. Not only did the host priests chant as she drank; Rubruck was
‘obliged’ to ‘sing’. This places Rubruck in an ethical quandary. On one hand, he must
comply with the norms of a hostile host. On the other, he must fulfil his (literal/
figurative) mission of spreading the Word. Either way, restraint was adopted as a means
of balancing these priorities; it was a form of insurance policy that facilitated
concomitant proximity to, and distance from, the Mongols.
In relation to plight, Rubruck observes but does not politicize suffering. He notes in
Chapter 5 that “slaves fill their bellies with dirty water, and with that rest content” (Ibid:
84). There is a sense of compassion here. Slaves are portrayed as resigned to the notion
that their circumstances are sufficient. In Chapter 13, Rubruck links plight to the
wildness and wilderness of Mongolia’s environment: “We travelled on for three days
without encountering human beings. We, and the oxen, likewise, were thoroughly
exhausted…When on the fourth day we finally came across some people, we rejoiced
like shipwrecked men coming into harbor” (Ibid: 110; emphasis added).
Human/animal distinctions blur; the explorers are equated with their vehicles: both are
worn out. The environment is cast as a hostile, barren void from which human life itself
is absent. Three days of isolation ‘shipwrecked’ Rubruck and his troupe; such a notion
implies the likelihood of death in the otherland without rescue.
Similarly, in Chapter 22 he notes: “There is no counting the times we were famished,
thirsty, frozen and exhausted” (Ibid: 141).

17

This is not the only occasion on which priests were observed to officiate in drinking ceremonies. Later,
Rubruck recounts how he was “in the residence of [a] young princess…and she gave the priests a good
deal to drink…[T]he priests made a great howling as they chanted in their drunkenness: a state not viewed
there with disapproval either in a man or a woman” (Ibid: 196).
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In Chapter 29 he ponders the ultimate sacrifice: “[T]here are so many starving people
who are not provided with food, and the instant they saw us preparing a meal they would
crowd in upon us and we had to share it with them. It was there that I experienced what
a martyrdom it is, when destitute, to give bountifully” (Ibid: 188).
The foregoing imagery of wilderness, destitution and solitude in the otherland should
be understood in the context of medieval preoccupations with ars bene moriendi, the
art of dying. Etiquette governing ‘good death’ followed Christian pro- and
prescriptions surrounding certain actions during death (Lahtinen and Korpiola 2017).
Rubruck faced spiritual as well as existential peril. Put bluntly, he was “lucky to come
out alive” (Rubiés 2009: 96). The duration, climatic hostility and environmental risks
of the journey were such that “the friars’ mere survival seems a success in itself” (Ho
2012: 948). Rubruck demonstrated humility and discipline in the face of such risk. He
avoided taking umbrage at the otherland in which he found himself.
Concerning extortion, Rubruck recalls in Chapter 9 how, on acquaintance with the
Mongols, “they began brazenly to demand some of our rations…Having drunk one
flagon of wine, they demanded another, claiming that a man does not enter a house on
one foot. We gave it to them, saying by way of apology that we did not have much”
(Ibid: 97; emphasis added). In the same chapter, he observes how the Mongols “laid
wondering and covetous eyes on everything they could see on our attendants – knives,
gloves, purses and belts. I refused on the pretext that we had a long way still to go and
ought not to divest ourselves so soon of the items we needed to complete such a journey.
At this they said I was an impostor” (Ibid: 98).
One chapter later, Rubruck recalls how an interpreter, working for Mongol commander
Scacatai, “demanded some of our food, which we gave him. He also asked for some
garment or other…We made our excuses. He enquired what we were taking for his
master. We took a flagon of wine and filled a jar with biscuit and a dish with apples
and other fruit. He was disgruntled that we were not taking some valuable cloth.
Nevertheless, in fear and diffidence, this was how we entered” (Ibid: 100; emphasis
added).
In Chapter 16, Rubruck recounts how, “anticipating their [the Mongols’] greed I had
removed…the Bible…and other volumes to which I was more attached. But my lady
the Queen’s psalter I had not dared remove, as it had attracted too much attention by
reason of the gold illuminations it contained” (Ibid: 120). These reflections offer
valuable insights into Rubruck’s restraint in the face of material demands. Whilst he
gave wine, he was left with no choice other than to deny greater provisions. For already
“[o]n the outward journey…Rubruck found himself quickly stripped of most of his
valuables by acquisitive members of the Mongol camps he encountered” (Watson 2011:
91).
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Rather than framing these circumstances within the context of Mongol hostility, he
exercised relative discipline by arguing – truthfully – that the length of his onward
journey necessitated those goods. When Scacatai’s interpreter was ‘disgruntled’ at
Rubruck’s provision of wine, biscuit and fruit, he entered in ‘fear and diffidence’,
anticipating hostility. And whilst Rubruck removed the Bible from his person given his
perception of the others’ ‘greed’, he ‘had not dared’ alter the location of his Psalter due
to the Mongols’ interest in its gold illuminations. Rubruck’s discipline manifests itself
as a tempered adaptation to the otherland. He neither ‘submitted’ nor sought to impose
his beliefs on the people and places in which he was a guest.
But Rubruck’s restraint is most evident in his politico-religious dealings. Work found
that Chapter 28 contained the richest evidence. There, he recalls being questioned why
he journeyed to Mongolia:
“I would reply: … ‘the King of the French sent by us a sealed letter… I tell you
that he has never done you any injury. If he had done you any, so that you were
obliged to wage war on him and his people, he himself, as a man of justice, would
be willing on his own accord to make amends and to seek peace’… They were
amazed and kept repeating constantly: ‘Why have you come, seeing that you did
not come to make peace?’” (Ibid: 172; emphasis added)
The interrogators were ‘amazed’, I argue, at Rubruck’s restraint. The earlier
universalising logic – logic of exceptionalism and expansionism applied by both
Christendom and the Mongols – was cast as bipolar(izing) in consigning the other as
either ‘with’ or ‘against’ the collective self. Christendom was either ‘with’ or ‘against’
the Mongols, and vice versa.
Rubruck’s response to the interrogators, however, goes against the grain of
universalization. He neither cast Christendom as ‘pliantly submissive’ nor ready for
war. He confirmed royal authority to travel and affirmed that Louis had never hurt the
Mongols, and that peace would have been sought had this been the case. Such tact is
disciplined in both (a) complying with Rubruck’s Franciscan prerogative – avoiding
contravention of Christendom’s politico-religious objectives – and (b) avoiding harm
done to the otherland in which he is a guest.
In the same chapter, Rubruck recalls being questioned about France, namely “whether
it contained many sheep, cattle and horses – as if they were due to move in and take it
all over…I had to exercise great self-control in order to conceal my indignation and
fury, and I replied: ‘It contains many fine things, which you will see for yourselves if
you happen to go there’” (Ibid: 180; emphasis added). The tone indicates Rubruck’s
concomitant grievance at Mongol insensitivity and self-discipline, acknowledging the
fragility of his own otherness abroad.
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Another interrogation, in Chapter 33, narrowly avoids bloodshed. Rubruck recalls
being asked “numerous questions about the Pope and the king of the French, and about
the routes by which they were reached. But [a] monk overheard this and…warned me
not to answer [the interrogator], on the grounds that he was seeking to get himself sent
as the ambassador. Consequently, I held my tongue…He made some insulting
remark…to me, for which the Nestorian18 priests wanted to denounce him, and he would
have been either executed or beaten to a pulp; but I would not have it” (Rubruck 1990:
227-228; emphasis added).
Two italicizations indicate Rubruck’s restraint in this instance of an aspiring
ambassador seeking intelligence on Christendom. On one hand, he maintained silence
under questioning, out of loyalty not only to Louis and Christendom, but also the host
who counselled caution. On the other, he prevented the host priests from executing or
beating ‘to a pulp’ the would-be ambassador after the latter insulted Rubruck.
Discipline was used to avoid harm not only to Christendom and France, but also the
Mongol whose insolence would have cost him his life.
That is not the only occasion on which Rubruck mediated with his hosts. Revisiting
Chapter 28, Rubruck recalls the Nestorians asking if he would follow their customs or
his own. His reply was bold: “‘We are priests, dedicated to the service of God…We
have come a long way. First, with your permission, we shall sing praises to God, Who
has safely brought us this far from so great a distance; and after that we shall do as your
master wishes, provided we are given no order which is contrary to the worship and
honour of God” (Ibid: 177).
Here, Rubruck conditionally agrees to participate in Nestorian practices, with the
condition being that no order is given that contradicts Rubruck’s perception of holiness.
Palpable is his avoidance of value universalization. He did not exceptionalize Latin
Christian protocols. He accepted his own otherness abroad, and with the Nestorians’
permission proceeded to worship God in the Franciscan way. Rubruck shall do as the
Nestorians wish, so long as he is not ordered to contravene his doctrines.

18

The Nestorians, an Eastern Christian community, had established themselves in Mongolia by the eighth
century, but remained unfamiliar to the West until the Fifth Crusade (1218-1221) (Montalbano 2015:
591). The Nestorians belonged to that group of “Oriental Christians – Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians,
Jacobites and other churches considered ‘heretical’” by Latin Christendom” (Rubiés 2016a: xiii-xiv).
The Nestorians were “declared heretical at the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon but established
themselves in Mesopotamia and Persia. Nestorius of Constantinople had himself studied at Antioch but
his teachings on the nature of Christ and the Virgin Mary were nevertheless declared heretical at the
council of Ephesus in 431” (Goody 2015: 285). Such observations illuminate the deeper chasms within
Christianity in the medieval period. Rome was but one of five patriarchal sees: “the other four, reflecting
the eastern Mediterranean origins of Christianity itself, were located in the eastern Roman Empire, in
Constantinople…and in Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria” (Linehan et al 2018a: 3).
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Rubruck situates himself ‘between’ west/east, seeking common ground between both
domains’ priesthoods, and disciplining himself in such a way as to be willing to practice
in Nestorian fashion, conditional on not contravening Franciscan custom. Considering
the Nestorians were deemed heretical (Ho 2012: 949), this is no small feat.
Work for this section identified restraint and discipline in Rubruck’s account. Not only
did he control himself in the face of perceived Mongol incivility. Not only did he
demonstrate tact – giving wine, expressing ‘fear and diffidence’, safeguarding his Bible
whilst ‘daring not’ remove his Psalter – in the face of extortion. Rubruck’s restraint was
most evident in his politico-religious dealings. He controlled himself to the extent he
permitted the possibility of Latin-Nestorian collaborative practice, on the condition he
did nothing to jeopardise his Franciscan duty. These manifestations of discipline set
the context in which intercivilizational dialogue could be pursued between
(literally/figuratively) distant civilizations.
If it is true, as Tolan suggests, that “denigration of the other is the back side of Christian
universalism…[which] crystalized…in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries” (2002: 283;
emphasis added), Rubruck conducted himself contra universalism, seeking common
ground on which relatively hostile actors could tentatively converge. Pursuing common
ground involved attuning himself to the needs and mores of the Other, alongside
acknowledging his own otherness abroad.
Attunement denotes here an open mindset, receptive to alterity and mindful of one’s
own alterity beyond frontiers. To be attuned is to be cosmopolitan and curious. It is to
demonstrate attentiveness to the ‘others’ around oneself, and to be inclined towards
reflecting on one’s own otherness in the world. It is to such attunement that the paper
now turns.
Cosmopolitan Curiosity
It was Montalbano who questioned how one’s “entry into a new physical space oblige[s]
an individual to re-evaluate his or her cultural assumptions” (2015: 606) in a world of
multiple particularities.
By crossing the frontier of homeland/otherland, and entering a new space – new for the
traveller, and in this instance relatively new for the origin civilization – one’s
presuppositions are thrown in stark relief; they are illuminated in contradistinction to
the new environment, the new surroundings in which one is a guest, the new
presuppositions of otherland.
Cosmopolitan curiosity is about such reflection and re-evaluation in ‘other’ spaces that
are not one’s homeland. It involves engagement with, and attentiveness to, otherness:
both others’ and one’s own.
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Rubruck’s is an account of such attunement: he navigates Mongol particularities,
making sense of them and their distinctiveness. He avoids quarantining the Mongols
in the realm of the barbaric alien. He is aware that he may be deemed by the Mongols
the barbaric and alien other, his earlier ‘fear and diffidence’ indicating the figurative
thinness and frailty of the ice upon which he was treading.
Rubruck’s ethnography, then, “is filled with his gazes upon Mongols” (Khanmohamadi
2008: 90). In each of his encounters, “we find the subject-viewer of the scene, William,
represented as an object within the frame of description…[making] his own subjectivity
and emotions part of the message, locating himself as an inextricable part of the scene
he is setting” (Ibid: 101). His was an attempt “to understand…rather than criticize their
[the Mongols’] culture and society” (Montalbano 2015: 600; emphasis added).
Work found that such attentiveness to the otherland, such cosmopolitan curiosity,
manifests itself most palpably in the otherworldly imagery used in Rubruck’s account.
Whilst I am not aware of otherworldliness receiving discrete coverage in the extant
Rubruck corpus, the use of such imagery should not be entirely surprising: for Rubiés,
“[i]f the opposition between barbarism and civilization constituted a powerful paradigm
for explaining cultural differences, geography and ‘climate’ – both associated with
astrological influences and distinct national ‘temperaments’ – offered an important
alternative” (2016a: xxxv; emphasis added).
And Jackson attributes “the meagre harvest of… mission” not only to the physical
distance between Christendom and the Mongols, the dearth of missionaries, and
language obstacles, “but also to the universe the Mongols themselves inhabited and in
particular to their preoccupations in matters of religion, nature and magic” (2018: 5).
There is a sense, then, that spiritual and environmental otherworldliness – captured in
the Mongols’ world and worldview – was itself a hindrance to Rubruck’s Franciscan
prerogatives.
Imagery contains figurative capital with which otherness is illuminated in
contradistinction to selfhood. Otherworldly imagery helps delineate the competing
‘we’ feelings of Christendom and the Mongols, but Rubruck avoids barbarising the
‘other’ civilization.
As early as Chapter 1, he notes how “I really felt as if I were entering some other world”
(1990: 71). Rubiés identifies this statement as “a qualified experience of otherness”
(2009: 95). And Montalbano cites this statement in substantiating Rubruck’s use of
“metaphysical language, suggesting the inefficacy of words to describe his
surroundings” (2015: 599).
The fact Rubruck’s available lexicon could only go so far in describing the otherland is
crucial: his worldview, his homeland, hinged on Christendom.
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The chasm between homeland/otherland was so vast that language could only do so
much. In experiencing the feeling of ‘entering some other world’, Rubruck becomes
the object of his own ethnography, at one and the same time author and protagonist in
a narrative wherein he is the other in someone else’s homeland. “Sometimes,” as
Khanmohamadi observes, Rubruck “is simply at a loss for words” (2008: 100).
Nowhere is otherworldliness more evident than in Rubruck’s coverage of the
(human/natural) environment in which he finds himself. In Chapter 35, soothsayers are
said to “disturb the atmosphere with their incantations, and when the cold is so
severe…that they can find no means of relief, they hunt out people in the camp whom
they accuse of bringing on the cold; and these are put to death without delay” (Ibid:
244; emphasis added). Two italicisations denote otherworldliness. Firstly, the
atmosphere is ‘disturbed’ – deliberately altered for the worse – by soothsayers with
ungodly powers. Secondly, environmental peril is an outcome, in the Mongols’ eyes,
of people ‘bringing on’ climatic ills. Human beings are cast as conduits of evil.
Importantly, Rubruck does not question the moral and theological presuppositions
causing the soothsayers to see that bringers of the cold are ‘put to death without delay’.
Neither does he question the theological and moral probity of the soothsayers per se.
He records his observations, disciplining himself in terms of the extent—or even
presence—of normative opposition. The otherworld forms a rhetorical locus of his
enquiry; the attention he pays to it exemplifies his attentiveness to otherness. He
demonstrates a curiosity for the world beyond his Franciscan horizons, casting the
otherworld as firmly of another civilization, without barbarising the other.
As with soothsayers and ‘bringers of the cold’, so too spirits and winds. Rubruck notes,
in Chapter 8, that when a prominent member of society falls ill, “guards are stationed
at a distance around the camp and allow nobody to pass within those limits, since they
are afraid an evil spirit or wind may come in with those who enter” (1990: 96). Evident
here is a form of environmental malevolence: the spiritualization of the environment.
Such an ‘evil’ environment is a life-taking rather than life-giving rhetorical
phenomenon (see Weaver 2018: 7), embodying evil, a force Christians trace to original
sin. Evil ‘comes in with those who enter’; entrants are outsiders whose trust is
contingent on Imperial acceptance. ‘Others’ hailing from beyond boundaries bring (or
may be tailgated by) malign extra-jurisdictional forces. By deploying guardspersons
and cordoning the ill from the otherworldly, the Mongols conduct bordering19 practices
that control ingress/egress and protect their homeland.
Bordering is a concept widely used in critical political geography to denote the act of “separat[ing] and
bring[ing] together. Borders allow certain expressions of identity and memory to exist while blocking
others” (Paasi in Johnson et al 2011: 62). Bordering is evident in Rubruck’s assessment of the threshold
taboo, a prohibition on touching the Mongol equivalent of a front doorframe. This offence was punishable
by death (Rubruck 1990: 117).
19
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Such evil is associated with demonic forces. In Chapter 27 Rubruck recalls, when
traversing the Tarbaghatai range (Watson 2011: 98), his guide asking him “to recite
some auspicious phrase that would put demons to flight, since along this pass it was
usual for demons suddenly to carry men off… Sometimes they would seize the horse,
leaving the rider behind, and at others they would pull out a man’s innards and leave
the corpse on the horse” (Ibid: 166; emphasis added).
Rubruck observes the guide linking human mortality to non-human risk. Rather than
dismissing or barbarizing his guide, Rubruck complies, chanting the Credo in unum
Deum, and noting that “by the grace of God we passed through unharmed” (Ibid: 166).
Rubruck became ‘other’. ‘Other’ attuned himself to host, orienting his conduct to the
norms and mores of Montalbano’s (2015) ‘new physical space’, the otherland.
Rubruck’s was “the role of protecting the small group [his travelling party] from the
supernatural; his usefulness within Mongol society was thereby confirmed, and his
status as a holy man with power akin to that of a Mongol shaman was established”
(Watson 2011: 98).
Finally, consideration should be paid to Rubruck’s observation of Mongol ritual, which
is also replete with otherworldly imagery. The ritual that struck a chord, during work
for this paper, was one that appears to sanctify the classical elements (earth, air, fire,
water). In Chapter 2, Rubruck notes that during Mongol celebrations, “the steward
leaves the dwelling with a goblet and some drink, and sprinkles it three times towards
the south, genuflecting each time, in honour of fire; next towards the east, in honour of
the air; next towards the west, in honour of water; and some is thrown towards the north
for the sake of the dead” (1990: 75-76); the latter can be profitably associated with the
earth.
Rubruck’s treatment of those elements situates the Mongols in a temporal-civilizational
(pre-Christian) hinterland that is (literally/figuratively) distant from Christendom. But
his observation of this ritual is objective and avoids value-loaded moral or theological
critique. He avoids barbarizing the Mongols.
This section gauged, in Rubruck’s account, a cosmopolitan curiosity for the otherland.

Whilst my next investigation will trace the origins of the threshold taboo and cast it as one historical birth
of geopolitics – namely a stimulus of the inside/outside delineation – let us content ourselves in here
observing Rubruck’s objective observation of this phenomenon. He reports, in Chapter 15, how “we
were given a stern warning to be careful not to touch the threshold” (Ibid: 117). In Chapter 29, Rubruck
recounts how, on exiting the ruler Mangu Chan’s residence and bowing to Chan, his colleague “stumbled
over the threshold… [and] the men keeping watch…laid hold of my colleague and made him halt so that
he could not follow us: someone was called and ordered to escort him to Bulgai, the chief secretary at
court, who condemns accused persons to death” (Ibid: 194).
The next investigation must identify the reasons for, and presuppositions underpinning, this taboo. It
must, through a historical lens, assess the threshold taboo’s geographical and historical prevalence.
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By this, I mean Rubruck was attentive not only to the ‘other’ but also, crucially, his own
otherness in a realm beyond his homeland. He offered what Watson termed “his ‘gift
of self’” (2011: 90). Otherworldly imagery was observed to temper the way he ‘read’
and ‘wrote’ the (human/natural) environment in which he was guest and observer.
Environmental peril was observed by Rubruck to be associated with evil forces, the
soothsayers ‘putting to death’ bringers of the cold, the demonic forces knocking riders
off their horses.
The Mongols were observed by Rubruck to be situated in a temporal and civilizational
hinterland, with classical elements animating celebratory rituals. The otherland he
observes is one of wildness and wilderness. But nonetheless, Rubruck avoids
barbarizing the ‘other’. He avoids drawing civil/uncivil binaries that delineate the
(un)holy. He avoids quarantining the Mongols in the realm of the alien. The findings
presented in this section cohere with Khanmohamadi’s claim that “William
discovers…not the prescribed aimlessness and unreason of nomadic society, but
precisely the opposite…[going] out of his way to affirm Mongol humanity, eschewing
in all but rare instances the varied discourses of dehumanization available to him in
favor of an affirmation of Mongolian humanity and reason” (2008: 93-94).
Conclusion
“…there has never been an age in which Christianity attained so complete a cultural
expression as in the thirteenth century. Europe has seen no greater Christian hero
than St. Francis…perhaps even no greater Christian ruler than St. Louis”
(Dawson 1953: 183)
Dawson’s is an apt quote with which to close this investigation. Despite existing
differences of opinion, it can be agreed that the central Middle Ages were a time of
exploration, conquest, and pathfinding. Latin Christendom sought to universalise its
Civita Dei, pushing its extant frontiers to the limit. At the same time, the Mongol
Empire evinced equivalent exceptionalism and expansionism, stretching its very
boundaries seemingly ad infinitum, only to turn away from Austria as a result of internal
politicking.
Centrifugal geopolitical forces pushed away from these respective civilizations and –
in very particular instances – into one another. One such instance of frontier
penetration, in this ‘clash of civilizations’, was Rubruck’s passage to Mongolia at the
behest of Louis. It was an unenviable task: preach the Word and collect field
intelligence for dissemination to Louis on return. ‘Crusade and mission’ (Kedar 1984)
went hand in hand.
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Whilst there is a small corpus on Rubruck, it is nowhere near as expansive as its
counterpart on Marco Polo, graced not only with an explorer’s stardom but academic
honor (recall the Ovis Poli). Noting this understudy status on the civilizational stage,
my goal was to seek the extent to which a critical (re)reading of Rubruck could propel
extant understandings of a Christian eastward mission, in an era when “the classical
image of civilized man’s degenerate, deceitful, and deadly antagonist” (Jones 1971:
406) prevailed.
What followed was an acquaintance with a Franciscan friar about whom the academic
and public domains seemingly know little: a man whose report has but bobbed upon the
ocean of history and anthropology, and whose subsequent history following the report’s
dissemination is unknown. The ensuing work exposed an ethnography that was human,
intimate, and replete with personal and experiential learning (Jackson 2016).
Rubruck’s account brought into question such prevalent notions of the barbarian. There
was no indication that Gog and Magog would be breaching Alexander’s walls. Whilst
the Mongols were portrayed as Other, Rubruck also portrays himself as Other: he is
aware of his own otherness, his awkward alterity in a land that hosted him as a guest
and a potential enemy. Rubruck was sandwiched between and within civilizations
pursuing concurrent policies of exceptionalism and expansionism.
Two palpable themes became evident in the analysis: Rubruck’s restraint in the face of
perceived incivility and his cosmopolitan curiosity, defined here as attentiveness to
otherness: both others’ and his own. Rubruck evinced self-discipline by observing but
not ethico-theologically ostracising the Mongols in their circumstances of drinking,
plight and extortion. His narrative is one of self-control in his discretely politicoreligious dealings. In fact, perhaps he was too restrained: after all, he converted only
six persons on his journey (Montalbano 2015: 599). “His is indeed”, for Rubiés, “a
narrative of disappointment” (2009: 109).
Meanwhile, his concomitant attentiveness to otherness yet avoidance of barbarization
was demonstrated in his use of otherworldly imagery. The soothsayers, spirits and
sanctification of classical elements each helped distinguish self/other, but such
distinctions were not weaponised in favour of Latin Christendom and against the
Mongol Empire.
They responsibly delineated homeland/otherland, observing but not rendering alien the
incongruous otherworldliness of nature, magic and spiritualisation. He did not fight
these particularities; he noted them and accommodated them to the extent that his
Franciscan prerogatives were not placed in jeopardy. Think of the Credo in unum Deum
and the Franciscan-Nestorian collaborative practice.
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In the final analysis, the restraint and cosmopolitan curiosity evident in Rubruck’s
account sets a context in which disparate civilizations could be tentatively bridged in a
dialogue of civilizations, to use Lynch’s lexicon (2000). Rubruck took one fractional,
cautious step forwards in intercivilizational history. His was an attempt at “crosscultural comprehension” in an age of crusade and mission (Phillips 2016: 81), a display
of “willingness to attempt some understanding of those diverse peoples and their alien
cultures” (Ibid: 85; emphasis added).
Rubruck’s “great self-extension towards the other” (Khanmohamadi 2008: 89) is as
radical today as it was in the thirteenth century. I just hope that scholars will discover
more about this ethnographer of otherness.
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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the current Iranian regime is no novelty in
Iranian history and political thinking, but has two antecedents: the rule of the Sasanians
in late Antiquity (3rd–7th centuries) and that of the Safavids (16th–18th centuries) in
modern times. After a brief outline of relevant historical events the paper scrutinizes
the common features of these three regimes. The comparison includes the analyses of
foreign policy, its scope, aim and direction, cultural policy and the relevance of political
ideologies, socio-economic policy, religious policy, political structure and mechanisms
of decision-making. The results of the comparison are visualized in a table pointing out
numerous similarities and remarkable common features throughout the centuries.
Keywords: Iran, hierocracy, comparative politics, religion
Introduction
The nature and causes of the Islamic revolution have been the focus of attention of
social scientists for decades, but the answers they have provided for this undoubtedly
complex phenomenon emphasize considerably different aspects. There is an enormous
amount of literature dealing with the subject.
Some deal with the Iranian revolution within the theoretical framework of Islamism and
underline that the Iranian revolution is a manifestation of modern political Islam.1
These writers are interested in what can be fitted into the theoretical framework of
political Islam and pay less attention to the historical and cultural background of Iranian
society.

1

Peter Mandaville: Global Political Islam. Routledge: London: 2007: 179-197; Olivier Roy: The
Failure of Political Islam. I. B. Tauris: London: 1994: 168-183; Olivier Roy: Globalized Islam: The
Search for a New Umma. Columbia University Press: New York: 2004: 83-88; Mohammed Ayoob:
The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. The University of
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor: 2008: 42-63; Tarek Osman: Islamism. A History of Political Islam from
the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Rise of ISIS. Yale University Press: New Haven and London:
2016:189-216.
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Other writings are works of modern historians pointing out Iranian socio-economic
peculiarities in detail, while putting less emphasis on ideological features.2
This essay does not belong to either of these types, since it intends to approach the
problem rather from the global viewpoint of history.
As we will see, the current system is not the only hierocratic form of rule in Iran, but it
has two antecedents during the long history of the Iranian nation. That is why it seems
worthwhile to compare and contrast these systems, and to underline similarities and
differences between them, which in turn will also provide us with the opportunity to
draw more general conclusions.
1. Turning points in Iranian history
A history going back thousands of years could not be told in one article; therefore, I
will highlight only some decisive turning points in Iranian history that will help to
understand the main arguments of this paper.
1.1 Ancient Iran
Pastoralist tribes speaking various dialects of Iranian languages arrived on the Iranian
plateau around 1000 BCE and settled down in Western Iran along the Zagros
Mountains. Tribes which later came to be known as Medes settled close to the eastern
border of the then powerful Assyrians, a military hegemon of the Ancient Near East
which regarded the presence of the Median tribal confederacy both as a military threat
and an opportunity to gain horses which the Assyrian army greatly needed. As a result,
wars were fought with Assyrian victories, but when the Median leaders formed an
alliance with the Babylonians, they were powerful enough to drastically change events.
In a couple of years, the most important Assyrian cities, including the capital, fell into
the hands of the allied forces and the last battle in 610 BCE diminished the Assyrian
state altogether. The territory of the former Assyrian state was divided between the
Medes and the Babylonians, two powerful empires which regarded each other more and
more as rivals, not allies. Open hostilities were abandoned, however, and the next
decades witnessed an equilibrium of forces in the Near East.3

2

Charles Kurzman: The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.:
2005; Nikkie R. Keddie: Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution: Yale University Press: New
Haven: 2003: 214-240; Ervand Abrahamian: Khomeinism. Essays on the Islamic Republic. University
of California Press: Berkeley: 1993; Said Amir Arjomand. After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors.
Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2009. David Menashri: Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran.
Routledge: New York: 2001.
3

For more on these wars see: Amelie Kuhrt: The Persian Empire. Routledge: London: 2009: 19-46.
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This situation came to an end when Kurush (Cyrus), backed by the Persian tribes,
revolted against Astyages, the last king of the Medes, and secured his victory on the
battlefield near Pasargade with the help of the Median aristocracy changing sides.
With the great wars of Cyrus and his son Cambyses (530–522 BCE), the Persian Empire
grew to an unprecedented extent, including territories from Egypt to Afghanistan, and
Pakistan to Bulgaria and Greece. Although Darius I and his son, Xerxes, ultimately lost
the Greek wars, it was by no means a great disaster for the Persians. The real problems
were found within the empire itself: ineffective government, heavy taxation, open
revolts and harem intrigues prevented the Achaemenid Empire from stabilizing itself in
a radically changing environment (the rise of the Macedonians; the secession of Egypt;
and the wars of the governors with each other).
When Alexander sought revenge for Athens, he found a disorganized state which fell
to him within a few years. But Alexander seems to have had no strategy for the future,
or at least was prevented from acting accordingly by his early death, a consequence of
his dissolute lifestyle.
As a result, open hostility broke out between his former commanders to decide
succession, with Seleukos emerging as victor (Ipsos: 301 BCE). This is how the
Seleucids came to power in Iran and the Near East.4
But Seleucid power did not last for long in Iran because they lost more and more
territories to an Eastern Iranian tribal federation, the Parnis. The Parnis settled down in
the north-eastern province of Iran already known during Achaemenian times as
Parthava. They were renamed after it, which is the reason they are called Parthians
today. The Parthians annexed Iran and later also Mesopotamia from the Seleucids and
under strong leadership by kings, such as Mithridates I (171–138 ) and Mithridates II
(123–87), they established an Iranian empire large enough to be a dangerous rival to the
Romans during the coming centuries.
The Parthians restored the Achaemenid Empire without the territories of Egypt, Asia
Minor and Palestine, although they did everything to have access to the Mediterranean
Sea through Syria and Palestine. The Romans, for their part, wanted to prevent the
Parthians from occupying these strategically important territories, both for military
A classic about this period is Albert T. Olmstead’s: History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press: 1948; fine comprehensive surveys are Richard N. Frye’s: The Heritage of
Persia. The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York: 1963: 53-114 and Josef
Wiesehöfer’s: Ancient Persia from 550 BC to 650 AD. I. B. Tauris: London 1996: 5-102; the work of
Muhammad Dandamaev and Vladimir Lukonin: The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989 discusses political, economic and social institutions and
various aspects of cultural life; recently Amelie Kuhrt’s: The Persian Empire. Routledge: London:
2009 covers the topic and the period in the same depth.
4
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reasons and for long distance trade, resulting in unavoidable hostilities. The great
Roman-Parthian wars of the first two centuries CE always started with Roman military
successes but ended with peace treaties confirming the status quo.
When during the first years of the 3rd century CE Caracalla was defeated by the
Parthians, nobody believed this powerful kingdom would soon be destroyed.5
Here history repeated itself: as in the case of the Medians, a regional power not
overthrown by rival states, its sudden end came from within in the form of a revolt,
seemingly unimportant at the beginning but growing very dangerous with the powerful
nobility changing sides.
In the case of the Parthians, Ardashir, a local Persian leader in the remote province of
Pars, revolted against the Parthian king who was engaged in world politics and paid no
attention to his case. But Ardashir’s revolt spread as he won more and more battles
against other local leaders and in the end established himself as the greatest challenge
to the Parthian king. The final battle was won by Ardashir with most of the Parthian
nobility on his side. This is how the Parthian kingdom came to a sudden end and the
Persian Sasanian dynasty started.6
With the coming to power of the Sasanians, the political landscape of Iran changed: the
religion of Zarathustra (Zoroaster) evolved more and more into central position both in
a religious and political sense; a new Zoroastrian church was established, an ecclesiastic
organisation unknown to the Achaemenids and the Parthians.
The Sasanian kings tried to centralise their monarchy, though this effort was hindered
by the joint opposition of the nobility (both Parthian and Persian) and the Zoroastrian
clergy. Foreign policy, however, remained unchanged, and the strategic importance of
the Levant was also acknowledged by the Sasanians, who fought bloody and victorious
wars with the Romans during the 3rd century. The celebrated victories of Shapur I over
the Romans (244; 259–260) correspond at the same time to the shame of the Roman
rulers being captured or killed in the battlefield.
In spite of this, the Sasanians were prevented from occupying Syria and the Levant and
with the death of Shapur I, former Persian victories were transformed into heroic stories
of the glorious past, yet were unable to prevent the Romans to retaliating for their losses.
After decades of warfare the border was established, as in the case of the Parthians, at
Richard N. Frye’s: The Heritage of Persia. The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New
York: 1963: 124-168 has a balanced view on the role of the Seleucid’s in Iran and the Hellenistic
heritage; for the rule of the Arsacids (Parthians) see Frye: 170-197, Wiesehöfer: Ancient Persia from
550 BC to 650 AD. I. B. Tauris: London: 1996: 115-149 and Klaus Schippmann: Grundzüge der
Parthischen Geschichte. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt: 1980.
6
The story of Ardasir’s coming to power is narrated by a short work full of legends and contradictions
called Kar Namag-i Ardasir (accessible in Middle Persian in H. S. Nyberg’s: Manual of Pahlavi vol. III: Otto Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden: 1974.).
5
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status quo ante. During the long reign of Shapur II (309–379), the Sasanian state
witnessed remarkable stability and prosperity.
But the next decades proved to be very turbulent both in domestic and foreign policy.
The coming of the Huns from the East and the catastrophic foreign policy of Peroz
forced the empire to subjugation by the Huns. Peroz’s son, Kavad, was also unable to
restore law and order and to free Iran from the Huns, while the Mazdakite uprising
against the nobility and feudal system contributed to more chaos.
It was left to Khusrav I (531–579) to secure law and order, gain victory over the Huns,
and re-establish a state on solid ground both politically and economically. Small
wonder that Khusrav was and still is regarded as one of the most talented and celebrated
Persian kings. His son, Ormazd, followed the path of his father but was dethroned and
killed by conspirators from among the nobility who secured the throne for his son,
Khusrav II (590–628). This king opened hostilities with the Byzantines which resulted
in a nearly 25-year war ending in 628 with catastrophic consequences: with no territory
won the empire suffered heavily. It lost a great amount of military forces and labourers,
was ruined economically, and its king was killed in the end by the hands of his own
men.
The next decades bear witness to the agony of the dynasty unable to restore order even
in its own palace, due to constant harem intrigues, a situation very similar to that of the
last decades of the Achaemenids. To press similarities further: with Yazdagerd III, the
last Sasanian king, we have a tragic historical figure similar to Darius III: both kings
had to face a powerful enemy with a disintegrated, ruined empire. Just as Darius III
lost to Alexander, so did Yazdagerd III to the Arab-Muslim army.7
1.2 The coming of Islam to Iran
The demise of the Sasanians was perhaps the most important turning point in Iranian
history: not only a dynasty disappeared, but Iran as a hegemonic power in the Middle
East and a sovereign state ceased to exist.

For the Sasanian political history books of reference are Richard N. Frye’s: The Heritage of Persia.
The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York: 1963: 198-222 and Klaus Schippmann’s:
Grundzüge der Geschichte des sasanidischen Reiches. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt:
1990. Josef Wiesehöfer’s: Ancient Persia from 550 BC to 650 AD. I. B. Tauris: London: 1996: 151-221
and Touraj Daryaee’s: Sasanian Empire:The Rise and Fall of an Empire. I. B. Tauris: New York: 2009
discuss in addition to political history also social and economic institutions, religions, the arts and
sciences. A classic on Sasanian economic history remains Franz Altheim – Ruth Stiehl’s: Ein
Asiatischer Staat. Limes Verlag: Wiesbaden: 1954; on social history: Ahmad Tafazzoli: Sasanian
Society. Bibliotheca Persica Press: New York: 2000. A new theory was developed about the fall of the
Sasanians by Parvaneh Pourshariati: Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire. The Sasanian-Parthian
Confederacy and the Arab Conquest of Iran. I. B. Tauris: New York: 2017.
7
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What is more, the native Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, lost ground against Islam
which became dominant within three centuries as more and more individuals and
communities embraced Islam.8
As a result, Iran lost its former status and became one region of many in the Umayyad
Caliphate. After 750, with the Abbasids on the rise, the importance of Iranian cultural
heritage grew, symbolised by the new capital, Baghdad, where Iranian influence was
heavily felt, most notably in the state administration.9
When the power of the caliphate was in a steady decline during the next centuries, we
can witness the secession of the periphery, among them Iranian territories, from the
Caliphate. This is the reason why local dynasties such as the Samanids (East Iran), the
Saffarids (South Iran), the Buyids or Buvayhids (West Iran) managed to establish semiindependent states which remained within the boundaries of the Caliphate and
acknowledged the caliph as their supreme lord.
Things changed drastically when the Saljuqids, a confederacy of nomadic tribes of
Turkish origin who entered Iran in the first half of the 11th century, captured Baghdad
and devastated the Byzantine emperor’s army in the battle of Manzikert (1071), a
victory of importance for the next centuries.10 The Saljuqids established their own reign
in Iran, converted to Islam but failed to unite the country effectively, although a member
of the local gentry, Nizam al-mulk (1017–1092), a genius in public administration, did
everything to form an effective government. The last ruler, Sanjar’s death (1157) in
East Iran marked the end of the dynasty and the beginning of a new power vacuum.11
This power vacuum was brutally filled by the invading Mongols who entered East Iran
at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and their conquest was only stopped by the
Mamluks in 1260 in Syria. Since the ruling dynasties’ power was split according to the
territories in their control (e.g. the Golden Horde, the Mongol dynasty in China), the
Mongols remaining in Iran formed the Ilkhanid dynasty.

8

For the spread of Islam in Iran and the various political and religious resistance against it see Patricia
Crone: The Nativist Prophets and Early Islamic Iran. Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2012.
9
For the Abbasids and their administration see Ira M. Lapidus: A History of Islamic Societies.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2014: 74-85; a classic study of the first Islamic centuries
remains that of Michael Morony: Iraq after the Muslim Conquest. Princeton University Press:
Princeton: 1984.
10
For the political history of these turbulent centuries see Bertold Spuler: Iran in früh-Islamischer Zeit.
Politik, Kultur, Verwaltung, und Öffentliches Leben Zwischen der Arabischen und der Seldschukischen
Eroberung 633 bis 1055. Franz Steiner Verlag: Wiesbaden: 1952:69-111.
11
A detailed overview about the political development during the reign of the Seljuqids is provided by
C. E. Bosworth: The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World AD 1000-1217. In: The
Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 5: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1968:1-202.
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Established by a grandson of Genghis Khan, Hülegü (1218–1265), this dynasty
remained in power for less than a century, with Iran falling into a power vacuum again
upon Arpa Khan’s death (1336).
The Mongol invasion brought devastation and horror at the beginning but there was
also some cultural flourishing at its end. It was Ghazan Khan (1295–1304) who did the
most to create a unified and prosperous state from a devastated country by instituting
martial rule, stopping plunder and other forms of devastation, and establishing a state
administration with the help of Iranian collaborators. His reforms did not last long,
however, and Iran became disunited again after a few decades of his descendants’
unfortunate rule.12
The next unified Iranian government was established only in 1501 with the Safavids
coming to power. In the interlude Iran or, properly speaking, some parts of Iran, were
governed for shorter or longer periods by Timur and his successors, the Timurids
(1370–1506) in the east and the south,13 the Qara Qoyunlus (1380–1468) and the Aq
Qoyunlus (1378–1508), Turkish nomadic tribal confederations, in the west and the
north.14
The rising of the Safavids was, therefore, an important turning point, marking the end
of the period of fragmentation and the birth of a central government. The changes
brought about by the Safavids were more complex than this. The Safavids were
originally masters of a Sufi order founded by Safi al-Din, a highly respected figure
among his contemporaries who lived in Ardabil during the last decades of Mongol rule
in Iran. The Safavid order evolved over the next century into an influential and
powerful Sufi brotherhood with no direct political aspirations.
When, however, Shaykh Junayd changed policy in the middle of the 15th century, the
Safavids entered Anatolian politics, made an alliance with the Aq Qoyunlus and even
participated in local wars where Junayd and later his son and successor, Haydar, lost
their lives. The Safavids were backed by many Anatolian Turkmen tribal warriors, the
Qizilbash who formed the main basis of their army.
With their help the very young Isma’il, the leader of the order, became victorious in
these local tribal rivalries and was crowned Iranian king in 1501.
12

Svat Soucek: A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2000: 103-122; John
Andrew Boyle: Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans. In: The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol.
5: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1968: 303-421; for the information of the eyewitness
historiographer of the Mongol period see Rashid al-Din: The Successors of Genghis Khan (Translated
from the Persian by John Andrew Boyle). Columbia University Press: New York: 1971.
13
Beatrice Manz: Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran. Cambridge University Press:
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Shah Isma’il, as he was known from this time on, declared Shi’ism as the state religion,
causing indignation among the Sunni majority of Iran.
After the successful conquest of modern-day Iran and some parts of Iraq and
Afghanistan, the encounter with the Ottomans – who regarded the Safavids with good
reason a powerful rival – was inevitable. The battle of Chaldiran (1514) showed the
military supremacy of the Ottomans and ruined the myth of Isma’il’s invincibility;
therefore, the treaty of Amasya in 1555 was concluded in favour of the Ottomans.
Safavids were, by contrast, more successful in the eastern frontier where Shah Tahmasb
(1524–1576) defeated the invading Uzbeks and annexed some territories in the east
around Qandahar.15
Securing thus both the western and the eastern frontiers, a new Iranian state emerged
governed by a former Sufi brotherhood of Turkish origin. But the new regime was
more and more Iranicized as local experts were needed to run an effective government.
When the capital was later moved from Tabriz to Isfahan, this change was expressed
symbolically, too.
The Qizilbash Turkmen warriors, however, did not welcome these changes and tried to
regain their former leading positions, even threatening the royal power of the kings.
With the liquidation of the Qizilbash leaders, Shah cAbbas I put an end to this power
struggle and secured absolute power for the kings.
With Shah cAbbas the Great, we have the most capable Safavid king on the Iranian
throne, one who effectively strengthened royal power against nomadic influence. He
terminated their political and economic privileges, established a more effective central
government than his predecessors, reformed the army which enabled him to wage wars
with decisive victories, and developed infrastructure by building roads and bridges, thus
contributing to the flourishing of local and long-distance trade. He also had a tolerant
policy toward non-Muslims but was at the same time intolerant against Muslim heretics.
The beautiful city centre of Isfahan as we know it today was also taking shape during
his reign.
Unfortunately for the Safavids no such competent king ever emerged from among Shah
Abbas the Great’s offspring, and the rule of the Safavids started to decline.
Deteriorating economically, militarily and politically, Sultan Husain (1688–1726) was
unable to stop invading Afghan tribesmen who managed to blockade the capital causing
endless suffering for the inhabitants (1722).
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Though the Afghan interlude did not last for long, with the collapse of the Safavids,
Iran remained disunited for the rest of the 18th century because neither Nadir Shah
(1736–1747) in the east nor the much beloved Karim Khan Zand (1751–1779) in the
south-west were able to unite the country.16
1.3. The Modern Period
Only with Agha Mohammed Khan (1789–1797) and the rise of the Qajars (1789–1925)
was there a united Iran again.
The Qajars were no newcomers in Iranian politics: a tribe of Turkoman origin in northeastern Iran, they had close relations with the Safavids, enjoying prominence during
their rule. After the demise of the Safavids, the Qajars contested for power for half a
century with the Zands, which they won in the end. The backwardness of Iran became
manifest during the Qajar rule which was to be seen not only with respect to the
European countries but also to the Ottomans and the Russians.
This is the reason why the Qajars lost all military encounters with the Russians during
the reign of Fath cAli Shah (1797–1834) and lost considerable territories in the
following humiliating peace treaties. Although some efforts of reform were made
during the long reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848–1896), notably by the reforming
minister, Amir Kabir (1848–1852), his assassination marked also the end of any such
policies.
Ineffective governance, harsh rule, corruption, and humiliating concessions granted to
foreigners gave rise to an opposition wanting gradual reforms. These demands included
a constitution which was granted at the end by Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1906, after
some protests and demonstrations. The first Iranian constitution was modelled on the
constitution of Belgium (1831), though political and social circumstances were rather
different in Iran. As a result, the constitution did not bring calm into Iranian domestic
politics, which became more complicated when the First World War broke out.
Though declared neutral, considerable parts of Persia were occupied by the rival powers
(Ottomans, Russians, Britain). No wonder, then, that at the end of the war Qajar rule
was de facto non-existent, which made it possible for Reza Khan, Commander of only
2,500 Cossacks, to enter the capital in 1921. He became Minister of War that year,
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Prime Minister in 1923, and was crowned as king in 1926. He took the name Pahlavi
(a hint to the Sasanian period) and this is how the Pahlavi dynasty was born.17
Modelled on Kemal Atatürk’s reforms, a modernization period began which was
accompanied by westernization and secularization (expansion of the army,
improvement of transport infrastructure, education reforms, new dress code, language
reform, renaming the country from Persia to Iran) which met social opposition headed
by the ‘ulama’, who feared to lose their traditional power (education, vaqfs, courts). As
a result of Reza Shah’s pro-German policy during the 1930s British and Soviet forces
entered Iran in 1941, and the shah abdicated in favour of his son.
Mohammed Reza took effective control only after 1946 when the Azerbaijan crisis was
solved, and the Soviet troops withdrew from Iran. A new crisis soon emerged when
Mohammed Mosaddeq, leader of the National Front, became Prime Minister in 1951,
and decided to nationalize Iranian oil. This made him very popular in the country, but
he was unable to settle all domestic and international problems resulting from this action
(the blockade of the British, large debt).
Mosaddeq was finally removed from office in 1953 with the help of the CIA (Operation:
Ajax) and sentenced to life-long house arrest. Though this action brought the king back
to full control again, it gave rise to enduring nationwide conspiracy theories about
hidden foreign manipulations in Iranian politics. Moreover, the coup made the shah a
close ally of the USA, his position being denounced by the opposition as a puppet of
the Americans (see such caricatures after the revolution).
The king continued the reforms initiated by his father some decades earlier including
more educational reforms, land reform, liberalization, and modernization of the army.
It was put together in a program called the White Revolution in the 1960s. Being a
nationalistic, secular westernization, this program again met the opposition of the
‘ulama’, this time headed by a young cleric, Khomeini, who was expelled from the
country.
The 1970s saw an economic boom fuelled by rising income from the oil industry and
at the same time the controversies over the land reform, which made millions of people
unemployed. It forced them to settle in cities looking for jobs, more often than not in
vain.
17
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Thus, as a result of the reforms, Iranian society became polarised between the very few
rich and a mass of people living in poverty; therefore, dissatisfaction with the regime
grew. Dissenters were silenced with the help of the security agency SAVAK for
decades, but repression failed at the end and revolutionary forces were not to be stopped
even by imposing martial law in 1978.
Since the army was not in full control of the situation the shah fled the country the next
year and made the way free for Khomeini to return.18
2. Iranian hierocracies in history
2.1 Zoroastrianism
The Avesta, the holy book of the original Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, has several
terms to refer to ecclesiastic functions. One of them, ratu, designates a peculiar group
of priests, who were more than priests performing rituals but had to be regarded rather
as spiritual leaders, and whose unquestionable intellectual abilities and social authority
gave them absolute power with respect to the people under their care. Besides religious
leadership this included legal competence as well, since the ratu had the power to
excommunicate those who challenged their leadership.
Therefore, as demonstrated by Philip G. Kreyenbroek, the leadership of a spiritual
authority is deeply rooted in Iranian tradition and goes back millennia (Kreyenbroek
1994, 3-5).19 There seemed to be no fundamental change in the ratu’s competencies
for centuries since in the Sasanian era (224–651 CE): the rad continued to be a spiritual
leader of those under his leadership, and in line with Sasanian politics, he was also the
discretionary judge of sins and crimes committed against religious morality (Jany 2007,
350-352).20 Against this background it is worth considering the political leadership of
spiritual authorities in Iranian history.
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At first sight the Achaemenid period (559–331 BCE) has no place in a discussion on
hierocracy since the rule of the Achaemenids was a secular monarchy with no official
state religion and, therefore, providing considerable religious autonomy to its subject
peoples. Even so we can witness references to the high god Ahura Mazda in the
inscriptions of Persian rulers, but it was a common practice for centuries and fits the
political traditions of the Ancient Near East.
More significant than this is the so-called daiva-inscription of Xerxes (486–465 BCE),
a royal edict which orders the destruction of the temples of false gods and forbids the
cult of demons ( = false gods) as the only sign of religious intolerance in this period.21
While it is unclear against which religion’s practice the order was issued,22 it is evident
that it represents a policy change compared to earlier practice.
The replacement of the secular, agriculture-based Ancient Persian calendar by a fully
Zoroastrian calendar in the second half of the Achaemenid era was another step to
establish a more religion-based political structure,23 but the inscription of Darius I (522–
486 BCE) and its worldview is of primary importance for our present investigation.
In fact, Darius I came to power through a conspiracy followed by an armed revolt which
took Darius almost two years to suppress.24 After his victory, Darius put in writing his
own version of the events in the rock inscription near Behistun, in which the king
presented himself as a representative of law and order and the favourite of the divinity.
This is commonplace in the Near East, but he goes further and condemns his enemies
as men of lies. It is hard to overestimate the significance of this rhetoric because in
Zoroastrianism lying (Old Persian drauga, Avestan druj) is one of the most evil acts
which is attached to the world of Angra Mainyu (Evil Spirit) and his associates like Azi
Dahaka, a fearful dragon who was defeated by the great Iranian hero Thraetaona.

21

The Old Persian text is edited by Roland G. Kent in his: Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon.
American Oriental Society: New Haven: 1953: 151.
22
The interpretation of the inscription is still subject to debate among Iranists as the word daiva
(demon) could refer to various entities unacceptable for the Persian king. It could denote foreign gods
and their cults (Babilonian or even, Greek gods), or the ancient Iranian pantheon the gods of which
were declared demons by Zoroaster in his teaching to highlight the role of the supreme god
Ahuramazda.
23
Muhammad Dandamaev – Vladimir Lukonin: The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989: 290-292.
24
Darius told the story completely different, of course, and his version was accepted also among
Iranists. It was Olmstead who expressed his doubts first and pointed at the contradictions in the
narrative: Albert T. Olmstead: History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press: 1948: 109.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25

84

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

79

In this way the king transferred religious dualism into a concrete political situation
elevating the fight for political power to a cosmic level in which Darius represents law
and order and righteousness while his enemies the forces of destruction symbolised by
the act of lie. In referring to this dualism between the forces of order and destruction
Darius implicitly puts himself into the position of Thraetaona and his enemies to the
role of Azi Dahaka, the embodiment of lie. Since according to the dualistic Iranian
(Zoroastrian) worldview mankind is divided between the righteous (ashavan) and the
liars and the wicked, his inscription fits perfectly into the religious understanding of his
own society.25
Though modern Shi’ism was developed independently from Zoroastrian dogma, the
heritage of age-old Iranian worldview and way of thinking could nevertheless remain
alive in some religious and political affairs. It is probably no accident that Khomeini,
the leader of the Iranian revolution also fought against several “Satans” (such as the
shah and his ally, the United States, together with the Iraqi leader, Saddam Husain),
thus making his political adversaries evil creatures.
And while political opponents all over the world fight each other with rhetorical
weapons, the elevation of their struggle to a cosmic level is not a general tendency. It
was the deeply religious American president, G. W. Bush, who understood the real
message of this rhetoric and answered in his own way with the creation of the Axis of
Evil.26 From this point on, it was not two rival states (Iran and the USA) any more who
oppose each other but two ‘Satans’ struggle against each other and in such a situation
there is no room for compromise.
Small wonder then that after Khomeini’s death, this “satanic” rhetoric was dropped
from the Iranian political discourse to achieve a less confrontational policy towards the
US, and the new American president also put an end to the previous rhetoric.
A more developed example of hierocracy was born in the Sasanian period. Immediately
after his military coup d’état, the new Sasanian king Ardashir (224–240 CE) embarked
on centralisation on a scale never seen before: he eliminated the previously existing
small kingdoms within the empire and established a central administration, which his
successors brought to further perfection throughout the centuries. As a result, districts,
towns and villages came into being as the basic units of administration.
25
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At the same time, the Zoroastrian church established its own institutional system, an
ecclesiastic organization which had not existed previously. Two powerful persons of
the 3rd century, Tansar and Kardir, organised the Zoroastrian clergy into a hierarchical
church which was modelled on the state administration: the church was headed by the
mobedan mobed, the equivalent of the king of kings, followed on the provincial level
by the provincial mobeds, the structure ending with local mobeds in the bottom of the
system.27
Establishing organizational structures went hand in hand with the standardization of the
religious doctrine: Zoroastrian priests narrowed down the competing readings of
Zoroastrian religion, and defined the circle of canonical texts, which was followed by
the codification of the Avesta (although complete standardisation was never achieved).
Religious practices which were irreconcilable with the new doctrine were eliminated
(e.g. the cult of Anahita); this is how a central role was given to the fire cult, an already
existent but not exclusive form of cultic activity.28
All of these had the logical consequence that Zoroastrianism, now redefined, was
elevated to the rank of state religion and, therefore, the Zoroastrian church presented
itself as a powerful political player for centuries. Its influence was further developed
when almost the entire legal functions were transferred into the hands of the Zoroastrian
priesthood: the various dignitaries of the Zoroastrian church were at the same time
judges deciding in civil and criminal cases, interpreting legal norms and the head of the
church, and the chief mobed was the legal advisor to the king ex officio. It comes as
no surprise that the religious law established by the Zoroastrian priesthood was at the
same time the law of the Empire and the fact that not a single royal decree has reached
us can hardly be explained only by archaeological misfortune.29
In this world view, there was hardly any place for followers of other religions, and in
fact, the persecution of the members of other religions began in the first decades of
Sasanian rule, putting an end to the previous tolerant policy.
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The first targets of religious persecutions were the Manicheans, the Jews of Babylonia
suffered less, while the situation of the Iranian Christians depended heavily, but not
exclusively, on the actual state of affairs of foreign policy, Christian Roman and
Byzantine Empires being the rivals of Sasanian Iran.30
The persecution of Christians was achieved by legal means, but these criminal
procedures were in the majority of the cases examples of show trials where almost no
attempt was made to observe even contemporary Zoroastrian criminal law.31
The reign of mobeds was a collective rule, and the powerful mobedan mobed was not a
leader in one person, but the head and representative of the priestly class. There was
strong group cohesion within the Zoroastrian church, a caste-like, closed system since
it could be entered only by birth. The group cohesion protected members who were in
line with the policy of the clergy but eliminated dissenting members as happened with
Mazdak, most probably a Zoroastrian priest whose egalitarian teaching attracted the
underprivileged. The movement was supported by the monarch Kavad at first (495–
531 AD); later, however, when the initially peaceful movement stirred up acts of
violence and brought general chaos upon the country, he changed his policy. The
movement was suppressed by Kavad’s chosen heir to the throne, Khosrav I, in the years
before his ascent to the throne of Iran.32
Political behaviour was determined by religious doctrines and by the interests of the
church while consideration of state interests was either of secondary importance or nonexistent. Some examples prove that rulers opposing the power of mobeds and the
nobility were dethroned, blinded, imprisoned, sometimes even killed by the joint effort
of both the clergy and the nobility (e.g. Kavad (488-496; 498-531), Hormizd IV (579590), Khosrav II (590-628), Ardasir III (630)).
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The queens Buran and Azarmidukht as well as others were in power only for a very
short period of time between 630 and 632, leaving the king as the only figure to
represent the interests of the Iranian state against lobbying interests, with less and less
success as time went on.
This policy did not change even when the decline of the demoralised dynasty and the
attacks of the first Muslim groups brought the state to the brink of collapse.33
The fall of the Iranian state brought about the demise of the Zoroastrian church as well;
therefore, this policy was ineffective and self-destructive for both the nobility and the
priesthood.34
Efforts to strengthen the power of the clergy were also visible in works on political
theory, written by priestly scholars.
One of them, the Letter of Tansar, claims that the heir to the throne was to be elected
from among the sons of the dead ruler by the leading officials of the imperial
administration and the mobedan mobed, but in case of disagreement, it was the mobedan
mobed whose vote decided. Sources prove that this was far from contemporary
political reality and no king left the decision on his heir to any of his officials.
Nevertheless, the demand itself speaks volumes about the ambitions of the clergy.35
Despite both theoretical and practical efforts to decimate the king into a shadow figure,
the Sasanian monarch remained the most important political figure for centuries.
Therefore, we can witness a dual rule of kings and mobeds, best expressed in the socalled twin-theory formulated in the Letter of Tansar. Accordingly, religion and
kingship are twins born of one womb and never to be separated.36 This is not a fully
developed hierocracy like the Caliphate which unites both religious and secular
administration but is closer to the Byzantine model with the emperor and the patriarch
on his side.
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2.2. Islam
After the fall of the Sasanians, there was no independent Iranian state for centuries,
Iranian territories being incorporated into the Islamic Caliphate. Although the
conquering Saljuqids made some efforts to organise an Iranian state with effective
administration, they ultimately failed as did the Mongols and the Timurids.
Only the rule of the Safavids (1501–1736) is worth mentioning in a discussion of Iranian
hierocracy. The state of the Safavids, born in a power vacuum in Iran, was a turning
point because: (1) a central, sovereign Iranian state was established again; (2) political
power was seized by an originally Sufi order of Turkish origin, which embraced Shi’ism
in the long run and, therefore (3) proclaimed Shi’ism as the official religion of the state
in 1501.
Safavid rule represents a more developed form of hierocracy since the head of the
Safavid order was at the same time the Iranian monarch; thus the former dual structure
of the Sasanian state was replaced by a personal union. It is worth emphasizing that the
Iranian state was in fact governed by the head of a religious order, and it was not the
king who joined an order, a tiny but important difference. Even Shah Abbas the Great
(1587–1629) emphasised that he ruled as the leader of the Safavid order although it is
undeniable that whenever the interests of the order and the state were at variance, he
gave priority to the latter.37
What is more, the order sometimes even interfered with the system of succession to the
throne, as happened at the election of Safi I (1629–1642), at the coronation of whom
there was a marked emphasis on following the ceremonial rules of the Safavid order.
Only after Abbas II (1642–1666), that is, in the last decades of Safavid rule, became the
link to the order, an empty formality when the position of the head of the order sunk to
the level of a royal title, but monarchs were still regarded as having supernatural power
in the eyes of society at large.38
The regime formed after the Islamic revolution (1979) provides the third and most
developed model of Iranian hierocracy, which is different from its predecessors in
several aspects.
The most important structural difference is that we cannot find either dualism (between
the state and the church) or personal union (in the head of a religious order and the
state), since the leader of the revolution and the Islamic state (rahbar), that is,
Khomeini, was not head of any religious order.
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This is the most developed form of hierocracy because the leading person of the clergy
(marja’-e taqlid) is at the same time the supreme leader of the state, organs of state
administration being necessarily subordinated to him directly or indirectly.
Overcoming the dual system of the Sasanians the clergy was now victorious over the
state which had no leader of its own of equal standing to the rahbar. This is the reason
why the qualification of the rahbar was originally defined so that it had to be the leader
of the clergy alone who could fill the position.
The qualification of the rahbar was in fact tailored to Khomeini’s person, who indeed
fulfilled all the requirements. After his death, however, no eligible person was to be
found; therefore, the qualifications were modified, thus weakening the theoretical
foundations of the system. 39
With the advent of the Islamic republic, the revolution eliminated the monarchy because
of its alleged anti-Islamic nature, propagated by Khomeini himself, and shaped the
constitution in a way that the head of the clergy could have no rival.40 The president of
the republic is subordinate to the power of the rahbar, and since the Prime Minister was
no more efficient either, the position itself was abolished during a revision of the
constitution.
All of this led to the paralysis of executive power, witnessed time and again in
succeeding decades. Legislation by the Parliament (Majles) is also subordinate to the
power of the clergy as a result of the veto of the Guardian Council, controlled by Shi’a
religious scholars.41
Moreover, the leader of the clergy has been incorporated into the constitution, with his
unique qualities of leadership as the underlying principle of the constitution (velayat-e
faqih). This is more than concentration of power in the hands of one person, codified
in the constitution, since velayat-e faqih is a religious doctrine as well. Therefore, the
velayat-e faqih theory, legitimising the leadership of the rahbar, signifies a legal and a
theological foundation of the system at the same time.42
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Thus both executive and legislative powers are controlled and sometimes paralysed by
the dominant clergy.43
In other words, to uphold dominance and enforce the interests of the clergy takes
priority over the proper functioning of state organs: these are already signs of the selfdestructive policy of the mobeds and the nobility in the Sasanian period.
Similarly, to the rule of the mobeds, the current system also represents a collective rule:
a group-domination by the politically active members of the Shi’a clergy. This does
not include the whole clergy, as there are clerics who turn away from politics and
withdraw into the solitude of madrasas (in the same way as herbeds, the priest-teachers
who did not take part in political activities in the Sasanian era), and there are also
dissenting clerics.
The latter are sometimes more threatened by the oppressive mechanism of the regime
than civilians are, since a separate court has been established for processes against
dissenting clerics, and this court passes sentences of imprisonment and capital
punishment by the hundreds: up to 1990, 286 clerics were convicted, including 14 death
penalties.44
This group, constantly changing in composition, rent with inner conflict and fraught
with faction-battles, is not a ‘party’ or any other institution but a conglomerate of
learned individuals sharing common values, beliefs and interests protected by both the
constitution and its supreme leader. In this respect, it resembles the Sasanian
hierocracy, which also had its own supreme leader but lacked, obviously, any
constitutional support.
Therefore, the person of the leader was of vital importance for both the Sasanian and
the current clergy since it was the leader who protected their common interests against
anybody (including the representative of the Iranian state), guaranteed inner cohesion,
and punished dissenting members. But the position of the two leaders is different in
their respective systems: the leading role of the mobedan mobed was a consequence of
his position in the ecclesiastic hierarchy while that of the marja’-e taqlid is the result of
his position in the scientific hierarchy among the learned and, therefore, learning and
social prestige are the dominant factor in his selecting.
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To achieve the smooth operation of the Sasanian clergy was easier, since a new
administrative leader could be created any time to avoid a leadership vacuum, whereas
it is not easy to find a genuine spiritual leader, which may lead to leadership crises, as
happened after Khomeini’s death in 1989.45
3. Common features
3.1 Foreign policy
In what follows I will explain the common features of the three hierocratic systems
outlined above. For the sake of clarity, I divided them into foreign and domestic issues,
although, evidently, there are interactions between these two fields.
In the field of foreign affairs, the first striking phenomenon is the confrontational,
offensive policy, most of all during the first decades of a given period, predominantly
directed against the West.
The Roman wars of the Sasanians, even though they had antecedents in the Parthian
period, were offensive encounters of this kind, which began to lose their intensity after
the initial successes of Shapur I (241–270 CE), and ended in defeats and territorial
losses at the end of the 3rd century, and resulting in upholding the status quo in the
following century.46
We can find a similar situation in the early Safavid period when the wars against the
Ottomans stopped with the defeat at Chaldiran (1514), establishing the status quo which
changed only to the disadvantage of the Iranians with the loss of Mesopotamia.47
The foreign policy of the current regime directed against the West also began with a
complete change of orientation (the shah being a close ally to the US), hallmarked by
the occupation of the American embassy, and it has been going on until the present day
on the level of both rhetoric and armaments.
None of these three regimes was able to transform initial, rather symbolic victories into
political or territorial advantage in the long run.
•

The Sasanians, it is true, conquered some Roman towns near the border but it
was the most they could achieve and finally had to withdraw.
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The Safavids, too, gained some minor victories over the Ottomans due to their
surprise attacks and enthusiasm at the beginning but were routed in the battle of
Chaldiran.
The current regime also enriched itself with a symbolic victory over the US with
an attack against the American embassy but nothing more was achieved: the
hostage crises ended, and Iran found herself on the defensive against Iraq.

The intensity of these early confrontations is in direct relationship to the ideologicalrhetorical attacks that accompany them. The anti-West onslaughts of Khomeini (the
US as the great Satan) and Ahmadinejad are essentially no different from the inscription
of Shapur I in which the Roman emperor is depicted as a dishonest liar (again!)
attacking his country.48
It is an important question why Iran is so aggressive on the western front and far less
belligerent on the others. I think the reason for this is the fact that Iran always had to
face stronger attacks from the west, both in a military and in an ideological sense, while
she was less vulnerable from other directions.
As mentioned above, during its history Iran had to face strong military competition from
the west which she was unable to overcome (Roman-Byzantine advances, the military
supremacy of the Ottomans, the military predominance of the West).
As far as ideology is concerned, Iran had to face strong ideological and religious
competitions coming from the west against which she had to protect herself. During
the Sasanian period, ideological unity (Zoroastrianism) had to be established against
Hellenistic, post-Hellenistic, and Christian Rome. Similarly, Shi’ism became the
official religion because it markedly separated Iran from the Sunnite-Hanafite
Ottomans. In modern times, the program of re-Islamization against secular
westernisation is in line with the previous policies.
No such attacks were perceived from the east from whence no concurrent ideologies
threatened with victory. Therefore, foreign policy toward the east was no more than
defence against the nomads (Massagetes, Huns, Turks, Mongols, Uzbeks) for two
thousand years. Hinduism did not enter Iran, Buddhism reached only Merv on the
eastern border, and conquering Turkish-Mongol people adopted Iranian culture
(embraced Islam) instead of forcing their own belief on the Iranian population.
Soviet Communism as an ideology was not perceived to be as dangerous as Western
ideas already present in Iran during the Pahlavi regime. No surprise, then, that the
Soviet Union was the lesser evil for Khomeini: Iran shared a common border with the
Soviets but none with the Americans.
48
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This offensive but at the same time self-defensive foreign policy was accompanied by
a cultural policy which emphasized Iranian heritage in general and the Iranian religious
tradition and included the denial and occasionally the demonization of the outside
world. The cultural policy of the Sasanians was strongly built around the first organized
Iranian religious tradition, Zoroastrianism, both in domestic and foreign policy.
Legitimacy, social structure, legal system and cultural life were all in line with
Zoroastrian religious demands as were foreign and religious policy. The latter included
a harsh denial of Christianity (the leading ideology of the West) in the form of both
apologetic writings and prosecution of Iranian Christians.49
Shi’ism, when declared to be the official religion of the Safavids, had a similar function:
it displayed a marked separation from the Ottomans, the rival from the West and from
the less dangerous Southern power, India. Thus, it is religious ideology again which
separates Iran from the other powers. But it had the consequence that Iran became more
and more isolated from both the Muslim societies and the Western world.
It is symptomatic that among Safavid rulers it was only Shah Abbas the Great who was
acquainted with the contemporary trends of international politics and who took some
steps to strengthen his rule with diplomatic efforts among the nations.50 In the modern
period, the anti-Western rhetoric of writer Al-e Ahmad (gharbzadegi:’weststruckness’)51 became one of the most important messages of the Islamic revolution,
reduced to a few brief slogans understandable for all, emphasising the need to forget
about foreign ideas and to return to the genuine Iranian cultural heritage.
The current regime had chosen for the third time in Iranian history to isolate its country
from the world with the help of religious ideas and it is the opposition, quite logically,
which is more receptive to foreign, mainly Western, ideas (democracy, human rights,
etc.).
These rejectionist policies resulted in losing touch with contemporary global trends and
Iran found herself sooner or later in a fight against powers of unequal strength.
Byzantium was stronger than Sasanian Iran in every respect (it was not by accident that
it survived the Sasanians by 800 years), just as the Ottoman state was more modern than
that of the Safavids in all decisive factors.
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The rejectionist policy of the current regime manifests itself in the wilful breach of the
norms and values of the international community (hostage crises, the denial of the
Holocaust) and the effort to build up a coalition with partners which share also an antiWestern political line for whatever reasons (e.g. Venezuela under Chavez). Despite
this there is no doubt about the regional power of Iran when governed by hierocracies:
the Sasanians were such a regional power and what is more, they were the only
dangerous rivals to Rome and Byzantium.
The regional power of the Safavids cannot be questioned either, although they were less
dangerous to the Ottomans than the Sasanians were to the Romans. The regional power
of Iran today cannot be doubted either; nevertheless, their more ambitious plans
certainly raise questions.
A similar continuity may be seen in the efforts to reach the Mediterranean Sea for both
geopolitical and economic advantages.
Already the Parthians fought desperate wars against Rome for the possession of Syria,
which the Sasanians continued in vain for centuries. The Safavids were prevented in
their similar intentions by the loss of Mesopotamia to the Ottomans, and in the modern
period states like Syria and Iraq stand in the way of these ambitions.
It is, of course, no accident that the current Iranian foreign policy is very active in Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon, participating in a complex matrix of regional conflicts in order to
achieve the upper hand and it is again the western powers (most importantly the United
States) which hinder Iran from doing so.
3.2 Domestic policy
Coming to domestic affairs, it is also important to point out that each hierocratic system
seized power by military means. Both the Sasanians and the current regime acquired
supremacy by armed revolts against the previous regimes (Parthians, Pahlavi
government). The Safavids, too, seized power with weapons, although they filled a
power vacuum in Iran rather than revolting against an established power.
A further similarity is that in all three cases the leaders of the new system were believed
to have supernatural powers, and they did not neglect to emphasise this. In his
inscription, Shapur I presented himself and his founding father, Ardashir, as the
descendant of gods, the interpretation of which causes considerable trouble to modern
scholarship but seemingly less to his contemporaries.52
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In a similar vein, Shah Isma’il I saw and represented himself as a kind of a supernatural
being, a claim unconditionally accepted by his followers.53 This is exactly why the
defeat at Chaldiran was a turning point in Safavid history, since it was more than a
military collapse in a battle against the Ottomans: it was the charisma of Isma’il that
was destroyed.
Despite this, later kings also demanded a certain superhuman status, the acceptance of
which was made possible by a religious system built upon a peculiar combination of
Sufism, folk Islam and Shi’ism. The situation was essentially similar in the case of
Khomeini as well. Although he never made claims to a supernatural position, his
followers attributed a charisma to him which made his leadership unquestionable. His
supernatural position was replaced by his standing as marja’-e taqlid, rahbar and the
constitutional superpowers granted him by the Iranian constitution. Moreover, he was
referred to as Imam, a title reserved for the Twelve Imams, a novelty which some clerics
believed was on the edge of blasphemy.54
Outstanding personalities were decisive in the chain of events or, to put it differently:
the establishment of the hierocracies was rather the personal achievement of the leading
figures than the result of a popular uprising or the attempt of the powerful clergy to
achieve dominance.
Sasanian history began with the revolt of Ardashir against his overlord, the Parthian
king, which was no more than a successful attempt to seize power by an overly
ambitious petty local leader which was not backed by the mobeds at that time. What is
more, the establishment of the Zoroastrian church and its incorporation into the state
administration took place only subsequently, in a long and systematic process which
reached its peak only towards the end of the 3rd century. Neither can we find the Shi’a
clergy behind Isma’il I, a lonely hero with a small group of enthusiastic followers
fighting for power.
Since Iran was overwhelmingly Sunni at this time, obviously no Shia clergy existed to
back Isma’il’s movement. To overcome this shortcoming, Safavids had Shi’a legal
scholars, the Amilis, brought in from Syria to work on the ideological foundations and
the power structure of the new system which lasted for several generations.55
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The current system is not different in this respect, since the Islamic revolution was
fought not by the Shi’a clergy as a group but mostly by Khomeini himself, who was
supported by a variety of different social groups, while the clergy was divided on the
issue of whether or not they should give up their traditional apolitical attitude and take
part in everyday political activities. The victory of the revolution reinforced the position
only of the politically active clerics again as a result of a longer process.
Behind these regime changes there were no socio-economic considerations, attempt at
economic reform or even rhetorical references to such aims. Under the early Sasanians,
socio-economic conditions deteriorated compared to the less rigid and repressive
Parthian rule, which had not established a caste-like social structure as its successor did.
Isma’il I, too, was not in the least concerned with the wellbeing of his subjects, had no
intention to be so, and his followers did not support him because of any such demand.
Abbas the Great was the single ruler among the Safavids who tried to revive agriculture,
industry and commerce, but his successors created such chaos in these fields that the
state lacked enough economic-military power to oppose the Afghan invaders.56
The Islamic revolution was not born out of the intention to eliminate poverty either,
although it is true that the revolution was backed predominantly by the impoverished,
mostly urban, population who were no beneficiaries of Pahlavi modernization.
Should they have any hopes for economic progress, these were soon dashed since, as of
today, the presidency of Rafsanjani was the only brief period during which economic
considerations received any attention.57
As Khomeini put it: “Economics is for donkeys” and “We did not make a revolution to
slash the price of watermelon.”58
Though President Ahmadinejad emphasised again the issues of economics during his
presidency, this policy did not change the fundamental orientation of the regime. Basic
issues remained what they were for decades: the role of the rahbar and that of the clergy
in politics, the interpretation of Islam, the role of the state in society and the struggle
for more international influence.
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Opposition thinkers such as Soroush, Shabestari, Kadivar and others do not criticize the
regime on grounds of what they perceive as bad economic policy but present a different
religious understanding of Shi’ism, another interpretation of Islamic law and have
dissenting views on the role of the clergy in politics and democracy.59
3.3 Ideology
Another remarkable common feature of these three systems is a strong ideological unity
guarded by unbending rigor. To explain this one may often come across the argument
that without such an ideological unity it would be impossible to keep together a state
like Iran with her enormous size and geographical division. No doubt, there is
considerable merit in this argument, but it should be qualified since the empires of the
Achaemenids and the Parthians were significantly larger than the states run by the
hierocracies and they still managed to survive for altogether 700 years.
To understand this, we should bear in mind that the Achaemenid and the Parthian states
were decentralized, being a conglomerate of local autonomies attached to and
controlled by the court, a system which could function without any compulsory
ideology. By contrast, hierocracies always attempted to create a centralized
government (with varying success) which was backed in fact by a similarly centralized
ideology in order to eliminate local autonomies and secessionist movements. If the
central governments were able to protect the unity of the country with political and
military means, Iran remained intact. When, however, the government failed to do so,
the country fell apart into different smaller territorial units. This happened after the fall
of the Sasanians and the disintegration of the Safavid state resulted in the same end.
Closely connected to this ideological centralization we can find the policy of declaring
the primacy of religious law. In the Sasanian period, Zoroastrian law functioned as
state law as well, and in the modern period we can also witness Shi’a law being the
foundation of Iran’s legal system. More importantly, the entire legal function was
concentrated in the hands of the clergy: in the Sasanian period, jurisdiction was
administered by the clergy, with different priests (rad, mobed ) in charge of particular
courts, and the whole system was controlled by the mobedan mobed with his theoretical
and practical directives.
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In principle, the head of the legal system was the monarch as the supreme judge, but in
the absence of a well-organised system of appeals, it did not work. People had the
chance to appeal to the king only twice a year during two religious festivals, but this
clearly inoperative system was eliminated in the 5th century, and the king lost his last
opportunity to alter the corrupt or unlawful decisions of his officials to the advantage
of the society.60
A similar tendency can be observed in the Safavid period as well: under Shah Sulayman,
in 1683, the right to appeal to the monarch was abolished, with the result that society
lost its last legal hope to correct an unlawful or wrong judgment.61
The present-day court system is also under the influence of the ‘ulama’, especially the
special court of the clergy, which is under the exclusive control of the rahbar, with the
task of charging dissenting clerics.62 The rahbar therefore fulfils the same function in
the modern legal life as the mobedan mobed did previously, since his statements are
regarded as theoretical and practical guidance for courts.
These systems are also characterised by a tendency to diminish the inherent pluralism
of the official religion by attempting to elevate one single interpretation to canonical
status while neglecting others, although the regimes never fully succeeded in this effort.
For example, Sasanian Zoroastrianism highlighted the fire-cult and abolished the cult
of goddess Anahita even though the ruling dynasty had strong ties to this cult, but was
unable to diminish Zurvanism, a Zoroastrian ‘heresy’ even followed by some Sasanian
kings.63
The current system also emphasises a legalist-normativist understanding of Shi’ism and
tries to downplay other interpretations, although they are deeply rooted in Islamic
tradition and were taught in madrasas for a long time. Contemporary thinkers such as
Montazeri, Soroush, Kadivar, Shabestari, and former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan,
clerics and intellectuals who backed the Islamic revolution and the Islamic regime for
years or even decades, developed rival interpretations of Islam to the current, legalistnormativist reading in previous years.64 But these ideas were regarded as onslaughts
on the official religious understanding and these persons were treated immediately as
enemies although they previously belonged to the inner circle of power.
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If pluralism within the official religion was not tolerated, the status of other religions
deteriorated even more. Some religions were allowed to exist (Judaism, Christianity)
while some others were not.
It is interesting to note here that religions having nothing (or little) to do with the official
religion were treated much less harshly than those which came into being as a result of
a schism within the official religion. Mazdakism was brutally uprooted in the late
Sasanian period. Followers of Manicheism, a very complex religion built upon Iranian
tradition were persecuted during the entire Sasanian period.
Meanwhile, a few atrocities against the Jews and Christians were in the spotlight of
Sasanian wrath when the rulers believed that foreign policy demanded punitive actions
against them (since they could easily be charged with loyalty to the enemy, that is Rome
and Byzantium). In the Safavid period we can occasionally observe the persecution of
Sunnites (Abisaab, 2004, 24-27; 33-35), but the Baha’is, followers of a new religion
deeply rooted in Islamic tradition, were denied any protection and are not members of
tolerated religions according to the current constitution.
It is not to say, of course, that followers of tolerated religions were treated equally with
members of the official religion but at least they could operate, although atrocities
occurred as in the case of Tateos Mikaelian, an Armenian priest murdered in 1994.65
Advocates of foreign ideologies are treated similarly to adherents of non-official
religions irrespective of whether they are for Western (democracy, human rights,
political pluralism, etc.) or non-Western (e.g. Soviet-type socialism) thought. The
Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, was outlawed at the very beginning of the Islamic
republic irrespective of the fact that it was also a member of the broad coalition against
the shah’s regime.
Similarly, advocates of Western thought are believed to be or at least denounced as
Western agents collaborating with foreign powers against Iran, a charge with serious
consequences. This helps us understand why leaders of the green opposition demanding
more democracy and openness hastened to declare publicly that they respect the
underlying principle of the Iranian constitutional system, velayat-e faqih, although this
undermines their own program, since this very principle is the most important obstacle
in the way of further democratisation.
Another common feature of these systems is that they represent a collective rule. The
present-day regime is not a one-party system or a personal dictatorship, and to interpret
the power of the rahbar as a one-person leader or a dictator would be to misunderstand
the situation.
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The rahbar is only the leading representative of the clergy, its political and ideological
leader and the guardian of the hierocracy. The mobedan mobed used to have the same
position: as the head of the Zoroastrian church he represented its interest at the royal
court, influenced political decisions and guaranteed the ideological unity. But powerful
Zoroastrian clergy was a relatively narrow circle: just as not every priest was involved
in politics in the Sasanian era, not every cleric participates in political activities today.
The functions of local, low rank priests and clerics are reduced to local leadership and
propaganda: as earlier it used to be the provincial mobeds who fulfilled these roles,
today it is the imams of the Friday prayer sent to the countryside who do the same.
Besides political advantages, all three systems provided economic advantages, too, for
their members. The mobeds were in a privileged position in the Sasanian era in an
economic sense as well, and they did not hesitate to support the monarch if the
protection of the existing feudal order was at stake. The Safavid period was not at all
different; the privileged status of Shi’a legal scholars, judges and high-ranking officials,
and the financial advantages provided for them by the vaqfs (pious “endowments”),
were in sharp contrast to the miserable plight of peasants who were close to starvation
in a year of poor harvest.
It is no accident that when chronicles wanted to emphasize the scope of sufferings, they
claimed that not even members of the ‘ulama’ had enough to eat. In this context the
proverbs, satires parodying the hypocritical behaviour of the ‘ulama’ are
understandable together with the increasing enthusiasm for Sufism, which can be
interpreted as a non-political, religious opposition to the dominant Shi’a normativism.
No wonder that this development gained strength in the last decades of Safavid rule,
that is, during the time of disintegration and economic collapse.66
Today, too, the hypocritical behaviour of the mullahs comes up against constant
criticism, the social and economic positions and the autocratic way of exercising power
meet increasing social opposition. The socio-economic dissatisfactions logically
manifested themselves in a religious disguise in these hierocratic systems. The
Mazdakite movement in the Sasanian period started as a religious reform supported by
the destitute, the impoverished peasants who had lost their lands. Nowadays, leading
thinkers of the opposition started a religious discourse to point out the shortcomings of
the current regime and to elaborate their own religious and political vision. The
programs of Soroush, Kadivar and Shabestari urge a religious reform, highlighting the
reconsideration of the principle velayat-e faqih. No wonder that the regime answers in
a similarly religious way: labelling every member of the opposition collectively as
hypocrites.67
66
67

Rula Abisaab: Converting Persia. I. B. Tauris: London: 2004: 97-99.
Mehran Kamrava: Iran’s Intellectual Revolution: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2008:

120-173.
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Conclusions
As outlined above, the three hierocratic systems share a variety of common features in
their composition, domestic and foreign policy, socio-economic structure and power
base. It is not to say, of course, that they are identical in every respect. Perhaps the
most remarkable difference is that the hierocracy of the Sasanian period manifested
itself in a dual system, with parallel and competing competencies between the
Zoroastrian church and the state.
The Safavid system was already monistic in the sense that the leader of the Safavid
order was at the same time the head of the state, this personal union guaranteeing a coordinated relationship between the two, with the interests of the latter in mind whenever
the two clashed.
The current system differs from its forerunners in that it emphasises the priority of the
hierocracy: the leader of the clergy is at the same time the supreme leader of the Iranian
state and every state organ (including the president, the government and the legislative)
is ultimately under his direct or indirect control. Being, however, a collective rule, it is
small wonder that important positions in the economy, the media and the judiciary are
in the hands of the clergy and its non-cleric allies.
When the interest of clerical rule is at variance with the proper function of state organs,
it is in most of the cases that the former one gains the upper hand and dominates.
This is the reason of the numerous dysfunctions in the government and the legislature,
known by both Iranian politicians and society.
But I think it is not what Khomeini originally had in mind. Studying his fatvas and
decisions we can find numerous examples to prove that the leader of the revolution gave
priority to the interests of the state. In his opinion the only thing that matters is the
interest of the Islamic state, and this is the only one which must be taken into
consideration. Shocking some in his audience he once declared that the government of
the Islamic state has the right to override even Islamic legal regulations such as the
pilgrimage, if that is what the interests of the community, that is, the Iranian state,
require (Schirazi 1998, 64).68
In other words, Khomeini resembles rather a Safavid ruler, while his current successors
are uncertain as to what strategy to follow. This loss of orientation is the most important
cause of the fragmentation within the ruling elite which can be perceived even by
outsiders.
I outline the results of the comparison in the table that follows:
68

Asghar Schirazi: The Constitution of Iran. Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic: 64.
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Issues of
systemic
comparison
Head of the state

97

Sasanian period

Safavid period

Islamic republic

Monarch

Head of the
Safavid order

Leader of the clergy:
marja’-e taqlid and
rahbar
Leading jurist of the
clergy and rahbar

Position of the Head of a church,
leader of the vertically structured
clergy
Religious
King is supernatural
standing of the (god): Ardashir I;
first leaders
Shapur I

Head of an order
and ruler

Origin
Clerical backing No priests behind the
of the movement revolt

Wars with rivals
No Shi’a clerics
behind the
movement

Political ideology

Shi’ism

Twin-theory: state and
church are twins
Status of state Trying to abolish
religion
immanent pluralism
and to establish one
canonical
interpretation
Clerical positions Court, judiciary,
teaching, propaganda,
intellectual elite
Privileges for the
hierocracy

Political and economic
privileges

Economic policy
Religious policy

No priority
State religion; others
tolerated or persecuted

Cultural policy

Inward looking;
internationally isolated

Foreign policy

Offensive in the early
decades
West; only defensive
in other directions

Orientation of
offensive foreign
policy
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Supernatural:
Isma’il I

Immanent
pluralism
narrowed

Court, judiciary,
teaching,
propaganda,
intellectual elite
Political and
economic
privileges
No priority
State religion;
others tolerated
or persecuted
Inward looking;
internationally
isolated
Offensive in the
early decades
West; only
defensive in other
directions

Imam, charisma and
above the
constitution:
Khomeini
Armed revolution
Clerics being
divided concerning
active role in
politics
Velayat-e faqih
Trying to abolish
immanent pluralism
and to establish one
canonical
interpretation
State organs,
judiciary, teaching,
propaganda,
intellectual elite
Political and
economic privileges
No priority
State religion; others
tolerated or
persecuted
Inward looking;
internationally
isolated
Offensive in the
early decades
West; only
defensive in other
directions
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Issues of
systemic
comparison
International
standing and
aim

Sasanian period

Safavid period

Islamic republic

Regional power;
confrontations with
rival local and global
enemies (Rome) to
achieve more

Regional power;
confrontations with
rival local and global
enemies (US, Iraq) to
achieve more

Head of the state

Monarch

Regional power;
confrontations
with rival local
and global
enemies
(Ottomans) to
achieve more
Head of the
Safavid order

Position of the
leader of the
clergy
Political system

Head of a church,
vertically structured

Head of an order
and ruler

Centralized;
opposition nonexistent or paralyzed

Political style

Oppressive; backed by
unquestionable
religious-political
ideology
Politically motivated
religious reform:
Mazdakism ending in
crushed popular
uprising

Centralized;
opposition nonexistent or
paralyzed
Oppressive;
religious-political
ideology is less
rigorous
Non-political
religious
disguise: Sufism

Forms of
opposition and
dissatisfaction

Leader of the clergy:
marja’-e taqlid and
rahbar
Leading jurist of the
clergy and rahbar
Centralized;
opposition nonexistent or paralyzed
Oppressive; backed by
unquestionable
religious-political
ideology
Politically motivated
religious discourse:
Sorush, Shabestari,
Kadivar

The end of such a long essay brings the question of what to learn from all this. In
answering this question, one should avoid two mistakes.
The first would be to think that we can infer from historical examples directly to future
events and can tell the future only because we have parallels in the past, however strong
these parallels may be. Historia est magister vitae is a commonplace, although with
merit, but is insufficient to build up theories or worse, policies, upon it.
The second mistake would be to forget all about these remarkable structural similarities.
As I have demonstrated, these came into being not by accident but as inherent features
of the Iranian hierocratic regimes. If we understand these, in fact very complex and
sometimes contradictory socio-economic and political factors, we can have a better
understanding of current Iran, which enables us to see things as they are.
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Now we see an Iran with a relatively stable system (the green movement is over, a
current Arab spring having no impact at all) although handicapped by a variety of
systemic contradictions and social dissatisfactions. The current hierocracy is, just like
its forerunners were, a centralized – both in state administration and ideology – and
strongly-controlled state which rules out any debate over fundamental issues. State
organs function despite numerous dysfunctional aspects, the territorial integrity of Iran
is in no danger while the opposition is divided and powerless.
This was the model of the previous hierocracies, too, which managed to survive for
many centuries and their collapse was brought about by their own unsolved inner
contradictions in the long run. External attacks (Arab-Muslim armies, invading
Afghans) only put an end to the agony, being consequences rather than causes.
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St. Thomas Aquinas and the Third Hellenization Period
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Abstract
In this paper, I assert that currently the world has been experiencing the Third
Hellenization Period that started with the Italian Renaissance, instigated by the
teachings of the theologian and philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE).
Unlike philosophers in previous periods (First and Second Hellenization as well as
Medieval), St. Thomas preached that Truth is a function of both Natural Revelation and
Supernatural Revelation. This resulted in, simultaneously, Christianizing Aristotle (St.
Thomas’ most referenced philosopher) and Aristotleizing Christianity, thus opening up
the doors to human reason that had been muted during the Medieval centuries.
I also assert that the basic constituent of Hellenization is freedom: the freedom to think
or reason, the freedom to seek gratification from aesthetics, and the freedom to
undertake a spiritual journey towards a less restraining life through empowerment and
metamorphosis. Ancient Greeks realized that freedom to pursue their desires, subject
to constraints (geographical, cultural and legal) as well as balance of mind and body,
would give them the capability to excel in whatever they set their minds to, a freedom
that sparked an unyielding endeavor for truth, perfection and excellence that made them
achieve phenomenal accomplishments which astound us to this day. It appears that,
despite obstacles, this kind of freedom drives the current Hellenization period on a path
to higher levels of wellbeing for all.
Keywords: Hellenization, Western Civilization, freedom, Aquinas, philosophy,
democracy, aesthetics, globalization, history, wellbeing

Introduction
Figuratively, we all carry the Greek gene. To a small or large extent, we are all
connected by a thread, the inheritance that ancient Greeks bestowed on us: Philosophy,
Democracy, Athletics, Theater, Mythology, Science, Art, Architecture and Literature
among many more. In general, all those universal fundamental ingredients were needed
to create an evolving and prospering civilization.1
1

Of course, the Greek thread is not the only thread that connects us. We are also connected by the
inheritance we have received from, among others, China, India, Egypt, Judaism, Babylonia, Islam, the
Vikings, the Ottomans, the Mayas, the Incas and many more. In this paper, I choose to write about the
Greek thread; hopefully, future work will bring to light other threads.
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My first objective in this paper is to assert that today the world experiences the Third
Hellenization Period which started with the Italian Renaissance in Europe after the
Middle Ages. (Hellenization is the way of life based on general principles, established
or improved by ancient Greeks.)
This period, like previous such periods, is characterized by universal principles which
guide us towards a common denominator world structure for the benefit of all. The
differences between this Hellenization period and the previous two are that (a) the
current one is global in its scope, (b) the underlying principles are adopted at increasing
rates (oftentimes through violent uprising), and (c) it is facilitated, a great deal, by (and
evolves with) technological improvements in communications (e.g., internet and social
media) and in transportation, as well as the spread of commerce, tourism, sport and
entertainment.
My second objective is to try to offer an explanation as to why the ancient Greek
contributions are everlasting and growing in relevance. I believe that the ancient Greeks
detonated an explosive, an outburst of ideas and principles that, as we speak, is still in
progress, engulfing in its inferno, like an expanding fireball, the modern open-minded
freedom-valuing world. In the words of Henry Miller (The Colossus of Maroussi, pp.
210-211):
[The] spirit of eternality … is everywhere … [S]elf-perpetuating Greece …
has no borders, no limits, no age … it is impressively vast. (pp. 46-52).
Greece … made me free and whole … still … the fountainhead of wisdom
and inspiration.
It is indeed remarkable that today’s free people base their evolving way of life on the
increasingly important, practical and rewarding formulae invented by the ancient
Greeks.
In whatever follows2, in Section 2, I attempt to justify why we are currently
experiencing the Third Hellenization Period; in Section 3, I stress the importance of
freedom in conjunction with Hellenization. This is followed by summary and
conclusion in Section 4.

2

In addition to readings excerpts that are quoted throughout the manuscript, the paper has benefited
from information and knowledge contained in the following books: Aquinas (1977 and 1999), North
(1973), Berlin (1956), Osborne (2008), Paine (2003), Russell (1986), Fine (1983), Kenny (2012), Weitz
(1966), Strauss (1987), Cornford (1965), Warner (1986), and Graves (1960).
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Third Hellenization
The First Hellenization Period (FHP) of the western world ended with the unification
of Greece under Macedonian rule when Philip II defeated Thebes and Athens (and their
allies) in the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BCE). During the FHP period, Greece
experienced three civilizations: the Minoan Civilization (with its center in Crete), the
Mycenaean Civilization (mainland Greece, primarily Peloponnese) and the Classical
Greek Civilization (with Athens serving as both its center and main contributor). 3
The FHP period was characterized by city states and, according to Morton Smith (The
Ancient Greeks, p.87): by “the dissemination of Greek artifacts and customs through
trade and colonization” — a period during which the western world experienced the
birth of sophisticated architecture and art as well as the first work of its literary canon,
Homer’s epics; a period interrupted by the so called ancient dark ages (1200–750 BCE)
triggered by the invasion of the Dorians who swept down from the North, to be followed
by Classical Greece (5th-4th centuries BCE).
The Second Hellenization Period (SHP) of the western world started in 336 BCE with
Alexander the Great and continued until 391 CE when Theodosius I the Great decided
to suppress non-Christian traditions. The period was characterized by empire-building
(Macedonian, Roman, Western Roman, Eastern Roman) founded on, mainly, classical
Greek thought. As stated by William Morey (Outlines of Roman History, Chapter
XVIII), "we might say that when Greece was conquered by Rome, Rome was civilized
by Greece."
The SHP ended when, in 391 CE, Theodosius I the Great instituted a series of decrees
called the "Theodosian decrees" suppressing non-Christian traditions. Theodosius I the
Great ordered the demolition of all ancient temples, sanctuaries, the banning of the
ancient Olympic Games in 393 or 394 CE and, most sadly, the raising to the ground of
the Serapeum of Alexandria inclusive of its rich library.
Theodosius I was called “The Great” because he (a) managed to unite the Western and
Eastern Roman Empires (the last Roman Emperor to successfully do so), (b)
temporarily secured the future of the Eastern Roman Empire through diplomacy, and
(c) championed Christianity with the issuance of his “decrees” against non-Christian
traditions.
Unfortunately, though the foundations he built for the unity between Western and
Eastern Roman Empire were not very strong; after his death the two Empires broke
apart and never united again.
3

Dates, along with main events, have been placed in timelines in the Appendix: Table A1 offers a
condensed timeline on Hellenization Periods and Table A2 a more extended version from the Bronze
Age to Sulla.
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“The Great” one, prior to his death, unwisely enthroned his two sons, Arcadius (12
years old) to rule the East, and Honorius (8 years old) to rule the West. His diplomacy
amounted to giving autonomy to non-Roman people, such as the Goths, in exchange
for military assistance inclusive of troops and horses to fight for the Empire. The
unintended result was the creation of a separate nation within the Empire, which
remained a persistent danger to its internal stability.
Some modern historians have intimated that this threat was a factor in the eventual
decline of the Empire. For example, in 390 CE, the population of Thessaloniki rioted
in complaint against the presence of the local Gothic garrison. The garrison commander
was killed in the violence; in revenge, Theodosius ordered the Goths to kill all the
spectators (about seven thousand) gathered in the local arena for a circus. For this brutal
massacre against humanity, “The Great” one was excommunicated by the bishop of
Milan, Saint Ambrose.
Undoubtedly, the “decrees” of Theodosius I against non-Christian traditions mark, as
asserted here, the beginning of the Medieval Period which held back western
civilization for about a thousand years. Likely, the decrees were motivated by the
inferiority of the non-Christian Syrian Neo-Platonism philosophy school, in fashion
when Theodosius I acquired power, led by the post-Plotinian philosopher Iamblichus
(250-325 CE).
According to John Cooper (Pursuits of Wisdom, pp.384-385), “the post-Plotinian socalled Syrian Neo-Platonism … diverged in momentous ways from the purely
rationalist, traditionally Greek-philosophical spirit of Plotinus’s (and Porphyry’s) work.
… In short, for Iamblichus, salvation depended on pagan religious magic” which
Cooper (p.385, footnote 123) sees as rationalism’s “degradation and loss of intellectual
nerve.”
The ideas of Iamblichus contradicted the prevailing, until then, way of thinking by
Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman philosophers; he challenged the predominant
philosophy paradigm according to which truth was a function of natural revelation or
inference based on human observation. As Cooper (p.387) eloquently puts it,
Iamblichus challenged the “philosophy, in the old sense, going back to Socrates and
continuing through Plotinus, of a life led on the basis of, and exclusively from, a
rationally worked out, independent and authoritative, account of reality (including an
account of the nature and characteristics of divinity).”
The ideas of Iamblichus could not compete against Christianity as conceived by
Theodosius I. Truth as a function of magic could not hold water; especially the kind of
magic that is different from religion.
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R. Merrifield (The Archaeology of Ritual and Magic, 1987) defines the difference
between religion and magic (stated in Wikipedia, 2016) as follows: “ 'Religion' is used
to indicate the belief in supernatural or spiritual beings; 'magic', the use of practices
intended to bring occult forces under control and so to influence events; 'ritual',
prescribed or customary behavior that may be religious, if it is intended to placate or
win favor of supernatural beings, magical if it is intended to operate through impersonal
forces of sympathy or by controlling supernatural beings, or social if its purpose is to
reinforce a social organization or facilitate social intercourse.”
Unfortunately, the faulty transformation Iamblichus established contaminated the preexisting philosophical paradigm which, as a result, lost its appeal, opening the road to
the Christianity model of the times. According to the Christianity model of those times,
truth was a function of supernatural revelation (divine communication of truth in which
either the manner of communication or its content is beyond the capacity of human
nature to attain). Undoubtedly, the ideas of Iamblichus could not compete against
Christianity’s powerful messages of hope, renewal, selflessness, compassion, justice,
forgiveness, and unconditional love and therefore, justifiably, Theodosius I made it the
mandatory religion for his people.
Regrettably, the contaminating ideas of Iamblichus caused the disappearance of the preexisting philosophical paradigm of natural revelation from the scene, to appear again
about a thousand years later through the teachings of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE).
During its absence, humanity experienced the Medieval Period or, as some prefer to
call it, the Dark Ages. (The timeline in Table 1 indicates major philosophical paradigms
and the corresponding Hellenization periods.)
The “decrees” of Theodosius I the Great against non-Christian traditions, marking the
beginning (as asserted here) of the Medieval Period that held back western civilization
for about a thousand years, the killing of many people (inclusive of the seven thousand
Christians in Thessaloniki), his unwise treaty (diplomacy) with the Goths and the
appointment of two minors as his successors — all serve as data against greatness. One
may wonder, why still affix the words “The Great” next to Theodosius I?
Later, in 529 CE, Justinian I closed the first university ever established in the history of
humanity — Plato’s Academy. Although the second university ever established,
Aristotle’s Lyceum, was no longer an active school at that time, by then Aristotle’s
“positive” and Plato’s “normative” philosophies had settled, harmonically, around
Neoplatonism. Hence, when Justinian I closed Plato’s Academy, he closed Aristotle’s
Lyceum as well. In other words, he turned off “reasoning.” Without a doubt, the
Theodosian decrees, along with the closing of the two schools in Athens, plunged
Europe and the Middle East into intellectual stagnation.
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Additionally, the millennium-long Medieval Period was marked by barbarian invasions
(similar in havoc-causing to the invasion of the Dorians in ancient Greece), long wars,
epidemics, the decline of free trade and atrocities such as the crusades and the various
inquisitions, committed by misguided Christian zealots. The Medieval Epoch ended
with the advent of various rebirth (Renaissance) occurrences which in some areas of
Europe started earlier than in others.
As knowledge of Greek declined in the west after Theodosius I and the fall of the
Roman Empire, so did knowledge of the Greek texts, many of which had remained
without a Latin translation. The fragile nature of papyrus, as a writing medium, meant
that older texts not copied onto expensive parchment would eventually crumble and be
lost. The introduction of Greek philosophy and science into the culture of the Latin
West in the Middle Ages was an event that transformed the intellectual life of Western
Europe. It consisted of the discovery of many original works, such as those written by
Aristotle in the classical period. Greek manuscripts had been maintained in the Greekspeaking world in Constantinople, Armenia, Syria, and Alexandria.
Interest and availability of Greek texts was scarce in the Latin West, but ancient Greek
ideas, mostly philosophy and science, had permeated the Islamic world; Muslim
conquests extended to the European continent. Sicily and Spain were conquered by the
Arabs at around 700 CE. With the aid of Greek and other ideas, Iberia quickly became
the most heavily populated and thriving, materially as well as culturally, area in Europe.
One of the rulers of Muslim Spain, Al-Hakam II, sought to gather books from all over
the Arab world, creating a library which would later become a center for translation into
Latin.
Later, crusaders during the Fourth Crusade (1202-1204 CE) sacked Constantinople,
thus giving them access to its rich libraries populated by ancient Greek and Roman
texts. In turn, many of these texts were translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke
(1215-1286 CE), a Flemish Dominican scholar, and Philhellene, one of the most
distinguished men of letters of the thirteenth century.4 At the request of Thomas
Aquinas, he undertook a complete translation of the works of Aristotle or, for some
portions, a revision of existing translations. It is noteworthy that he was the first
translator of the "Politics" (c. 1260 CE) and of the mathematical treatises of
Archimedes, among many more.

4

From 1277 on, until the end of his life, William of Moerbeke, served as archbishop of Corinth. A little
Greek village, Merbaka (Agia Triada), is believed to have been named for him; it lies between Argos
and Mycenae.
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Table 1: Philosophy & Hellenization Periods

SOCRATES
PLATO
ARISTOTLE
(470-322 BCE)

ALEXANDER
THE GREAT
(356-324 BCE)

1st HPc
Truth is a
function
of Natural
Revelationa

2nd HP
PLOTINUS
(204–270 CE)

IAMBLICHUS
(250-325 CE)

Truth is a
function
of Magic

THEODOSIUS
I
THE GREAT
(347-395 CE)

Truth is a
function of
Super Natural
Revelationb

AQUINAS
(1225-1274
CE)

TODAY

Truth is a
function of
Natural Revelation &
Super Natural
Revelation

Medieval
Period

3rd HP

a

Natural Revelation is inference based on human observation.
Super Natural Revelation is divine communication of truth in which either the manner of
communication or its content is beyond the capacity of human nature to attain.
c
HP stands for Hellenization Period.
b

Especially after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 CE, and the resulting
influx of refugee Byzantine scholars into Western Europe, the spread of ancient Greek
and Roman knowledge began to intensify, setting the foundations for the Italian
Renaissance and the Third Hellenization Period (THP).
As asserted here, the Italian Renaissance and thus the THP began with Saint Thomas
Aquinas whose work marks the end of the long sleep of reason from the time of
Theodosius I through the Medieval centuries.
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Saint Thomas Aquinas played a major part in reinstating the rationalist tradition by
intertwining it with Christian theology. By the time Aquinas began his literary work, a
large part of Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings had become available in Western Europe.
Although his philosophical orientation was dominated by Aristotle, he was aware of the
vast scope of thought produced by the ancients (translations into Latin by William of
Moerbeke of Greek and Roman texts collected in Byzantine libraries), and the earlier
medieval writers who were also influenced by ancient Greek thought, namely: Saint
Augustine (354-430 CE) and Boethius (480-524 CE); the Islamic philosophers and
writers al-Kindi (800-872 CE), al-Farabi (872-950 CE), Ibn Sina or Avicenna (9801037 CE), Ibn Rushd or Averroes (1126-1198 CE) 5; and the Jewish philosopher and
writer Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 CE), whose opposition to the Neoplatonism of
al-Farabi and Ibn Sina significantly contributed to Aquinas’s understanding.
Thomas Aquinas was influenced heavily by Saint Augustine who in turn was influenced
by the works of Aristotle (particularly his Rhetoric and Poetics). Augustine, in both his
philosophical and theological reasoning, had formulated an earlier synthesis of
philosophy and theology by combining the Christian faith with elements of Plato’s
thought, which he had discovered in the writings of the Neoplatonist Plotinus and his
early and influential writing on the human will — a central topic in ethics, which would
become a focus for later philosophers such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and
Schopenhauer. Shortly after Augustine, in the sixth century, Boethius made a portion
of Aristotle’s works available in Latin.
Prior to Saint Thomas Aquinas, thinkers wrestled with the problem of relating
philosophy and theology, expressing this problem as the relation between faith and
reason. Aquinas exerted a decisive influence by clarifying the precise questions
involved, acknowledging alternative solutions offered by different authorities, and
answering the major objections to his Aristotelian-Christian solutions. In this way,
Aquinas perfected the “scholastic method.”
Thomas Aquinas believed that revelation could guide reason and prevent it from
making mistakes, while reason could clarify and demystify faith.
By combining the philosophical principles of reason with the theological principles of
faith, he became the chief founder of Scholasticism, the objective of which was the
reconciliation of classical and late antiquity philosophy, especially that of Aristotle and
Neoplatonism, with Christian theology.
He argued that Aristotle’s method of using reason and observable facts from nature to
arrive at truth led to God.
5

Averroes' reception in Western Europe contrasted with his ultimate rejection by Arabs in Spain. Soon
after Averroes, ancient Greek ideas in the Arab world were largely opposed by those who disliked
anything not “truly Arab.”
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According to Aquinas, humans must use reason to understand “natural law,” which
comes from God. Scholastic philosophy was an attempt to put together a coherent
system of traditional thought rather than a pursuit of genuinely novel forms of insight.
The content of this system was for the most part a fusion of Christian theology and the
philosophies of Plato and especially Aristotle. Most distinctive in scholasticism was its
method, a process relying chiefly upon strict logical deduction, taking on the form of
an intricate system and expressed in a dialectical or disputational form in which
theology dominated philosophy.
It has been said that Aquinas “Christianized” or “Baptized” the philosophy of Aristotle
but, in the centuries that followed the Renaissance and to this day, there is ample
evidence that Christianity was also “Aristotleized” by Saint Thomas Aquinas.
According to Josef Pieper (Guide to Thomas Aquinas, back outside cover): “Aquinas
reconciled the pragmatic thought of Aristotle with the Church, proving that realistic
knowledge need not preclude belief in the spiritual realities of religion. …[T]he
marriage of faith and reason proposed by Aquinas in his great synthesis of a
‘theologically founded worldliness’ was not merely one solution among many, but the
great principle expressing the essence of the Christian West.” In other words, Aquinas
taught us to seek truth as a function of both natural revelation and supernatural
revelation.
After the initial surge of interest in classical learning and values, which brought us the
early THP, chiefly characterized by the renewed freedom to reason and explore, many
discoveries and events followed that fanned the flames of change and progress, turning
this latest Hellenization progression into an ever growing explosion that today has been
engulfing in its inferno, at increasing speeds, the whole world. It is also during this
period that the Scientific Revolution gained momentum, and observation of the natural
world replaced religious doctrine as the source of our understanding of the universe and
our place in it. Copernicus up-ended6 the ancient Greek model of the heavens by
suggesting that the sun was at the center of the solar system and that the planets orbited
around it. At the same time, exploration, colonization and Christianization of what
Europe called the "new world" continued.
6

According to Petrakis (2004), "The theory that the Earth revolves around the Sun was a truly
revolutionary scientific advance. It also provided great impetus to the development of the modern
scientific method, which was finally liberated in the middle of the 16th century from the constraints of
dogma and nonscientific considerations. This breakthrough is often but mistakenly attributed to the
great Polish astronomer Nicholas Copernicus, and despite indisputable evidence to the contrary, the
true discoverer of the theory, the astronomer Aristarchos of Samos that lived in the 3rd century BCE in
Alexandria, is still sometimes denied his due credit." Petrakis quotes Sir Thomas Heath regarding the
matter as follows: "Sir Thomas Heath has written in his definitive study on Aristarchos: 'Copernicus
himself admitted that the theory was attributed to Aristarchus, though this does not seem to be
generally known ... But it is a curious fact that Copernicus did mention the theory of Aristarchus in a
passage which he afterwards suppressed'."
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Suddenly, the world of the Europeans was a lot bigger, and opinions about that world
were more varied and more uncertain than they had been for centuries.
Among the many discoveries during or after the early THP are: clocks, lenses
(eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes), the printing press, compass, gunpowder, the
submarine, the market system, scientific progress (e.g., chemistry), the industrial
revolutions (from the first to the fourth), and many more. And among the many events,
one may enlist the exploration of new lands, the end of the Hundred Years' War between
the English and the French, the writings of Shakespeare and the Protestant Reformation.
Additionally, the West experienced the advent of the Age of Reason, the re-birth of
Democracy as well as the re-birth of the modern Olympic games.
Undoubtedly, during the THP, the World appears more united, increasingly morphing
into a global entity—a more progressive, more compassionate and more peaceful
cosmopolis that takes advantage of the net benefits associated with all those valuable
concepts contributed by the ancient Greeks.
It seems that Globalization [the rising interdependence of nations in terms of economics
(free markets and international trade subject to some regulation), governance (mostly
free democratic nations), and culture (continually liberated and amalgamated via social
media, international sport and entertainment)] has been fanning the flames of
Hellenization across the known world especially since “economics,” “governance” and
“cultures” are all governed by freedom to reason, the freedom that gave birth to the
ancient Greek achievements, the freedom that still propels us today towards better
understanding and higher levels of well-being.
Freedom and its impact
For the ancient Greeks, freedom was the basis of their civilization. They realized that
freedom to pursue their desires, subject to constraints (geographical, cultural and legal)
as well as the balance of mind and body, would give them the capability to excel in
whatever was important to them. This freedom sparked an unyielding pursuit of truth,
perfection and excellence and made them achieve phenomenal accomplishments that
astound us to this day. According to Herbert Gintis (2006):
There is a model of human well-being compatible with the notion that we humans
are complex adaptive systems, endowed by our genetic constitution with certain
capacities—cognitive, affective, psychomotor, aesthetic, and spiritual—and an
individual well-being depends on the extent that we have developed these
capacities and have the means of exercising them. Happiness, in this view, is not
what you have, but what you are. Societies are judged, then, not on what material
comforts they generate, but on the extent to which they foster the development of
human beings fully capable of exercising their personal capacities.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25

118

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

113

Did the ancient Greeks attempt to create an environment (a society or civilization)
conducive to enabling human beings to use their personal capabilities?
Clues for an answer to this question may be found in Thucydides. In his superb
Pericles’ Funeral Oration (available on various online sources in many languages) in
addition to offering a how-to formula for the ages on what ought to constitute a funeral
oration for fallen patriots, Thucydides describes morals, traditions and customs of the
times that are practiced even today in the West.
Most significantly though, he points out that freedom is the factor that contributed to
the achievements of Athens — a factor that is still in force today especially as it applies
to the so-called western nations which are classified as free nations relative to the rest
of the world. Undeniably, freedom is one of those founding blocks of western
civilization.
Pericles starts by eloquently stating that those who fall defending freedom deserve the
paramount honor and that the orator should be careful neither to disregard nor to
exaggerate the achievements of the fallen defenders.
In turn, he states:
•
•
•

that freedom has given birth to a “greater than her reputation” Athens ready to
die for resisting rather than to live submitting;
that the power of Athens is freedom, that happiness is the fruit of freedom, that
freedom is the fruit of valor;
that freedom equals fearlessness and military advantage.

He continues by declaring that it is best:
•
•
•
•

to remain free instead of imitating others;
to govern with freely elected officials through democracy;
to lead free and enjoyable individual lives subject to ethics and the law;
to encourage free and open discussion, purposefulness and good risk-taking,
wealth accumulation for use (not for show), anti-poverty efforts and the
practicing of genuine generosity.

He concludes by stating that “comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to
offer to the parents of the dead.”
Broadly speaking, the answer to the question posed above (‘Did the ancient Greeks
attempt to create an environment (a society or civilization) conducive to enabling
human beings to use their personal capabilities?’) is yes.
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Greeks unleashed three fundamental freedoms which enabled people to more
effectively utilize their abilities:
•
•

•

the freedom to think or reason; in other words, the freedom to critically think
about everything — from the human body and spirit to the entire universe; they
believed that everything is governed by an order accessible to human reason;
the freedom to deal with the nature, creation and appreciation of beauty (natural
and human-made) through the prism of subjective rationality and societal
parameters; in other words, in the splendor of Greek scenery, the freedom to
endeavor gratification from aesthetics;
the freedom to undertake a spiritual journey towards a less restraining life
through empowerment and metamorphosis.

These three freedoms propelled Greece (especially Golden Age Greece) to become
classic; they established vehicles to evolving optimization rooted in morality (truth and
justice), genuine happiness (honor, sacrifice, respect, and struggle against evil) as well
as unique spirituality (to deal with, primarily, empowerment and the need for security
and psychological comfort.) At an increasing rate, these vehicles to evolving
optimization are still used today; they constitute the well-known concepts of
philosophy, democracy, theater, sport, mythology, art, architecture, medicine and many
more.
Sir Maurice Bowara (The Greek Experience), the eminent scholar and author, has called
these ancient Greek achievements “incredible,” revealing “Greece in its Golden Age
[as] a dynamic, colorful, infinitely creative society based on the belief that action in all
its forms was the natural end of men.”
There is an abundance of evidence that since then, these freedoms are enabling
humanity to progress in an evolutionary fashion towards a new optimum, subject to new
knowledge and constantly adapting to timely universal concerns.
As one may infer from above, the most important freedom that ancient Greeks permitted
to themselves and pursued with vigor and rigor was the freedom to reason, the freedom
to philosophize. Chronologically, Figure 1 shows, non-exhaustively, how philosophy
has evolved since ancient times in the West. The same figure can also be viewed as a
distribution of philosophers from ancient times to modern; it exhibits a high-low-high
pattern (such as the letter M), where “low” corresponds to the Medieval Period.
As pointed out by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, unless new studies reveal
additional names, “Histories of medieval philosophy often treat Thomas Aquinas,
John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham as the ‘big three’ figures in the later
medieval period; a few add Bonaventure as a fourth.”

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/25

120

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

115

After Philosophy, freedom to reason in ancient Greece (especially ancient Athens)
contributed Democracy. In 2019, there are 195 countries in the world. This total
comprises 193 countries that are member states of the United Nations (UN) (2019) and
two countries that are non-member observer states: the Holy See and the State of
Palestine. Not included in this total count of 195 countries are: (1) Taiwan (the United
Nations considers it represented by the People's Republic of China); (2) The Cook
Islands as well as Niue, both states in free association with New Zealand which are
members of several UN specialized agencies and have been recognized "full treatymaking capacity,” but are neither member states nor non-member observer states; (3)
Dependencies (or dependent territories, dependent areas, dependencies) and Areas of
Special Sovereignty (autonomous territories); and (4) Other countries recognized by the
UN as not being self-governing.
Figure 1: Distribution of Philosophers from BCE to CE
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Figure 2: Democracies and Autocracies through time

Currently, out of 193 recognized countries, 123 are democratic. Unlike philosophy,
since ancient Greek times, democracy did not spread as fast. Figure 2 depicts the slow
rise in the number of democracies over the last two centuries. The end of World War I
led to the birth of many democracies. However, during the 1930s, many of these young
democracies then reverted to being autocratic. After World War II, the number of
democracies began growing again. But it was the fall of the Iron Curtain, circa 1989,
that led to a more dramatic increase in the number of democracies.
Although there are many negatives associated with Democracy (such as, among others,
gridlock and polarization, harmful lobbying, slow in deciding, susceptible to
kidnapping and to social media interference), democratic nations are more likely to
secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic
development, protect their citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold
human and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, improve
education, improve the global environment, and protect human health. By and large,
the benefits associated with Democracy exceed the costs.
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Other contributions made by ancient Greek free thought, which continue to evolve and
mutate during the THP, are those that relate to their undertaking of a spiritual journey
towards a less restraining life through empowerment and metamorphosis by relying on
a religion that made gods in their own image, mythology, drama, comedy, and of course
art in all its forms, concepts which to this day evolve and mutate as we speak; more
specifically:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

pleasing to the senses, visual and performing forms of art (from ancient theater
to modern theater and cinema, from hand-made to machine-made art, from lyra
to modern guitar music, and from ancient temple to modern skyscraper
architecture);
mythology (from Hesiod, Homer and Aesop to modern Superman, Harry Potter
and Star Wars);
epic and lyric poetry (from Homer and Pindar to modern literature narration, to
sonnets and from free verse poems to lyrics for songs);
prose fiction (from Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Clitophon, to Shakespeare,
Tolstoy, Chekhov, Hemingway, and Rowling);
historiography (from Herodotus and Thucydides, the fathers of historiography,
to cliometrics);
science and mathematics (from Thales, Pythagoeas, Democritus, and
Archimedes, to Tesla, Einstein, Mendeleev, and Higgs);
technology (from triremes to modern boats and from the Antikythera
mechanism to modern computers); and
athletics (from ancient to modern Olympics and to other modern sports such as
football and basketball).

Undoubtedly, in this increasingly globalized THP, one must wonder how society would
deal with (a) income disparities between the haves and the have-nots that appear to be
stagnant, (b) climate warming, (c) conflict and unrest, and (d) threats to global health?
What the above paragraphs imply is that the world is more likely to deal with these
problems successfully when the freedoms to reason, elect and create are nurtured
universally than when they are not.

Summary and Conclusion
I asserted above that currently the world has been experiencing the Third Hellenization
Period which started with the Italian Renaissance, instigated by the teachings of the
theologian and philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE).
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Unlike philosophers in previous periods (First and Second Hellenization as well as
Medieval), St. Thomas preached that Truth is a function of both Natural Revelation and
Supernatural Revelation which resulted in, simultaneously, Christianizing Aristotle (St.
Thomas’ most referenced philosopher) and Aristotleizing Christianity, thus opening up
the doors to human reason that had been muted during the Medieval centuries.
During both the First and the Second Hellenization Periods, Truth was a function of
Natural Revelation. Towards the end of the Second Hellenization Period, the
philosopher Iamblichus (250-325 CE) started to preach that Truth is a Function of
Natural Revelation and Magic (magic resembling what today is known as black magic).
Unfortunately, the faulty transformation Iamblichus established contaminated the preexisting philosophical paradigm; as a result, it lost its appeal, opening the road to the
Christianity model of the times, according to which Truth was a function of
Supernatural Revelation alone (divine communication of truth in which either the
manner of communication or its content is beyond the capacity of human nature to
attain).
Undoubtedly, the ideas of Iamblichus could not compete against Christianity’s powerful
messages of hope, renewal, selflessness, compassion, justice, forgiveness and
unconditional love; therefore, justifiably, Theodosius I made it the mandatory religion
for his people. Regrettably, the contaminating ideas of Iamblichus caused the
disappearance of the pre-existing philosophical paradigm of natural revelation, only to
appear again about a thousand years later through the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas.
During its absence, humanity experienced the Medieval period or, as some prefer to call
it, the Dark Ages.
I also asserted that the basic constituent of Hellenization is freedom: the freedom to
think or reason, the freedom to seek gratification from aesthetics, and the freedom to
undertake a spiritual journey towards a less restraining life through empowerment and
metamorphosis. Ancient Greeks realized that freedom to pursue their desires, subject
to constraints (geographical, cultural and legal) as well as balance of mind and body,
would give them the capability to excel in whatever they set their minds to; this freedom
sparked an unyielding endeavor for truth, perfection and excellence and made them
achieve phenomenal accomplishments that astound us to this day.
It appears that this thirst for freedom drives the current Hellenization period on a path
to higher levels of wellbeing for all. Undoubtedly, universal exercising of the freedoms
to reason, elect and create are more likely than not to contribute solutions to our current
global ailments such as stagnant income disparities between the haves and the havenots, climate warming, conflict and unrest, and threats to global health.
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Appendix
Table A1: Hellenization Periods
First Hellenization Period
of the Western World
(3000 BCE to 338 BCE)
From the Minoan & Mycenaean
Civilizations (3000 BCE) to the
Battle of Chaeronea (338 BCE)
won by Philip II of Macedonia
Second Hellenization Period
of the Western World
(337 BCE to 391 CE)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Architecture & Art
Epic Poems
City States
Trade
Colonization
The ‘Greek’ Dark Ages
Birth of, among other, Philosophy, Democracy,
Theater and Sport
• Macedonian Empire
• Hellenistic Centuries
• Roman Empires (Unified, Western, Eastern or
Byzantine until 390 CE)

From the time Macedonians took
over with Alexander the Great
(336 BCE) until Theodosius I
The Great (390) CE).
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Medieval Period
(Western Europe)
(392 CE to 1200s, 1300s, or
1400s CE)
From the suppression of nonChristian traditions by
Theodosius I The Great (391)
CE) to Renaissance (variously
interpreted as beginning in the
1200s, 1300s, or 1400s CE,
depending on the region of
Europe and on other factors)
Third Hellenization Period
of the Entire World
(1200s, 1300s, or 1400s CE to
today)

121
• Suppression of non-Christian traditions
• End of Olympic Games
• Demolition of Alexandrian Library and Ancient
Temples
• Barbarian Raids
• Population Decline
• Decline of Free Trade
• Scarcity of Literacy
• Cultural Decline
• Long Wars
• Epidemics
• Crusades
• Inquisitions
• Renaissance
Surge of interest in Classical Learning and Values
(Thomas Aquinas),
Printing Press and Compass, Gunpowder,
Discovery and Exploration of New Continents,
Free Trade,
Copernican System,
End of the Hundred Years' War between the
English and the French,
Capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans,
Translation of Ancient Literature from Arabic to
Latin and other Languages,
Protestant Reformation,
Ejection of Moslems from Spain
• American Revolution and re-birth of Democracy
• Emergence of the Free Market System (Adam
Smith)
• Re-birth of Olympic Games
• Democracy: dominant form of government in
the world (2014)
• Western Philosophy, Sport, Theater (and its
mutations), Art, Architecture, Science, prevalent
in all countries across the globe
• Globalization (increasing interdependence of
nations in terms of economics, governance and
cultures) spreads Hellenization at increasing
rates
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Table A2: Timeline from the Bronze Age to Sulla
2,000 - 1,700 BCE Mycenaeans enter mainland Greece.
1,700 - 1,500 BCE The height of Minoan Civilization is
reached.
The Bronze Age
3,000 – 1,100 BCE

1,400 BCE The rise of Mycenaean naval strength.
1,200 BCE The Trojan War, civil war, and the fall of the
Mycenaeans.
1,150 BCE Dorian Immigration into Greece mainland.
1,150 - 1,100 BCE Aeolian Immigrations begin to Asia Minor.
1,100 BC End of Mycenaean age and civilization. Early city
states are ruled through monarchy.

The Dark Age
1,100 - 1,000 BCE Ionian Immigration to Asia Minor.
1,100 - 800 BCE
900 BCE Dorian migration to the Aegean islands, Asia Minor
(area around Rhodes), and through the Peloponnese.
800 - 700 BCE Monarchies begin to be replaced by Aristocratic
Republics.
776 BCE Date of the first Olympic games.
621 BCE Draco's code of law - Athens.
Archaic Period
600 BCE Coin currency introduced.
800 - 500 BCE
566 BCE Panathenaic festivals established.
546 BCE Persian invasion and conquest of Greek territories
throughout Asia Minor.
507 BCE Cleisthenes' democratic constitution.
Classical Period
500 - 400 BCE

490 BCE First Persian invasion of Greece, the Battle of
Marathon.
480 BCE Second Persian invasion of Greece, Spartans are
defeated at Thermopylae, Athens is occupied by the Persians.
The Persians are finally defeated at Salamis.
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The founding of the Delian League.
479 BCE Persians are defeated at Plataea.
Classical Period
500 - 400 BCE

448 BCE Peace with the Persians
443 - 429 BCE Pericles is leader of Athens during the Golden
Age.

(continued)

430 BCE
Plague in
Athens

431 - 404 BCE The Peloponnesian War

411 BCE
Revolts in
Athens
404 BCE
Athens
Surrenders
to Sparta.

395 - 340 BCE Warfare between rival Greek leagues.
Late Classical
Period
400 - 330 BCE

371 BCE Thebes defeats Sparta at Leuctra
338 BCE Philip of Macedonia leads the Greek City States.
336 - 323 BCE Alexander the Great's reign begins.
323 - 148 BCE Greek City States remain relatively
independent. Frequent warfare continues between rival leagues.

Hellenistic Age
330 - 30 BCE

200 - 196 BCE First Roman victories over Greece.
148 BCE Macedonia becomes a Roman providence.
146 BCE Corinth destroyed by the Romans.
86 BCE Athens is sacked by Sulla.
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The Cold War and The Political Legacy
of The Counterculture of the 1960s
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ospakhomov@gmail.com
Arctic Studies Center, Liaocheng University, China
Abstract
A crisis of modernity — specifically the crisis of a modern vision of society — arose
in the United States and in the Soviet Union following World War II, simultaneously
with competition between capitalism and socialism and an ongoing Cold War. Both
countries faced similar economic and social crises that demanded resolution through
globalization. This meant that it was necessary to reconsider the very basis of social
order that had been formed in the 1930s and manifested in politics, economics, science
and mass culture. On the one hand, America saw a counter-culture develop while it
entered a period of capitalist globalization. On the other hand, the Soviet Union
remained within its existing paradigms, and did not try to promote a socialist project of
globalization. This led to its eventual collapse and integration into global capitalism.
Introduction
Between August 15 and August 18, 1969, roughly four hundred thousand young people
gathered in Bethel, New York for three days of peace and music known as the
Woodstock festival. It was not just an important event in the history of music and
symbol of counterculture movement of 1960s, but Woodstock was one of the turning
points that marked transition from modernity to post-modernity. Although the two
world wars eroded some faith in modernity, Western society remained within a modern
framework, with only slight negative impacts, limited mostly to another “lost
generation” of artists or intellectuals. The counterculture of the 1960s arose from
skepticism over a modern vision of society and economics and sought to turn quantity
into quality.
How did the United States and the Soviet Union react to simultaneous crises of
modernity? The crisis brought on by a modern vision of the human condition impacted
the global competition between capitalist and socialist paradigms as the Cold War
raged.
Both nations had to reconsider foundational theoretical assumptions and implement
radical transformations of politics, economy, science, and mass culture. They were
forced to reconsider the social function of technology and science.
Why did the Soviet Union fail, and America succeed?
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Historical scholarship on the Cold War traditionally covers a wide range of topics,
including extensive studies on politics,1 economy,2 science,3 or the military,4 but the
problems of the humanitarian dimension of competition between capitalism and
socialism are often overlooked.5 Study of these problems may help to create meaningful
contrasts between various aspects of the Cold War, including socialist and capitalist
reactions to modernity, and to develop an integrated understanding of this period.
Instead, the human aspects have generally appeared in Cold War scholarship in only a
restricted, narrow sense, as, for instance, in the analysis of pro-state personality
behavior of Soviet political elites or the anti-state personalities of Soviet dissidents.6
Others have examined the human dimension through extensive research about
ideology,7 information wars,8 competition of economic systems,9 or manipulation of
consciousness that covers different aspects of anti-communist propaganda pitted against
each other.
However, these topics need to be addressed as a part of much more fundamental
problem of society, one based on competing socialist and capitalist visions of modernity
and its practical implementation in political, economic and cultural institutions.
The purpose of this article is to compare two crises of the social order, one that
developed in the Soviet Union as a result of Stalinist modernization and the other that
arose from President Roosevelt’s “New Deal” in the United States. Both emerged
during the decades of the 1920s and the 1930s and they reached a crisis stage in the
1960s.

Edward A. Kolodziej, “The Cold War as Cooperation”, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Vol. 44, No. 7 (April 1991), 9-35
2
Nikolay Inozemtsev, Evgeny Primakov, and Igor Gur'ev, Uglubleniye obshego krizisa kapitalizma
(Moscow: Mysl, 1976),126-137.
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Audra J. Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in Cold War America
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 40-54.
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David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (NY: St. Martin Press, 1998), 3-16.
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Khrushchev (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).
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1985), 51-70, 90-114.
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Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol.1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010): 20-43.
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Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War (Houndmills; New
York, 1997).
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Yuri Bokarev, SSSR i stanovleniye postindustrialnogo obshestva na Zapade [USSR and Formation of
Post-Industrial Society on the West], 1970-1980 (Moscow: Nauka, 2007), 6-114.
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Stalin’s modernization and Roosevelt’s New Deal relied on a similar idea, that the state
could intervene to mitigate problems of inequity and decrease social tensions. From
the perspective of Soviet authorities, class antagonisms were the main obstacle to a fair
distribution of wealth in society. This meant that the Communist party, as the so-called
“vanguard of the working class,” had to lead a class struggle as it sought to build
socialism in one country, to erect a self-sufficient national economy.
In the West, the social disaster of the Great Depression in the United States saw
government adopt the role of mediator in conflicts between labor and corporate
management, thus keeping any class struggle within the framework of labor unions. In
addition, in order to decrease social inequities, the government imposed some
restrictions on corporations while simultaneously providing a safety net for all, thus
laying the foundations for a system that has become known as the welfare state.
During the post-war period, however, the Soviet Union and the United States responded
in opposite ways to the crisis of the existing social order. Increasing social complexity
and the individualization of expectations now meant that certain problems of society
could no longer be reduced simply to class conflict. Besides, by the 1960s, national
economies around the globe started showing the signs of recession due to the depletion
of internal natural and social resources. Under these circumstances, the emerging
counterculture protest movement and a recession during the 1970s led to modifications
of the New Deal as well as reconsiderations of classic liberalism.
There thus arose in the West the ideas of postmodernism and neoliberalism as main
paradigms of capitalist globalization. Neoliberal capitalism developed the economic
basis for a new social order through commercialization of individualized expectations.
But, unlike in the United States, reforms in Soviet Union largely remained within the
old framework, the Stalinist model of self-sufficient national economy. Eventually,
depletion of internal resources and the inability to develop a socialist version of
globalization led to collapse of the Soviet Union and the integration of its remnants into
global capitalism.
The United States and the Crisis of Capitalist Modernity
Following World War II, the prevailing idea was that economic and political stability
as well as sustainable development would be possible within the boundaries of the
nation state. World economic policies during this period relied on the idea that a return
to an unregulated free market economy would create rivalries that might create new
social and political instabilities.10
John Maynard Keynes, “Shaping the Post-War World: The Clearing Union”, in Donald Moggridge,
eds., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXV, Post War Activities 1940-1944
(London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 52.
10
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The main government strategy was to create national economies that regulate the flow
of finances and enable tax and spending to stimulate domestic investments. This
permitted government to ensure full employment while preventing a return of the Great
Depression and its concomitant communism and fascism.11
However, economic growth of the post-war period sharpened contradictions between
collective production and individual consumption that could not be resolved within the
framework of the aging New Deal consensus. The regulation of economic relationships
between large corporations and labor unions, backed by the state and based on a
somewhat conservative social morale, shaped the life of American households as
individuals enjoyed the growing prosperity of post-war America. Economic stability,
increasing prosperity and a housing boom produced the independent economic basis for
American households that then led to the formation of more diverse and individualized
social expectations.
This success, however, inevitably produced conflict as the government continued to
guarantee consensus between large corporations as major employers and labor unions
as main guarantors of workers’ rights. As a result, parts of society started to describe
themselves as critics of the conformity of American life and as opponents of the
corporate culture that had marked the New Deal consensus, thus weakening its mass
support and legitimacy.12
In essence, the post-World War II consumer economy13 cultivated social expectations
that it could not satisfy. New welfare programs, such as the G.I. Bill, increased the
diversity of individualized expectations and simultaneously weakened established
social ties, making more difficult meaningful interconnections between personal and
collective identities.
There were also growing disappointments about post-war abundance of consumer
goods. Some began to criticize society as hedonistic and materialistic, and this
legitimized a weakening of the social fabric.14 For instance, mass entertainment and
popular culture promoted images of individuals whose behavior did not fit collective
identities.15
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Henry William Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994), 3-30.
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Mass education generated increasing numbers of educated young people with high
expectations about upward social mobility that the economy could not satisfy.16
Unrealistic expectations of intimacy and love imposed on men and women in American
households produced growing disappointments about the family institution17 and the
assumptions of traditional gender roles.18
Finally, neither the economic nor the political system could fully address in a
satisfactory way the growing pressure from social and racial groups — and the majority
of Americans who supported them — as they fought to oppose the vicious suppression
that they had long experienced. A significant fact is that they had been excluded from
wartime or post-war prosperity because of the longstanding bigotry that defined
American society.19
1970s: “New Deal” vs “Woodstock”
The conflict between the older New Deal consensus and the emerging Counterculture
movement marked American society for nearly a decade from the late 1960s to the late
1970s.
Increasing anti-authoritarian sentiments, anti-establishment protest, the Civil Rights
movement, the women’s rights movement, and the opposition to the Vietnam War, as
well as the beginning of an economic recession, were the first signs of a deep crisis of
the postwar economic boom and also of the national economic growth model based on
domestic investments and social welfare.
American establishment and countercultural movement activists adopted two opposite
strategies to deal with the emerging crisis. The former tried to integrate new social
expectations into the existing political and economic system without changing it. The
latter sought modification of the existing state of affairs by an increasing number of
social distinctions to justify claims that varied from class and race to gender and
ethnicity.
Government policies relied on the idea that economic prosperity equals cultural
homogeneity.

16
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The post-war programs of economic and social development from the 1950s to the
1960s tried to adapt New Deal principles of full employment as well as equal rights to
disadvantaged groups in American society and thus integrate growing social
expectations and claims into mainstream society without gross qualitative changes.
The New Deal consensus had been the basis for legitimacy for American presidents
since Franklin D. Roosevelt, when government guaranteed economic prosperity in
exchange for political support. The guiding principle of government policies had rested
on the perception that it was possible to reduce social contradictions and preserve
cultural homogeneity by granting the access of all to economic benefits and equal
opportunities in politics or education. Specifically, the national administrations had
believed that access to economic benefits would result in assimilation and integration
of racial and ethnic minorities into mainstream society.
Thus, different presidential administrations during the 1960s relied on similar
mechanisms of government spending and interventions to guarantee equal rights (the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965) and employment
opportunities (Economic Opportunity Act of 1964) as a part of John F. Kennedy’s New
Frontier or within the War on Poverty as a part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society
initiative.20
This paradigm of direct correlations between economic prosperity and cultural
homogeneity was based on the particular role of state as a mediator of disputes between
capital and labor. Protection of worker’s rights was a legacy of New Deal policies that
had reduced the risk of a socialist or fascist revolution produced by growing discontent
of working people or others during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The solution was to modify rampant capitalism via regulations addressing the roles of
capital and labor through a system of labor relations backed by the state. The role of
government was to ensure that all conflict situations could be resolved within the
framework of corporations-unions-state.
It was necessary to put restraints on the power of big business and to preserve the ability
of unions to protect their members within certain limits that were safe for the existing
political and economic system.21
During the two decades of the 1950s and the 1960s, it had become clear that the triple
structure of consensus state-capital-labor had reached maturity and needed reforms.

20
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The government programs of fighting poverty increased diverse social expectations but
failed to improve living conditions overall.
Workers became frustrated as the economy started to fall; further, job segmentation as
well as growing inequality in pay among workers eroded class solidarity. Thus, a
longstanding consensus began to unfold.22
During the 1970s the forces of American industrial and financial capital wished to
restore the previous status quo. The New Deal and the subsequent postwar economic
models produced a unique moment in the history of capitalism. The power of big
business could not retard mass inflation and recession during the seventies. The New
Deal paradigm permitted labor unions to demand a rise in wages, but big business
reacted by increasing the prices of consumer goods to compensate for the wage
increases. This resulted in heightened inflation; that forced workers to demand salary
increases and in turn made companies increase prices. Thus, inflation rose once again,
now at an even higher pace. This put the financial sector into a disadvantage because
inflation decreased the value of money, forcing down investments. As a result, both
industrial and financial capital sought to weaken unions and control the employment
rate and, thus, agitate social sentiments.
The countercultural movement arose from the idea that economic prosperity should lead
to cultural and social heterogeneity. The narratives of the several protest movements
during the 1960s referred to traditional American values such as individual freedom,
democracy or economic prosperity; yet these movements did not explain how
Americans from different social backgrounds could co-exist. They advocated the same
goals as government, but their means were different. They wished to build independent
social and economic bases as alternative sources of legitimization of their claims against
mainstream society.
The political legitimacy of the counterculture movement in America rested on diversity.
It maintained an openness to varying claims about mainstream society and utilized
slogans that would appeal to people of different backgrounds, advancing metanarratives of “class” or “nation”. The counterculture offered a variety of individualized
interpretations of these notions from all possible backgrounds, from racial to gender.
It adopted two parallel strategies: collective and individual. The first one was aimed to
diversify as much as possible the social potential for protest movements through
varying claims and expectations. The second one addressed the individual personality,
as the counterculture encouraged discourse of searching for one’s “true self.”
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The mass movements of the 1960s posed a challenge to dominant theories of society
that had failed to keep up with growing diversity of “atomized individuals” who live in
a situation defined by the loss of personal authority. Marxism had failed to give a
convincing answer as to why social conflicts or new forms of social solidarity could no
longer be reduced to traditional class distinctions.23 Structuralism overlooked the
problems of human diversity and the creativity of imagination, believing that it could
produce an “objective” description of the world by defining universal principles and
interrelations of social experience.24
In addition, the academic discipline of Anthropology did not develop a wide-ranging
theoretical apparatus that would describe how ethnic culture functions in modern
urbanized society, nor did it result in a transition from the study of culture to the study
of ethnic boundaries as constructed in the process of negotiations among individuals.25
The Postmodernist answer was that if a unified description of society is not effective,
then the answer should not be the development of a new modified systems approach but
rather the inclusion of all possible descriptions without their coherent interrelation.
According to advocates of the postmodern paradigm, the dominant description of
society legitimized itself through reference to meta-narratives. This put these
approaches over other kinds of discourse and thus silenced the voices of those who were
excluded from the dominant discourse. Inclusion of individualized observations was
possible through the deconstruction of what previously was employed in the attempt to
unify different observations on society.26
For instance, according to Michel Foucault, it is not the concept of unity, but
discontinuity that is characteristic of every discursive statement. The purpose of
discursive analysis is to discover the rules according to which this discontinuity and the
fragmented character of objects and narratives is present.27
Protest movements became one of the crucial vehicles for introducing a postmodern
agenda into the Western political mainstream.
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New Left intellectuals during the 1960s and the 1970s helped to diversify major
elements of class-centered protest movement narratives that represented the struggles
between labor and capital while keeping its basic principle: differences must receive
fair compensation, the basis for the post-war welfare state ideology.
Thus, notions such as ethnic, racial, gender and class differences, along with ecological
problems, have become special cases of social criticism and the ideological justification
of compensatory claims through protest movements.28 Protest movements have
emerged as episodic forms of expression of discontent and expectations concerning
specific issues; protestors hope that state and the public will respond to the demands of
these protesters.29
To deconstruct traditional social boundaries, it is crucial to describe the individual and
not the collective as the starting point for all identities and social actions. The reason is
that individual needs do not have any boundaries and they are limited only by
imagination.
The idea of social justice as a crucial element of the New Deal paradigm died in the
atomized society30 of the postwar period. According to these thinkers, it is the
conception of individual self (not the collective) that makes community constitutive.31
Excessive anticipation of collective actions and identities of the New Deal paradigm
during the decade of the 1950s in the United States, as well as alternative forms of
communal life as proposed by countercultural activists during the 1960s, were tools to
solve social and economic problems, but both produced widespread disappointments.
This resulted in a decrease in the popularity of collective actions and a rise in the belief
of individualism and “zero-sum society” during “The Me-Decade” of 1970s.32
However, this loss of confidence in the paradigms of the 1960s provided several
advantages for those who favored empowerment of individualized identities instead of
collective ones. Disappointed expectations regarding collective identities permitted
society to break away from the cohesion of social control; at the same time, it demanded
compassion or compensations for the disappointments of the old ways.
28
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The first strategy was to describe the ideas of collective identity as backward and/or
unjust while at the same time coercive, suppressing individual expectations. This
legitimized a breaking away. The second strategy developed from an opposite
direction: it depicted the inability of individuals to overcome domination and the
coercion of unjust society, thus suppressing the feelings of compassion towards others.
This legitimizes the right to break away from collective ties.33
The Reagan Period: A synthesis between the “New Deal” and “Woodstock”
The administration of Ronald Reagan led to a synthesis between the New Deal
consensus and the countercultural movement, based on an asserted neo-conservative
ideology. By the late 1970s, the counterculture movement and the New Left had
receded in popularity and become fragmented. Simultaneously, there was a
reconsideration of liberalism, in part under the influence of the countercultural
challenge.
The result was the development of a unified comprehensive theoretical apparatus of
neoliberalism. This became mainstream ideology under Reagan, during the decade of
the 1980s.
The Reagan idea combined both individualism and collectivism based on a certain
vision of the American nation and its role in the international arena. The core element
of this Reagan revolution was a form of “communitarian individualism” that turned
American nationalism into a postmodern matrix integrating all possible individualized
observations on the idea of America without trying to establish interrelations between
them (and sometimes with reality) within a new meta-narrative.34
This synthesis would not have been possible without development of neoliberal
economic policies known as “Reaganomics.” The Great Depression, the legacy of
World War II, and the communist threat all strengthened the role of national economies
in restricting the flow of finances and stimulating domestic investments in the United
States during the post-war years. However, a full employment policy had resulted in
wages and prices rising together, decreasing investments in the economy and leading to
stagflation during the 1970s.35 The neoliberal approach promoted price stability and
inflation control as well as globalization of industrial production chains and financial
markets.
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Sino-American contacts during the early 1970s laid the basis for economic symbiosis
between two countries. China tried to find alternative solutions to failed socialist
modernization through foreign investments while the United States was anxious to deal
with the economic downturn of the 1970s.
Outsourcing of industries abroad to take advantage of cheap Chinese labor and the
eventual fragmentation of the American working class made a neoliberal economy, with
its focus on individual needs, possible. Flexibility of production was crucial to
satisfying the individualized demands of American consumers. This became possible
through the exploitation and violation of the rights of workers abroad.36
Another crucial aspect of “Reaganomics” was a new financial system that re-established
capital through refinancing of previous loans with new lines of credit. The early 1980s
saw the beginning of the emergence of the financial sector37 in the economy of the
United States.38 This period marked the beginning of the decline of personal savings,
previously a strength of the American people. The main source of money for American
households was not savings39 but credit provided by financial institutions. Simple
access to credit permitted the use of money for current consumption instead of saving
against future economic uncertainties. This system of refinancing was possible because
of an increase in the interest rate and then by a constant decrease in the value of money,
as represented by the interest rate of the Federal Reserve Bank. This system continued
until mid-2000s, when interest rates dropped to nearly zero and further credit financing
demanded new forms of speculation and marked the beginning of global recession.
Reagan nationalism changed the mechanism of processing contradictions between state
and society. Neoliberal politics produced growing economic inequality; this, alongside
reduced government spending on welfare programs, created risks of losing legitimacy.
In response, Reagan proclaimed the importance of traditional American democratic
values, and denounced government assistance; he thus dealt not only with economic
difficulties but also with a crisis of confidence posed by the counterculture movement
of the previous decade.
Detaching the national meta-narrative from the real economy, moving to a debt-driven
financial speculations model while retaining a modified version of consumerism,
permitted many possible observations on “traditional values” without forming a
coherent single whole.
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The Reagan administration then reduced the problems of growing social inequalities
into “culture wars” between different narratives. On one hand, this permitted
mobilizing more people with diverse agenda into mainstream politics that official
propaganda could represent as a success of American democracy and thus legitimize
the Reagan Administration. On the other hand, political diversity fragmented collective
actions and thus decreased the risk of possible unified protests against government
neoliberal politics40. The Reagan years offered a distinctive mechanism addressing the
contradiction between the collective and the individual.
The American mass culture during the 1980s often promoted a storyline where an
individual had to break ties with a traditional collective entity but eventually re-united
with it, bringing new meaning to the community that had once been. It was important
to show that traditional values were not just another propaganda slogan, detached from
real life, but constituted an integral part of American society and history.
Traditional values were supposed to appeal to the personal experience of every
individual; these values also helped to cultivate a sense of the national community as
well as to create a social basis for Reaganomics on the grass-roots level.
The standard opposition or juxtaposition of the collective and the individual was also
found in movies of that period. In these movies, dissatisfaction with a membership in
a certain community empowers an individual to break from its coercive ties in order to
pursue a stable life in an American household (Big, 1988) or create their own distinctive
collective identity (The Breakfast Club, 1985).
Success or failure of individual attempts encourages one to re-think the value of the
collective entity, a reconsideration that gives a chance to return and thus regain a sense
of community once again but this time on voluntary basis as a free individual choice.
It means that membership in a collective entity is no longer coercive and fake because
it is based on a balance between collective and individual expectations as well as true
and authentic feelings.
The American dream was a crucial element of Reagan nationalism; it encouraged
people to develop certain aspects of their individual personality in the form of
individualized upward social mobility. In case of failure, national ideology offered the
opportunity for self-improvement, which was a modified version of the search of “true
self” but this time with clear criterion of commercial efficiency.41
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This helped to legitimize transfer of the responsibilities for growing social inequality
from the Reagan era’s society and the economic system to the individual.
One of the most representative examples of success in the Reagan era was Steve Jobs;
he was a symbol of the possible synthesis between the 1960s counterculture, Reagan
neo-conservatism of the 1980s, and computer technology with an emphasis on
individual freedom and the neoliberal economy. Specifically, Steve Jobs turned the
legacy of New Communalist digital utopian ideas of personal computing and
networking into a commercially successful business project after Apple Inc. introduced
its “most personal computer,” the Macintosh 128K, for sale in 1984. As a famous
commercial campaign dubbed “1984” demonstrated, Apple Inc. tried to use information
technologies as a tool to augment and empower human intelligence. It was a device
opposed to the aspirations of the military industrial academic complex which sought to
replace people with artificial intelligence.
Simultaneously, Steve Jobs stood in solidarity with Ronald Reagan’s stance against
unions that he considered un-meritocratic and “the worst thing that ever happened.”
Further, he also was a proponent of outsourcing production facilities abroad to take
advantage of cheap Chinese labor, in a country where Apple factories later became
examples of neoliberal dystopia. His efforts did not go unnoticed; Steve Jobs was
awarded the National Medal of Technology by Ronald Reagan in 1985.
Finally, neoliberalism would not be successful without a particular understanding of
human nature that permitted it to justify its globalist claims. According to advocates of
the neoliberal agenda, the free market economy is the best fit for human nature against
national boundaries. For this purpose, neoliberalism locates economic motivation at
the center of an individual worldview imagination that usually operates with
contradictions in a self-referential manner between nature and culture and between
economic and non-economic expectations.
The first contradiction between nature and culture is crucial to draw attention to: it is
the particular image of the human body as a source of needs for economy.42 The second
one draws attention to scarcity risks that force individuals to pursue upward economic
mobility.
Reference to the universality of "human nature" appears as an omnipresent instrument
to overcome the coerciveness of national boundaries that limit individual freedom. At
the same time inequality is a universal motivator, driving us to search for opportunities
to open up the potential of human nature for the market.43
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The Soviet Union and the Crisis of Socialist Modernity
Historically, the role of the state in Russia has differed considerably from the role of
the state in the United States, and this has defined the way both countries reacted to the
modernity crisis of the postwar period.
In the United States, it may be argued, society felt the existence of federal government
seriously only with the Civil War or, at the latest, in early twentieth century after the
introduction of a federal income tax. By contrast, Russian statehood had emerged and
developed long ago as a hierarchically organized society with a strong centralized
bureaucratic apparatus where the state traditionally was the main employer. After the
Bolsheviks seized state power in 1917, they had to rely on this historical legacy, one
that by that time had lasted nearly two hundred years; it began manifestly with the
reforms of Peter the Great in the first quarter of 18th century.
Socialist modernization reproduced and augmented the already dominant role of state,
one that played a crucial role in the exploitation of the political and economic potentials
of society. Subsequently, any crises evolved not as contradiction between state and
society but from the disintegration of centralized statehood.
The Fragmentation of Economic Integrity
In order to justify their political legitimacy during the post-Stalin period, Soviet
authorities tried to solve the problem of increasing social complexity and growing
individualized expectations through an attempt to cultivate national solidarity
promoting the idea of Soviet people. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet leaders for
the first time faced the crisis of collective objectives and goal-setting.
This had direct political implications because legitimacy traditionally depended on the
ability of the Bolsheviks to set clear goals and put them into practice through economic
and political programs on a national and international level.
Stalin’s death sharpened a power struggle, one in which every faction in the Communist
Party tried to mobilize all possible resources to secure and strengthen their own power.
At the same time, it was crucial to find new ways to justify the vanguard role of the
Communist Party and thus preserve the power of the nomenklatura.
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Although Soviet leaders could still refer to the traditional goal of the building up of
communism, this time it was unclear what meaning they should put into “communism,”
how they should combine this with nationalistic rhetoric, and how they could practically
materialize these ideas into Five Years Plans and the ideological programs of the
Communist Party.44
Attempts to adapt to new realities demonstrated the inability of the Communist Party to
match growing diverse social expectations with a unified and centralized system of
national economy. Soviet society responded to the appeal of the Communist Party to
participate in so-called “all-people’s discussions” (vsenarodnoe obsuzhdenie) about
future economic plans.45 According to official data, about seventy million people
participated in the discussions and more than four million projects were prepared in the
period which ran from the official publication of the Seven Years Plan project on
November 14, 1958, until the opening of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union on January 27, 1959.
However, after calculations were made, it became clear that Soviet Union simply did
not have enough resources to bring to fruition the many social expectations
encompassed in the various Seven Years projects. The inability to implement them,
nonetheless, actually meant a lessening of political risks for leadership because those
expectations were supposed to become a new source of legitimacy for the Communist
Party.46
The centralized distribution of resources to satisfy growing social expectations
enhanced decentralization. The Communist Party’s status as taking the “leading and
guiding role” and its assignment to guarantee “social justice” prevented authorities from
undertaking discriminatory acts against interest groups.
They had no choice but to allocate resources in every possible direction, including social
welfare for the Soviet people, until there were no resources left for maintaining the
socialist system.
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A struggle for power forced Premier Khrushchev to give priority to mass consumptionoriented industries and decentralization to meet growing social expectations as an
attempt to secure and strengthen his own power base.47
His Sovnarkhoz Reform of 1957 marked the transition from an all-Soviet Union branch
management to a decentralized territorial principle which damaged the integrity of the
centralized system.48 The fragmented management system complicated the goal-setting
task for the whole economy because it was not clear what national project should
receive priority. Under these circumstances, different groups and factions within the
Soviet Union ruling class, from big factories to sectoral ministries and military
complexes, started promoting their own interests to justify them as national goals that
would benefit the entire society.49
The Communist Party exhausted its internal resources as it moved to combine
centralization and decentralization tendencies into a coherent whole. By the mid-1960s,
the Communist Party had at least two major projects available to overcome the turmoil
that had been produced by Khrushchev reforms in economy and politics. They pursued
opposite objectives: whether to promote centralization using information technologies
or to move towards further commercialization and decentralization of the national
Soviet economy.
The first project was the development of a nationwide system of computer centers for
information processing, collecting and use; it was known as OGAS (National
Automated System for Computation and Information Processing) with key functional
subsystems such as the Automated System of Plan Calculations50 and the program of
an Optimally Functioning Socialist Economy.51 The second project was an attempt to
introduce various criteria of the market economy, such as profitability and sales to
increase the efficiency of the planned economy.52
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Both eventually ended up in failure because Soviet authorities considered them as
separate and competing projects without trying to unite these two projects into an
integrated approach to economic reform. As a result, OGAS overlooked on-going
decentralizing tendencies both formal and informal, while the second reform tried to
institutionalize actual fragmentation into the economic system. It clashed with the
political interests of the nomenklatura which, naturally enough, sought to preserve its
centralized control over society.
In addition, the Soviet Union failed to initiate its own version of “socialist
globalization” to solve contradictions inside a national economy. During the decades
of the 1960s and 1970s, the capitalist states and the Soviet Union faced similar crises
of national economic slowdowns. For the United States by the mid-1970s the solution
to ongoing recession was transition from a national economy to globalization.
Theoretically, an alliance between the Soviet Union and China could have become the
core of socialist globalization but ironically, it was an alliance between the United States
and China that became the basis of capitalist globalization.
The socialist camp suffered from a contradiction between the promotion of the Stalinist
modernization model, one aimed at self-sufficient and relatively closed national
economic development, and the demands of international political solidarity.
Given the realities of postwar anti-colonial movements, the opportunity to develop an
independent national economy was very attractive and, in the short-term, this enhanced
the international political influence of the Soviet Union. However, in the long-term,
the USSR failed to offer a comprehensive model of integration of different national
economies into stable international alliances and common markets.
Further, the struggle for power during the post-Stalinist period forced Soviet leaders to
search for alternative sources to secure personal power, a drive that gradually evolved
into the De-Stalinization campaign. This posed serious political risks for Soviet allies
in East Asia who modelled their political regimes on Stalin’s legacy.
After failed attempts at socialist modernization, De-Stalinization could easily turn into
“De-Maoization” in China and “De-Kimization” in North Korea. Eventually, growing
tensions between China and Soviet Union culminated in a series of military border
conflicts in the late 1960s; these marked the disintegration of socialist camp.53
In response to the failure of socialist globalization, Soviet leaders preferred to initiate
integration into global capitalism.
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Joseph Stalin in the early 1950s allowed for the possibility of peaceful co-existence
between Soviet-allied socialist states and the capitalist bloc that marked a transition
away from the domination of basic principles regarding socialism and capitalism.
Later, during the Khrushchev (1953 - 1964) and the Brezhnev (1964 -1982) periods,
this idea attained practical implementation as well as theoretical development. It took
the form of economic and political treaties between the Soviet Union and capitalist
states, as well as in ideas of convergence between the two systems.
Warming of relations was the result of a combination of international and domestic
factors on both sides. The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of recently discovered
oil and gas deposits in Siberia to compensate for its lagging behind the West in economy
and internal economic problems. Long-term contracts were supposed to ensure the
inflow of foreign currency necessary for purchase of Western technologies and
consumption goods.
For countries in the capitalist bloc, normalization of relations with the USSR was a
guarantee that the Soviet Union would not take advantage of domestic political turmoil
caused by the counter-culture movement and the economic recession as well as the
1970s energy crisis. Besides, a stable supply of energy resources was crucial for the
development of integration in Western Europe.
Thus, these kinds of agreements had been initiated between Soviet and Western German
leaders since the late 1960s and embodied into the Treaty of Moscow (1970) and the
“Natural Gas Pipeline Deal” (1970), the latter followed by similar agreements with
France and Italy. The signing of the Helsinki Accords (1975) marked not only the
economic integration of the Soviet Union into capitalism but also the adoption of
Western political discourse by accepting international obligations of human rights
primacy (although without an actual intention to implement them in practice) and in the
exchange of agreements in the military sphere and regarding guarantees of territorial
integrity.54
The Fragmentation of Political Integrity
Similar to such drives in economic matters, attempts to modify the political system of
the Soviet Union demonstrated the inability of the Communist Party to integrate
diversity and marked the beginning of its disintegration.
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Soviet society perceived the speech of Nikita Khrushchev “On the Cult of Personality
and Its Consequences,” made to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (February 1956), as an official acknowledgement that the Communist
Party can be wrong and thus requires correction. De-Stalinization for the first time in
Soviet history clarified that it was for all classes of society and not merely the “vanguard
of the working class” to be empowered to demand modification of the Communist Party
politics and Soviet politics in general. Debates about the legacy of Stalin gave an
opportunity to Soviet people to cultivate and to openly express individualized
expectations. The speakers could come from various social and ethnic backgrounds
and directly politicize their views, introducing them into the political mainstream.
As the main hero in the Soviet cult film "Beware of the Car" (1966), arrested for stealing
cars and giving money to charity, said in his final statement before the court: "I just
wanted to help!"
All of these measures destabilized the political situation not only in Soviet Union but
also throughout the states of the socialist camp. Growing and diverse political
anticipations demanded new mass upward social mobility, thus changing the
composition of the nomenklatura; also sought was considerable modification of the
political system. This could pose a danger to the personal power of Khrushchev and
later to that of Brezhnev, and it could break the political monopoly of the Communist
Party. Diversification of social anticipations during the Khrushchev Thaw divided
Soviet society into pro- and anti-Stalinists, including some who criticized the
Communist Party for supporting Khrushchev, others who criticized Khrushchev for
supporting the Communist Party, and yet others who were against both.
Mass widespread social discontent varied from undercurrents of dissatisfaction to the
overt riots and mass disorders leading to many causalities such as Novocherkassk
massacre (June 2, 1962) or Prague Spring (January to August 1968).55
In addition, a nationalist agenda presented the Communist Party with a dilemma:
promote national unity or increase economic inequality?
The official propaganda promoted the necessity of collectivist values and the national
solidarity of Soviet people but the implementation in practice was only possible through
more inequality and alienation. The XXII session of the Communist Party (October
1961) proclaimed the establishment of a state of all people (obshenarodnoye
gosudarstvo) that later became a crucial element of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet
Union, securing a leading role for the Communist Party among all workers and peoples
of the country.
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However, the Soviet economy as a hierarchically-organized labor division system
within national boundaries had to keep a large number of people involved in low paid
manual work in spite of growing expectations of upward social mobility.
Further, urbanization, the large-scale migration from rural areas to cities, exhausted the
rural population as a crucial source of labor by the 1950s – 1960s. This created a conflict
between a proclaimed national solidarity (collective production) and inequality
(individual consumption) of hierarchically-organized social life where level
consumption depended on the place within hierarchy.
Since the majority of people worked for the state this contradiction influenced the life
trajectory of a majority of Soviet citizens, thus producing disappointed expectations and
automatically politicizing them. Produced disappointments for individuals translated
into narratives of their social, regional or ethnic backgrounds as latent resistance against
the state, eroding the social basis of the Communist Party in particular and the Soviet
nation in general.56
In response to the process of disintegration of the centralized management system, the
Communist Party developed a sophisticated mechanism of control and discipline over
the ruling class. Mikhail Suslov, Second Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and Politburo member responsible for ideology, in his speech before the
All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers (October 15, 1979), set mutually
incompatible goals: be (self) critical against bureaucratic constraints as well as against
a superficial approach towards ideological-educational work, but at the same time
follow strictly established rules and procedures.
Specifically, Suslov referred to a Central Committee resolution “The Further Perfection
of Ideological, Political and Educational Work.” This document suggested encouraging
Soviet people to perceive and describe their life events and individual experience
through the ideological framework of “real socialism” as represented by the 1977
Constitution of the Soviet Union and Brezhnev's memoirs such as “The Minor Land”
(Malaya zemlya), “Rebirth” (Vozrozhdenie) and “Virgin Lands” (Tselina).
This put Communist Party members into what is known as a double bind; any response
whatsoever to a part of the message results in a failed response to the other part, and
vice versa. Participants could not solve the dilemma between what Mikhail Suslov said
and what he really meant.
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Although the message was clear (do as you are told and leave your future to the mercy
of higher authorities), in reality any choice was wrong that made a certain person the
potential object of negative sanctions that increased the Party’s control over the
nomenklatura. For instance, the Central Committee could punish anyone for
“formalism” in ideological work and represent the Communist Party as an advocate of
people's interests against excessive red tape. Simultaneously, punishment for excessive
“creativity” and “voluntarism” towards “popular initiatives” could result in informally
representing the Communist Party as an advocate of the nomenklatura’s interests
against society.57
Failure to set collective national objectives transformed into a necessity to fit together
the fragmentation of the centralized management system and the growing diversity of
social expectations with the legitimacy of a one-party system. The answer was a slogan,
“Final Victory of Socialism,” declared at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party
(1959). It later developed into the idea of “Real Socialism” during the Brezhnev
Stagnation era. The ongoing disintegration was represented as proof of unity in
diversity and the dynamism of socialism. Socialist economics was necessary to create
the basis for building a communist society, the leadership said.
In reality, these ideological frameworks consisted of economic and humanitarian
dimensions. The former implied investments in a large number of infrastructure
projects that included logistics, irrigation, energy, and military infrastructure or space
programs. The latter tried to involve society in the practical implementation of these
initiatives. Both dimensions stressed the importance of the projects as basis for national
solidarity but without explaining their rationale for economy and society as a whole.
Different organizations and factions were willing to convince the Communist Party to
support their projects while society was to a certain degree free to describe their
individual participation experience and represent it publicly in literature, films or songs.
For instance, during the 1970s many young people participated in so-called “Shock
Construction Projects” such as the Baikal–Amur Mainline or the Kama Automobile
Plant (KAMAZ) under coaching from the All-Union Leninist Young Communist
League (Komsomol). These activities were reflected in Soviet mass culture as
becoming crucial Soviet national symbols during Brezhnev period (1966 - 1982).58
The “Soviet theory of ethnos” was an attempt to develop a scientific basis for the
existence of Soviet people. Similar to ideological framework of the “Real Socialism”
that did not exist in reality, Ethnos Theory was supposed to justify the existence of
“Soviet people” during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) in spite of the
persistence of ethnic differences in the USSR.
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In order to solve this contradiction, at least in theory, a group of Soviet ethnographers
from Institute of Ethnography of Academy of Science, led by Academician Yulian
Bromley, formulated a dualistic approach towards ethnic communities. It divided
ethnos into etnikos with stable cultural features of historically formed communities of
people59 and volatile ethno-social organisms where constant components take different
shapes depending on economic formation in a Marxist Leninist sense.
Thus, the theory of ethnos combines subjective and objective factors60 where objective
aspects presuppose that the abolition of class contradictions result in growth of ethnic
homogeneity and that the formation of the new historical community of Soviet people
as an interethnic entity based on socialism can exist.61 The subjective aspect covers
ethnic self-awareness; that includes not simply membership but also collectivelyshared opinions about the nature, territory and integrity of the ethnic community.62
The identity “Soviet people” permitted individuals not just to perceive themselves as a
part of this inter-ethnic entity but also to concretize this experience to local conditions
of “small motherland” (native land63) as a part of bigger Soviet motherland.64
Perestroika: Centralized Decentralization
Unlike during the Stalin period when authorities used anti-state, anti-Bolshevik and
other social sentiments that did not fit the Communist Party line to justify expansion of
state power during the period from the 1920s to the 1950s, Gorbachev’s reforms during
the second half of the 1980s used similar logic but in reverse order: he exploited antiSoviet sentiments as important sources of his personal power that had much wider
implications.
These measures officially institutionalized fragmentation of political and economic
system.

59

Yulian Bromley, Ethnos i Etnographiya [Ethnos and Ethnography] (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 37.
Yulian Bromley, “Towards Typology of Ethnic Processes”, The British Journal of Sociology Vol. 30,
No. 3 (September 1979), 341-348.
61
Yulian Bromley, "Etnograficheskoye izuchenie sovremennykh natsionalnhih processov v SSSR,"
[Ethnographic Study of Contemporary National Process in USSR] Sovetskaya etnographia, No. 2
(1983): 11.
62
Viktor Kozlov, “Problema etnicheskogo samoznonaniya i yeyo mesto v teorii etnosa”, [The Problem
of Ethnic Self-Consciousness] Sovetskaya etnographia, No.2 (1979), 79-92.
63
Viktor Kozlov, “Etnos i territoriya”, [Ethnos and Territory] Sovetskaya etnographiya, No.6 (1971),
89-100.
64
Alexander Tvardovsky, “O rodine maloy i bolshoy”, [On Small and Big Motherland] Collected
Works, Vol.5, (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura1980), 26-30.
60

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

151

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 83 [2020], No. 83, Art. 25

146

Number 83, Fall 2020

Besides, unlike the synthesis combining the legacy of the 1930s New Deal and the
1960s counter-culture legacy into a new ideological framework during the Reagan
years, Gorbachev used Stalin’s legacy to rely on a growing diversity of social
expectations without any attempt to unify them into a coherent ideological framework.
Instead, his exploitation of anti-Soviet sentiments marked the beginning of the
narrowing of state power that had long-term effects during the final Soviet statehood
crisis of the 1990s.
Disintegration of economics and politics forced Soviet leaders to look for alternative
sources of political legitimacy.
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985-1986 publicly stressed on several occasions his critical
attitude towards the current state of affairs in the Soviet Union and he admitted the
necessity of rebuilding an economic system which had become inappropriate for the
Soviet people. He called it the “improvement of socialism,” later known as Perestroika.
By the mid-1980s, it had become obvious that the Soviet Union had exhausted its
internal resources. Fragmented economic links as well as political ambitions of
individual institutions and factions outweighed national interests, impeding the
mobilization of economic and political resources by the Communist Party to solve
existing contradictions and misbalances. The Perestroika solution was to transfer the
diversity of individualized social identities to the political mainstream, justified as
“democratic socialism.” It meant that the logic of political leadership demanded the
establishment of direct symbolic links with society, thus bypassing official institutions
and expressing solidarity with those who felt excluded and discriminated against by the
Soviet system.
As the crisis worsened, the ideology of Soviet leadership evolved from Mikhail
Gorbachev’s alliance with dissidents like nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov to Boris
Yeltsin who himself became a “dissident” by voluntarily resigning from Politburo.65
The exhaustion of resources forced Soviet leaders to look for alternative internal and
external bases for their political legitimacy. The Communist Party passed a number of
legal acts such as the Law on Individual Labor Activity (1986) or the Law on State
Enterprises (1987) that not only officially institutionalized fragmentation of the Soviet
national economy and central planning but also encouraged further disintegration under
slogans of enhancing economic efficiency. By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was no
longer able to service foreign debt obligations to compensate for internal misbalances.
In order to extend new loans Soviet authorities needed to meet the requirements of
international financial institutions and implement neoliberal reforms of social welfare
reduction, deregulation, and mass privatization.
65
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For global capitalism, these reforms anchored certain positions of national economies
within international value chains. For Soviet leaders dependence on foreign
investments was supposed to become a new economic basis for internal political
legitimacy. In order to justify reliance on external legitimization, the nomenklatura
tried to provide more freedom to units of the Soviet economy involved in underground
commercial activities in exchange for political support.66
The search for alternative internal and external sources of political legitimacy posed a
threat to Soviet authorities and the national integrity of the Soviet Union.
Democratization of Soviet society during Perestroika mobilized large numbers of
people into the political process, bringing in those with diverse social background who
had been previously excluded from the political mainstream. However, implementation
of neoliberal economic policies inside the country and reliance on a nascent Soviet
bourgeois class excluded the majority of society from economic and political activities
and worsened the problems of social inequality. These actions deprived Soviet leaders
of much-needed support.
On one hand, it was much easier to pursue commercial profit both on domestic and
foreign markets without being a part of the Soviet economy and even the Soviet state.
Economic freedom granted by the Communist Party obviated the need to check
economic actions with other aspects of the economic system and to reckon with labor
unions bearing additional mandatory expenses for social welfare. Simultaneously, there
was growing opposition that publicly challenged the legitimacy of the Communist Party
and tried to promote alternative projects for reforming Soviet politics and the economy
that varied from nationalists, to Stalinists, to human rights advocates.67
Perestroika meant deconstruction of the Soviet meta-narrative. It put the Communist
Party in a deadlock between the necessity to criticize the current state of affairs and an
inability to develop a new positive agenda. Public discussion about existing problems
during the “Era of Glasnost” helped to integrate individualized descriptions and claims
towards the Soviet state into political discourse.
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The “Revert to Lenin” campaign68 opened official ideology to arbitrary interpretations
under slogans of supposedly Leninist tactics of political pragmatism, thus allowing
deviations from Marxist basics when required.
This justified the transition from ideas of “peaceful co-existence with West” or
“convergence of Soviet and American systems” to complete renunciation of the Soviet
experience as a “deviation from world civilization” and the eventual transition to a
market economy. Simultaneously, criticism towards state violence and socialist
modernization during the Stalin period delegitimized any attempts to “re-build” Soviet
nationalism via a comprehensive ideological narrative.
As a result, the Communist Party failed to justify state interventions or to offer new
ideology to recover from a crisis; it had nothing with which to confront the onrushing
collapse of Soviet statehood.
The last desperate effort to hold onto power included a transition to personal
dictatorship and then, the total disintegration of state institutions. During the late 1980s,
when the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse, it had become popular to muse
about a national leader who would extricate the Soviet Union from sliding into chaos
and somehow combine the interests of the national bourgeoisie with the political will
of disadvantaged classes in pursuit of social justice. The image of a strong leader varied
from the Stalin-type to the Pinochet-type of dictator, one who would complete
neoliberal reforms and transition to market economy or re-establish the old order.
Conforming to this public mood, Mikhail Gorbachev tried to change his status from
leader of Communist Party to national leader, becoming the first President of the Soviet
Union, on March 15, 1990, without general elections. However, a similar process of
pursuing personal leadership on the regional level spread throughout the country. These
self-proclaimed “dictators” ranged from leaders of Soviet republics to local crime lords.
Eventually, a failed coup d'état on August 19, 1991, made it clear that Mikhail
Gorbachev could rely neither on crumbling Communist Party nor on alternative
political forces mobilized during Perestroika. The end of the year witnessed the
institutionalized disintegration of the Soviet Union.69
Conclusion: Towards the New World Order
President George H.W. Bush proclaimed the beginning of a New World Order on
January 17, 1991.
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Although the speech was about the beginning of airstrikes against Iraq, it had much
deeper meaning and wider implication. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
socialist camp in 1991, the United States was left as the only power that could set and
enforce international rules. Achievement of this superpower status was the result of
efficiently reforming political, economic and cultural aspects of American society in
response to crises.
Social turmoil during the 1960s significantly challenged a modernist vision of human
life and society. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, many shared a similar
illusion: that solutions to social problems lie principally in the field of economics.
As Zygmunt Bauman put it, modernity was preoccupied with “orderly, manageable
society, to make human affairs regular and amenable to planning and control.”70 Yet,
the horrors of two world wars dampened some illusions of progress, even though the
development of computer technologies, medical breakthroughs, meaningful social
progress, and several postwar economic booms occasionally restored the faith of many
in modernity.
Ironically, there is today a disintegration of global capitalism, as mankind confronts
what it was fighting six decades ago: namely de-humanization. While mainstream
culture around the globe summons individuals to discover and develop positive aspects
of their personality, on-going artificial intelligence advances foreshadow the possible
control of freedom and innovation in human life through algorithmizing of big data.
The experience of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union should
clearly demonstrate to contemporary mankind that attempts to ignore the human
dimension or to put diversity of social life into Procrustean bed of algorithms may have
devastating consequences.
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Civilizational Dynamics of "Hybrid Warfare"
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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, analysts have struggled to make sense of the
proliferation of smaller scale conflicts. Several labels have been used to describe this
phenomenon, the most recent being “Hybrid Warfare.” This paper attempts to analyze
them through the perspective of civilizational theory.
Very rarely, however, have the civilizational dimensions to these "Hybrid Wars" been
extensively addressed. Considering that civilizations represent collective identities on
perhaps the most macro-scale, they play an important potential dimension in this ongoing debate. Avoiding any gross simplified variation of a "clash of civilizations" type
thesis, a civilizational perspective into this debate can also shed significant insight into
the nature of intra-civilizational conflicts and how they might also overlap with any
inter-civilizational conflicts.
A civilizational perspective also raises the critical issue of the persistence of collective
identities, even in an increasingly globalized world.
Introduction
The end of the Cold War not only brought about a marked transition in world order; it
also marked a critical transitional moment from modern to “late-modern” forms of
warfare. Throughout this time, stretching from the 1990s to the present-day, numerous
terms have been proposed to define this phenomenon, among them “New Wars,”
“Asymmetrical,” “Non-Linear” and more recently “Hybrid.” Intense debates contend
about what are the significant differences between these terms, if any significant
differences do exist. However, analysts all seem to agree that the nature of warfare in
the post-Cold War world is seemingly more complex and chaotic than during the
previous Cold War era. Many have even argued that traditional military theory
(represented by Carl von Clausewitz) is absolutely obsolete in this environment.1
In parallel to these debates, in the early nineties, Samuel Huntington caused a huge
uproar with his analysis concerning what he regarded as a marked transition in global
geopolitics, from the age of ideological blocs to the one of a “clash of civilizations.”
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One marked aspect of this clash concerns what Huntington referred to as “fault-line
wars” that primarily are defined as “communal conflicts between states or groups from
different civilizations.”2 Certain parallels to the current rethinking of the nature of
warfare are intriguing and do deserve a reexamination in light of subsequent events and
research.
Aside from Huntington’s analysis of “fault-line wars,” there has been extraordinarily
little if any major attempt to analyze the phenomenon of post-Cold War conflicts
through the prism of civilizations or civilizational theory. Most literature related to
“hybrid warfare” refers to the tactical or strategic elements, while this paper seeks to
analyze these conflicts through the prism of what it can discern regarding civilizational
dynamics in the contemporary world.
It is primarily the clashes of collective identities that hold the most proper interest for
civilizational-based scholarship, for even the whole “clash of civilizations” thesis is
built upon this basic framework, albeit on a macro-scale. A proper civilizational
analysis need not be wed to only a macro-scale viewpoint, or at least not on any
simplistic model of such.
“Hybrid Wars” and the clash of collective identities need not involve simply the clash
of one civilization against another civilization; they may just as well involve clashes
within a civilization or rather one faction of a civilization battling within its own
civilization as well as battling factions of another civilization. This suggests the multifaceted nature of these conflicts and how they correspond to the multi-faceted nature
of civilizations and collective identities in and of themselves. This overlap implies a
certain civilizational ontology to such conflicts. The formal addressing of this element
has often been neglected within both the existing body of scholarship and the
established civilizational analysis. There are several possible reasons for this, which
shall hopefully be addressed to a sufficient extent within this paper. A proper synthesis
of the existing scholarships holds much potential for yielding meaningful results into
the underlining relationship of war and peace at the present moment in world history
and its potential future.
The multi-layered approach necessary for investigating the nature of hybrid wars is a
natural fit for a civilizational paradigm. Civilizational analysis also provides a fruitful
potential for enriching the scholarship in the field, given its proper interdisciplinary
nature. Too often over-specialization in scholarship can hinder investigating complex
phenomenon for the varying angles and paradigms necessary for obtaining a proper
comprehensive understanding.
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Humanity at the current moment faces a precarious state of affairs which lays at the
very heart of this explosion of hybrid wars. On the one hand, they testify to the
endurance of collective identities; however, at the very same time, the existence of
Globalization testifies to the reality of cosmopolitanism and a proper engagement with
that reality as well.3 This tension cannot be easily resolved, if such a resolution is even
possible. This is not necessarily a reason for despair, for tensions are part of the human
condition and can often provide outlets for human creativity.
Theoretical Outline of “Hybrid Warfare”
Among the first to analyze the shift in military conflicts in the post-Cold War era was
the noted Israeli Martin Van Creveld in his 1991 book The Transformation of War.
Creveld made the argument that the age of modern warfare, dominated by the modern
state, was over. In its place would be a shift to lower-scale tribal-forms of warfare that
would become the new norm.
As Creveld starts off his book: “A ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and
defense departments all over the ‘developed’ world — the fear of military impotence,
even irrelevance.”4
Towards the end of the decade, Mary Kaldor followed up with her analysis of so-called
“New Wars.” Whilst “Old Wars” were characterized by large-scale clashes between
states, “New Wars” are often characterized by smaller-scale clashes by varying
networks across both local and global contexts fought by varying forces. Examples
involve human trafficking, new forms of slavery such as in Libya, Boko Haram, ISIS,
al Qaeda and the global narco-traffickers; in addition, there are terrorists, insurgents,
and proxy actors such as in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq.5
“Old Wars” were predominantly about geopolitical objectives; “New Wars” are
primarily about asserting collective identity politics.6 The parallels to Creveld’s
analysis are striking. There was significant debate over the concept of “New Wars” that
predominated during the late 1990s and 2000s.7
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The context of Kaldor’s analysis was largely to make sense of the ethnic conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia as well as the struggle against terrorism, in the wake of the
attacks of September 11, 2001, which often necessitated the use of Humanitarian
Interventionism on the part of NATO forces as a response.
Since the 2010s there has been a shift towards a different conceptualization called
“Hybrid Warfare.” Frank Hoffman was the first to coin the term “Hybrid War” in 2007,
arguing that it constituted a combination of actors (both state and non-state) using a
mixture of regular and irregular military means to achieve their common strategic and
geopolitical objectives. 8
Although Frank Hoffman was the first to conceptualize “Hybrid Warfare,” he certainly
has not been the only scholar to write on the subject. Col. John J. McCuen (Ret.) further
explains the nature of “Hybrid Warfare” as follows:
Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought
not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict
zone population, the home front population, and the international community
population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately
determine success or failure. 9
Unfortunately, a major weakness of “Hybrid War” theory is that there is no consensus
about how exactly to define it, and many of the conflicts it seeks to analyze are still ongoing and thus difficult to analyze fully with precision. To avoid this difficulty, this
paper largely relies upon Frank Hoffman’s original conceptual framework.
While sharing many of the critical characteristics of the “New Wars,” there is one
significant difference in that the “New Wars” were generally characterized as being
conducted outside the sovereignty of the modern state. By contrast, “Hybrid Wars”
were characterized as being used by both state and non-state actors, and furthermore
derived from a blurring of the distinctions between the two.10
Part of this contrast can be explained by considering the contrasting geopolitical
contexts of their formulations.
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Much of the discourse of the “New Wars” was situated in the immediate post-Cold War
context of American and NATO hegemony that engaged in humanitarian interventions
and focused more on the prerogatives of non-state actors. Its paradigmatic example was
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 1990s.11 By contrast, the “Hybrid War”
discourse considers the resurgence of competing great powers (such as Russia, China,
India, etc.) and how such powers might exploit irregular and non-state forces to their
wider geopolitical ends.
As Alex Deep explained: “The unipolar moment that has persisted since the fall of the
Soviet Union has given rise to an international system in which unconventional
challenges to the idea of traditional state-on-state war are increasingly prevalent.”12 Its
paradigmatic case study remains the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the
continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine.
One major strength of the “New Wars” discourse was its analysis of the importance of
collective identities in such conflicts, and their continual role in a globalized world.
With the resurgence of populist nationalism throughout the world in the past decade,
this bleeds into the current discourse of “Hybrid War” as well.
A predominant weakness of the “New Wars” discourse was the emphasis of a certain
cosmopolitan approach to collective identities (both on the local and especially on the
global scale), which almost seeks to disregard the importance such identities hold upon
human groupings. Mary Kaldor herself is deeply dedicated to this cosmopolitan
approach.13 Given the geopolitical context of “New Wars” discourse explained above,
this made some sense.
By contrast, “Hybrid War” theorists tend to take into more proper consideration the
continual reality of great power competition. In another contrast to the “New Wars”
discourse, “Hybrid War” theorists tend not to focus so much on the importance of
nationalism and collective identity politics, but rather to focus more on the wider
geopolitical implications of the rise of powers capable of challenging American and
Western hegemony. Nationalism, if addressed, is usually interpreted as one tool of
such powers to expanding their spheres of influence.
In a comparable manner, the relevance of civilizations in connection with hybrid
warfare has largely been absent from the related scholarship. This is not an easy issue
to address, not in the least because it requires discerning the best conceptualization of
“civilization” that would be most appropriate for the task at hand. To achieve this goal,
a foundational look at the underlining nature or ontology of civilizations is required.
11
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Theoretical Outline of Civilizational Ontology
The dynamics of human identities are complex and operate upon varying levels. This
helps necessitate the need for a civilizational paradigm that can carefully consider these
complex levels that participate in hybrid wars. Whilst a certain “clash of civilizations”
type of scenario is involved here, it does not, however, account for the totality of such
realities.
To provide one famous example: the inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkans of the 1990s
were as much a “clash of civilizations” (Western Latin Catholics vs. Eastern Orthodox
vs. Islamic) but yet could also be simultaneously interpreted as an intra-cultural clash
between different groupings of a fairly common southern Slavic meta-culture (former
Yugoslavia in a certain political sense).
This type of dynamic is seen in other examples of hybrid war type conflicts—that the
conflicting sides are fighting for distinct identities (even civilizational ones at times),
yet at the same time these identities’ characteristics can be very blurred. The current
on-going conflict in Ukraine between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians presents a
similar perplexing dynamic involving two distinct historical identities that have strong
historical ties to one another as well.
This raises a fundamental concern for studies of Civilizational Ontology. Civilizational
Ontology is concerned with the underlining nature of civilizations and seeks to define
their fundamental characteristics.
This can prove to be an elusive task, as demonstrated by the innumerable definitions
for what exactly is considered a “civilization.” This difficulty is due to the inherent
complex natures of civilizations, which also further necessitate the need for a multiparadigmatic approach in Civilizational Ontology. This helps establish Civilizational
Ontology as a proper over-arching framework to properly synthesize the varying
definitions and approaches regarding civilizations.
Due to this multifaceted nature of civilizations, a certain Civilizational Uncertainty
Principle could be proposed as a foundational starting point for Civilizational
Ontology. This Civilizational Uncertainty Principle would stipulate that the more one
attempts to precisely define a civilization’s characteristics the less we know of its
essential qualities.
Working on certain metaphors with natural sciences such as physics and astronomy,
civilizations can be best understood as constituting cosmologies on their own accord.
Pitirim Sorokin spoke of a Socio-Cultural “universe” from which its dynamics could
be studied in depth.
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This would establish the multi-faceted and multi-layered natures of civilizational
reality, yet also note the holistic unity at its foundation—albeit a chaotic unity.
The Civilizational Uncertainty Principle should not be interpreted as negating the
necessity for precision in defining the characteristics of civilizations, but rather simply
stressing the inherent limitations in achieving an over-arching precision. Civilizations
do exist and can be defined with a certain amount of precision; yet too much precision
can come at the cost of totality. Totality is a necessity for any macro-scale study of
reality, and civilizations do represent a macro-scale reality in the human universe. As
E.F. Schumacher once explained:
Maybe it is necessarily so that the higher things cannot be known with the same degree
of certainty as can the lesser things, in which case it would be a very great loss if
knowledge were limited to things beyond the possibility of doubt.14
Even given these inherent limitations and uncertainty, certain fundamental
characteristics of civilizational ontology can be established. There are two main
approaches to analyzing civilizational ontology, which roughly parallels the distinction
between substances as opposed to processes that exist within philosophy.15 They are
not necessarily mutually exclusive, but this distinction can pose significant challenges
if the goal is to synthesize these two approaches properly because they have differing
implications. For example, most conceptions of the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis
often exemplify a more substance or essentialist style of analysis.16
An issue related to civilizational uncertainty as well as the distinction between
substantial and processual approaches regards civilizational borderlines. Patrick
Thaddeus Jackson summarized the dilemma:
It is quite challenging to determine where any one civilization ends and another begins,
even though every kind of analysis of what a civilization is or does depends, at least
implicitly on some sort of boundary-demarcation exercise.17
That means borderlines between civilizations can often be blurred. This should not
mean resorting to the opposite extreme of arguing that civilizational identities are
meaningless and that such borderlines do not exist.
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Rather, a more balanced argument could present such borderlines as operating on a
gradual spectrum of degrees as opposed to abrupt black/white dichotomies.
Participants in hybrid wars often resort to such dichotomies to help bolster the
distinction of friend and foe.
This presents a challenging complexity to hybrid warfare theory that parallels the
challenging complexities of civilizational ontology in general. A resort to a Weberian
Ideal Type methodology may be the best resource available to pinpoint distinct
characteristics of certain civilizations from one another, yet without sacrificing the
honest recognition of the peculiar contingent circumstances involved in each context.
Benjamin Nelson, a pioneering historical sociologist of civilizations, made it a goal of
his scholarship to help resolve this exact kind of issue. He famously argued about the
existence of “civilizational complexes” and “inter-civilizational encounters” as being
at the heart of civilizational analysis.18 This provides a potential framework to
synthesize the substantial and processual approaches more properly. This would
involve expanding Nelson’s bipartite model into a tripartite model as follows:
1. “Civilizational Complexes” (or “Civilizational Complexity”) involve the most
basic underlining principle. Civilizations are complex macro-scale social
entities.
2. “Intra-Civilizational Encounters:” Due to the inherently complex nature of
civilizations, many subgroups and sub-entities within civilizations will
internally interact with one another on various levels. This can take the form
of both cooperative and antagonistic forms.
3. “Inter-Civilizational Encounters:” Civilizations can and often do interact with
one another in external forms as well, but like its internal counterpart can take
the form of both cooperative and antagonistic forms.
This model can help establish the complicated and overlapping nature of civilizational
encounters as noted above related to the hybrid wars phenomenon. Hybrid Wars cannot
be simply reduced to a simplistic “clash of civilizations” scenario, even if on the surface
it might have the appearance of such. Rather, as mentioned in the example of the
current clashes between Ukraine and Russia, it can be as much a clash within
civilizations as a clash between civilizations.
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This is reflective of the on-going processes of Globalization that have produced the
possibility for greater interconnections around the world, even producing the
possibility for the creation of a world-wide “meta-civilization.” This has had the effect
of further blurring the distinctions between “inter” and “intra” civilizational
encounters. “Hybrid warfare” can possibly be considered a predominant form of
“civilizational encounters” of the contemporary world. It is, so to speak, the other side
of the coin of an increasingly globalized world.
The entire nature of the debate concerning the underlining principles of civilizational
ontology and analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on the
relevance of civilizations and civilizational analysis in regard to contemporary forms
of hybrid warfare. It is hopeful that a useful preliminary introduction to the relevant
issues has been presented to create a workable framework to proceed further in
research.
Hybrid Wars and Geopolitical Prospects
The question then arises: what is to be done, or rather what can be done, about the
hybrid wars phenomenon? There are no simple or easy answers to such questions,
although it must be acknowledged they do raise particularly prominent issues that must
be properly addressed. Among them is the harsh truth that warfare is both a potential
and an actual reality in our world. The paradox one must contemplate is that peace
itself is dependent upon military force to become a reality in the modern world. War
thus has not become obsolete, as many such as Steven Pinker have argued, but rather
may be the best possible means for securing peace.
This paradox is borne in the issue of deterrence being among the best means for
securing peace. During the Cold War, nuclear-based mutually assured destruction
(M.A.D.) was a critical factor in preventing direct military conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
It can also be argued that the military predominance of the United States over that of
any other potential major military rival in the post-Cold War world has been a critical
factor in the decline of inter-state wars as well.19 The conceptual framework presuming
that peace and warfare as mutually exclusive is counterproductive for such purposes,
especially in the age of hybrid wars which themselves break traditional frameworks for
understanding warfare.
This means that “war,” “peace,” and even “deterrence” can and often do mean different
things depending upon the historical, civilizational, and geopolitical contexts involved.
Siniša Malešević. “Is War Becoming Obsolete? A Sociological Analysis” in The Sociological
Review, 62: S2, pp.65-86. 2014.
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The age of hybrid wars would necessitate a different understanding of “deterrence”
than what existed in the Cold War. A suitable form of “deterrence” in the age of hybrid
wars would include not just nuclear weapons but, as James K. Wither explains, would
also have to expand into “the application of specific political, informational, economic,
diplomatic” as well as traditional military means.20
Hybrid Wars are paradoxically not only a means of deterrence but also a means around
deterrence as well. To provide one contemporary example: Russia may not be able to
invade and to conquer parts of eastern Ukraine directly, as might have been possible in
a nineteenth or early twentieth century context. (Crimea remains the only exception.)
Not only could it prove too costly for Russia to mount a direct invasion, but it faces a
severe blow to its international reputation as well. However, giving support to proRussian paramilitary forces as a means to help extend its geopolitical interests in the
region is a more viable option for Russia to pursue. At the same time, such paramilitary
forces could use the indirect Russian support to help further their own ends as well
within the Ukrainian realm.
As military analysts Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky explain, this ultimately
leads to a situation where “the unplanned succession of different tools to fit different
— often unexpected — operational realities” takes its full effect.21
There is the more civilizational-orientated paradigm that enters into this mix as well.
Sticking to the Ukrainian example above, Samuel Huntington argued back in 1993 that
it provided a potential “clash of civilizations” between the Catholic Uniate West and
the Orthodox East.22
In light of the current situation, subsequent civilizational analysis proves a certain
rethinking of Huntington’s paradigm.
•
•
•

For one thing, the current clashes seem as much between the Ukrainian
Orthodox against the Russian Orthodox—which would indicate an “intracivilizational clash.”
Second, the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Uniate Catholics seem more
united against the Orthodox Russians.
Third, the Ukrainian Uniate Catholic Church is an Eastern-rite of the Catholic
Church, with liturgies and theology remarkably similar to the Eastern Orthodox.

James K. Wither. “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare,” Connections. Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2016),
pg. 86.
21
Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky. “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War.’” Wilson Center.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/7KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf Accessed 5/20/2020.
22
Huntington, pg. 37.
20
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Fourth, the issue of a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent of the
authority of the Moscow Patriarchate was a major issue which even resulted in
a full schism between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical
Patriarch in Istanbul in 2018.

The underlining point is that in this example it can be remarkably difficult to determine
which civilizations are clashing exactly. This relates to a larger issue of how best to
define what “civilization” even means in a given geopolitical context.
Civilizations and geopolitical blocs do not necessarily correspond with one another as
Huntington presumed when he articulated his “clash of civilizations” model,23 almost
in a manner of projecting the Cold War model of two monolithic blocs opposed to one
another into the realm of civilizations. This approach, while still common at the time
of Huntington’s writing, neglects the greater complexity of the Cold War, in which
different factions sought to exploit the support of one of the two major superpowers to
further their own interests.
This was especially the case in terms of the relationship between the Soviet Union and
Communist China, which ended in a bitter ideological split and conflict.
In an analogous manner, civilizations should not be interpreted as monolithic, either.
This is not to suggest that civilizations are irrelevant to geopolitics, but that the manner
in which they are relevant should not simply be reduced to clashes between groups of
differing civilizations. The Ukraine case, as explained above, helps to demonstrate the
difficulties that can arise when attempting to impose such a model on actual realities.
In fairness to Huntington, the events in Ukraine transpired long after he first formulated
his theories and subsequently never had the opportunity to modify his model to suit the
current situation due to his death in 2008. It should also be pointed out that Huntington
acknowledges the difficulty of trying to pinpoint the exact boundaries between
civilizations,24 which corresponds to the Civilizational Uncertainty Principle
articulated earlier. Nevertheless, these do not negate the significant weaknesses and
flaws in Huntington’s model that should be further reexamined in light of current
circumstances.
Given these kinds of circumstances in which hybrid wars tend to thrive, peace may not
necessarily mean the complete absence of violence but rather the lack of escalation in
violence to mutually assured destruction levels of intensity.

23
24

Ibid., pg. 21.
Ibid., pg. 43.
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Research concerning the violence in the former Yugoslavia had led researcher Yaneer
Bar-Yam to conclude that “well defined boundaries that allow for more local
autonomy”25 may be the best means to resolving such long-term tensions between
warring groups. These may not necessarily correspond to civilizational boundaries
(which are difficult to pinpoint), but no doubt civilizational analysis could play a
critical role in helping to discern where those boundaries do exist.
Conclusion
The analysis of contemporary forms of warfare continues to be an on-going issue. It is
vitally important that Civilizational Analysis should play a critical role in helping
understand this aspect of our world.
There already exists ample precedence for Civilizational Analysis being applied to the
general study of warfare, as Matthew Melko’s example was able to demonstrate.26
There is also the analogous increase of scholarship related to the subject matter that
already exists in the field of Sociology and Social Evolution studies.27 Therefore, it is
not out of the question for Civilizational Analysis to be able to investigate this
phenomenon thoroughly as well.
This paper does not intend to present an exhaustive investigation into the matter, but
rather seeks to help provide a foundation for further research by civilizational scholars.
The subject of contemporary forms of hybrid warfare is complex enough that it could
be studied from any number of paradigmatic angles. It would also be paramount to
avoid any simplistic definitions of civilizations and applying them in ahistorical and
inappropriate contexts.
This was among the fundamental flaws of Samuel P. Huntington’s model, which also
emphasized too much the “clash” as well. Contemporary hybrid warfare is more
complex than that and may actually include clashes within civilizations as much as
between them. However much we may dislike it, warfare remains a critical part of our
world.
It is necessary for civilizational analysts to pay close attention to hybrid warfare if it
seeks to better understand the world as it exists.

Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Solving ethnic violence,” New England Complex Systems Institute (June 15,
2017). https://necsi.edu/solving-ethnic-violence Accessed 5/21/2020.
26
Matthew Melko. General war among great powers in world history. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen
Press, 2001.
27
Siniša Malešević. The Sociology of War and Violence. Cambridge University Press, 2010. As well as
Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations. Pi Press, 2005.
25
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By doing so, their perspective would be greatly welcomed, since by nature they are
comfortable with investigating complex human social groups and behaviors which lay
at the heart of the very phenomenon of civilizations.
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The Psychology Department, Brandeis University in the 1960s:
A Comment on Feigenbaum’s Memoir
David Lester1
David.Lester@stockton.edu
Kenneth Feigenbaum has written a colorful account of his time as a faculty member of
the Department of Psychology at Brandeis University from 1962-1965 and his
interactions with Abraham Maslow (Comparative Civilizations Review: No. 82. 63-73,
2020). This view, from the perspective of the graduate students, supplements
Feigenbaum’s account.
I applied to the Department of Psychology in 1963. I was finishing up my B.A. in
psychology at St. John’s College, Cambridge University, and I had decided to emigrate
to the United States. (I had met a family in California who agreed to sponsor me.) I
applied to the University of California, Berkeley. I did not know that American
undergraduates applied to several graduate schools, and so I was content with that one
application.
However, I noticed a flier on a bulletin board from Brandeis University offering
fellowships for foreign students, and I decided to apply, even though it was on the other
side of the country from Berkeley.
My psychology advisor and I checked on the psychology faculty at Brandeis, and we
had not heard of any of them, including Abraham Maslow. (The psychology
department at Cambridge University was a Department of Experimental Psychology.)
Berkeley did not offer me a scholarship. Brandeis did, and so I chose Brandeis.
I did not get the foreign student fellowship, but instead a Charles Revson Science
Fellowship which paid my tuition and $3,000 a year for living expenses. (The foreign
fellowship went to John Benjafield from Canada who graduated and rose to become a
Full Professor at Brock University in Canada.) Since Kenneth Feigenbaum was in
charge of graduate admissions, I must thank him sincerely for admitting me.
In my first year, I was assigned to Jerome Wodinsky to run a rat study for him, and that
led to my interest in animal research. During my three years there, I carried out and
published many studies on exploratory behavior in rats. The psychological department
paid for the food and shavings for the rats and for the first few batches of rats.

1
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I eventually started my own breeding colony to save the department expenses (even
keeping the rats in my apartment). The department never asked me what research I
was doing or even about my research publications.
Having now learned who Maslow was, I wanted to take a course with him. He was not
offering graduate courses because, he said, graduate students were too angry and,
therefore, a nuisance. I took an undergraduate course on utopias with him that he teamtaught with Frank Manuel. It was an interesting course, and Maslow let Manual, a
dynamic individual, take the lead in the course. Since I was now the only current
graduate student that Maslow knew, he asked me to be his teaching assistant for his
undergraduate course. Of course, I accepted.
His teaching style continued to be low-key. At one point, the students in the seminar
told Maslow that he was talking too much and that he should be quiet until they asked
him a question. He agreed – for two weeks. Then he shut them up and took over again.
In my first year there were eight entering graduate students, and, under the Maslow
culture, we were the last students who were allowed to choose our own topic for our
dissertations. (Thereafter, graduate students were assigned to help faculty with faculty
research.) I chose suicide. Since no one in the department knew anything about
suicide, I was assigned to a new faculty member, Melvin Schnall, who was a
developmental psychologist.
The psychology department, led by Ricardo Morant as chairperson, had three groups:
experimental psychologists, humanistic psychologists and clinicians, and the three
groups did not seem to get along. However, in my three years there, I got to know and
to learn the theories of three major figures in the field. There was Maslow, of course,
and in my second year George Kelly came. In addition, for one semester each year,
Walter Toman, an Austrian psychoanalyst, came and taught his modern, rational
version of Freudian theory. Maslow thought that a major, but ignored, theorist of
personality was Andras Angyal, and Maslow convinced me that Angyal had, indeed,
proposed a powerful theory of personality. (Eugenia Hanfman and Richard Jones of the
psychology department edited Angyal’s essays for a book on his theory.)
These three theorists (Angyal, Kelly and Toman) are the underpinnings of my own
theory of personality, and I am still amazed that this small department of psychology
should have introduced me to three major theories of the mind.
What was the mood of the graduate students? We had our own lounge in the department
and a few offices for the senior graduate students. The mood was one of gaiety and
support. We had a pet gerbil in the lounge named Harry Harlow.
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On one occasion, a new faculty member (Harvey London) was showing his
undergraduate students the film of Stanley Milgram’s obedience research, but he would
not the graduate students in to view it. We called Maslow at home to protest, and
Harvey had to let us in.
As for supporting one another, we were allowed to attend dissertation defenses and ask
questions and, on one occasion a graduate student (Myron Arons) asked a question.
We took him aside and told him that the unwritten rule was that, even though we were
allowed to, graduate students never asked questions.
An interesting contrast came when George Kelly arrived. He brought his best graduate
student with him (Jack Adams-Webber), and he developed some followers in the
department. Early in his seminar, Kelly said that he wanted to split the seminar into
two groups – one for him and one against him. This was despite Kelly’s own theoretical
construct of constructive alternativism. His supporters argued him out of this because,
they said, they wanted to hear the critical questions and his response to them.
Maslow was on my dissertation committee. I went to his office where he was lying on
his couch. I sat in his chair at his desk and waited. “David, I would never write a
dissertation like this.” My stomach churned. “But who I am to tell you how to write
your dissertation? I think you will be a good psychologist. Are you happy with it?”
“Yes, Dr. Maslow,” I replied. “If you’re happy with it, then I am,” and he signed the
form. Maslow was true to his theory. I was allowed to self-actualize rather than help
him actualize his potential.
What of my path through the psychology department? I continued my research on rats
(eleven published papers by the end of 1967). The department did not offer a master’s
degree. You were given an M.A. if they threw you out. I told them that I wanted an
honest M.A. I applied for an M.A., much to their dismay. I had published articles in
Psychological Bulletin (on the fear of death) and some research articles on the fear of
death, and so the department awarded me an M.A. on that topic, using my published
papers.
My thesis advisor (Schnall) had a rule passed that graduate students could not publish
without faculty permission. I went to Ricardo Morant, the chairperson, and protested.
I had published far more than Schnall, and so he also should have to get approval.
Morant calmed me down, and we found a way around the rule, basically letting me
ignore it.
The result was that Schnall threw me out, and I asked James Klee to be my thesis
advisor even though it was already written. He agreed.
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My thesis defense was scheduled while Schnall was teaching, and the thesis defense of
Schnall’s student was scheduled while Klee was teaching. And no graduate student
asked me any questions at my defense!
Myron Arons, a graduate student starting in 1965, left with only a master’s degree and
persuaded James Klee to join the faculty at West Georgia College in 1970.
(Feigenbaum has his dates wrong here.) Klee died in 1996. Maslow retired in 1969
and moved to California where he died in 1970. Kelly died in 1967. Schnall was
denied tenure and became a child psychologist in Massachusetts.
Feigenbaum is correct in that the psychology department at Brandeis shows no interest
in its history. Several years ago, I tried to get their help in tracing all the graduate
students from the early years. They declined to help. Of my group of eight, three
finished their PhDs – myself, John Benjafield and Clair Golomb.
A final note. At one point, as an angry young man, I said to Marianne Simmel (a
professor in the psychology department) that Maslow had produced only one good idea
in his life. “David, if you have one good idea, you’ll be very happy,” she said.
I am still waiting for that one good idea.
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Response to Prof. Ernest B. Hook’s
Comments On “So-Called Euroasianism”
Dimitry Shlapentokh
dshlapen@iusb.edu
I was quite pleased by the fact that a professor, a full professor from the prestigious
University of California Berkeley, not only read my article, but commented on it.
(Comparative Civilizations Review: No. 82. 129, 2020) Indeed, millions of articles are
published every year, and the vast majority are absolutely ignored.
In order to respond to Professor Hook’s criticisms, I believe I need to do the following:
1) To provide a short synopsis of my article, “The Twisted Mirror of Perception:
Social Science in Service of Political/Ideological Expediency – The Case of
Russian Eurasianism.” (Comparative Civilizations Review: No. 81. 9-29, 2019)
It will help those potential readers who did not read my original article.
2) I would not elaborate on Prof. Hook’s assertion that I am a “Putinist” and do
not see the evil of Putin’s dictatorship. The reason for this is simple: the
response requires another long, separate letter. And my present response is long
enough. At the same time, I would be happy to respond to Professor Hook’s
statement in a separate letter, of course upon request. Also, Professor Hook as
well as others, of course, could find useful information about my views about
Putin’s regime in my forthcoming book, to be released by Palgrave.
3) I will focus on two of Professor Hook’s objections:
a) I claim that Francis Fukuyama was almost universally accepted in the
beginning of the post-Cold War era, and
b) I claim that both Gorbachev by the end of his tenure and Yeltsin were
viewed quite negatively by the majority of Russians.
Prof. Hook published a critical response to my article on the fate of Eurasianism, the
idiosyncratic political/philosophical doctrine which emerged among Russian émigrés
in the 1920s. I hold that interest in the creed in the United States and assessment of its
influence in Russia has been related not so much to the influence of the teaching in
Russia, but to the need of the “market,” the general public, political and economic elite,
and academia. And this implicitly shows how intellectual output is produced in the
West, especially the USA.
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Consequently, Western scholars ignored or marginalized Eurasianism when it was
quite popular in Russia, plainly because Eurasianism, with its stress on Russian cultural
uniqueness and penchant for authoritarian/totalitarian rule, did not fit the prevailing
Fukuyamian “end of history.” At the same time, interest in the creed re-emerged in the
2000s and especially after 2014, when American observers started to assert that
Eurasianism, or at least such people as Alexander Dugin, became quite influential in
shaping Kremlin policy.
It was done at the time when interest in Eurasianism in Russia had declined sharply and
Dugin became a political non-entity for the Kremlin.
The reason for such changes in views was, once again, the need of the American public,
at least a good part of it – the socio-economic and related political elite. All of them
wanted to present Russia as an insane imperialist, pouncing on the peaceful West.
Thus, I conclude that many Western, especially American, scholars do not so much
study events “as they are,” to paraphrase Leopold von Ranke’s famous expression, but
as a “marketable” intellectual product, often decorated with a postmodernist “fig leaf.”
The assumption that American scholars do not engage in abstract detached research but
often instinctively look for “marketable” intellectual output, whereas the market could
be the public, academia, or government, apparently irritated Prof. Hook and led him to
respond to my article, raising several objections. I will limit my analysis to two of
them. First, he challenged my assumption that the premise of Fukuyamism was
universally accepted. Secondly, he challenged my statement that Gorbachev and
Yeltsin were hated by the majority.
Let me start with his first premise. I am a historian, and one of the principles of the
craft is to look at a phenomenon from a historical perspective. Timing is often, albeit
not always, essential. If I were to state that Fukuyamism is prevailing today, I would
definitely be wrong. After Trump’s victory, the rise of “populism” and the statement
of Fukuyama himself, who often started to sound quite un-Fukuyamian, one could
indeed state that the idea of total domination of the “end of history” is far-fetched.
Moreover, there is one publication in a most prestigious press which elaborates on some
ideas that were unthinkable, almost obscene, a generation ago. Jason Brennan
published a book entitled Against Democracy. The major notion of the book is
surprisingly simple: the idea of one-man-one-vote is dangerous. The point here is that
the average American is just a primitive, illogical “basket of deplorables,” if one would
remember Hillary Clinton’s expression, and their collective decisions could be
disastrous. Thus, only a few educated persons should make decisions.
There was hardly novelty in this idea.
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Even those who had the most perfunctory knowledge of history or political thought
would state that such an idea has been in circulation for more than 2,000 years, at least
from the time of Plato and Confucius. It looks as if it was widely circulated in presentday China. At least this idea was elaborated to me in impeccable English by a young
Chinese woman with whom I strolled along by a lake in the summer residence of the
Chinese emperors.
The extraordinary nature of the book is the fact that it was published by a leading
academic publishing house (Princeton University Press). There is no doubt that at the
time when Fukuyama penned his famous essay, the proposal for such a book would be
immediately rejected by any Western publisher, more so by such a prestigious one as
Princeton University Press.
Jason Brennan is hardly alone in his views on democracy and implicitly on average
Westerners, especially Americans. Tom Nichols, a contributor to the prestigious
Foreign Affairs, lamented that present-day average Americans ignore the views of
experts and have become stupid, arrogant zombies. The present-day intellectual and,
implicitly, political arrangements are nothing but the road to “idiocracy” and “in such
an environment, anything and everything becomes possible, including the end of
democracy and republican government itself.” (Tom Nichols, “How America lost faith
in expertise. And why that’s a giant problem,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2017,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/how-america-lostfaith-e...)
Tom Nichols’s view on democracy and implicitly the hoi polloi is structurally similar
to Brennan’s, albeit not without a difference: For Brennan, the “deplorable” is still in
power and should be replaced by the rule of the enlightened authoritarian elite, for
Nichols the elite is still in power. Still, its enlightened rule could be challenged by
rising “deplorables.”
Yet, with all their differences, both authors implicitly conclude that democracy as it is
usually understood is not a workable institution. So, when I state that Fukuyamism
was almost totally embraced in the West, especially in the USA, I mean not today or
even more so tomorrow, when authoritarianism and, possibly even totalitarianism,
could be increasingly in vogue, especially if the economy tanks. However, I am
speaking of what was true more than 30 years ago, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
If Fukuyamism were not the dominant trend, anti-Fukuyamian ideas would be visible
and manifest themselves either in publications in leading mass media, books and, last
but not least, employment of those who opposed the creed in leading universities, think
tanks, etc. And here, the authors of those articles and books, well placed in prestigious
positions, could well challenge Fukuyama’s statement about American capitalism as
the best among all possible arrangements.
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They could note that the United States is hardly the promised land from all perspectives.
Already by the late 1980s the process of the country’s deindustrialization was in full
swing and while factories were closing, the statistics faithfully recorded an economic
rise. High inflation, often marginalized by statistics, was also underway, making higher
education and medical services increasingly out of reach for the majority. And of
course in the future, it would affect housing and even food. As a matter of fact the
present-day economic troubles could be traced to this time.
Indeed, the current pandemic is a case of just an acceleration of the economic decline,
with generations-long roots. One might remember here that the Black Death did not
prevent the flourishing of the Renaissance, and the Spanish Flu did not stop the advent
of the “Roaring Twenties,” despite the fact that both these pandemics led to a
catastrophic loss of life. Finally, these observers could well pay much more attention
than Fukuyama did to urban ghettos, populated by minorities. Their residents were
poor, desperate, criminalized and ready for violence.
The critics of Fukuyama’s ideas shall be connected with the view of China. As a matter
of fact, the publication of Fukuyama’s essay coincided with the brutal suppression of
protests in the center of Beijing. The observers could have noted that while these
actions were brutal – thousands were killed – it was the only way to save the country
from chaos and disintegration, and preservation of its totalitarian skeleton, essential for
China’s spectacular rise.
There is no doubt that these views circulated, at least in foreign countries. They could
well exist in the USA, and if they were indeed spread, those who embrace them could
well elaborate on their views on the pages of leading mass media, publishing their
monographs with prestigious presses, such as Princeton University, where a similar
treatise would be published thirty years later. And, of course, they could have been
employed by major universities, think tanks, and government offices. From their
position they could argue with supporters of Fukuyama’s creed.
The conflict between opposite views propagated by people with the same social status
would help to develop social thought in a truly unfettered manner. Is not the USA
supposedly a place of the “free market of ideas”? Still, those people who would preach
these ideas not only would not be published in leading publishing houses and teach in
top universities, but they, most likely, would not have any academic employment at all
even if openings were in abundance. They would most likely drive cabs or flip burgers.
The second question in the letter was related to my views that most Russians started to
hate Yeltsin and Gorbachev soon after their rise. Prof. Hook noted that my claims are
not substantiated, for no public opinion polls indicate the feelings of the majority.
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Moreover, he could well note that all Western monographs and countless articles
present both of them as heroic individuals and it was suggested that the majority of
Russians were quite pleased with them, the liberators from the totalitarian grip.
These, like many other political and historical images, are axiomatic in American
political science and public opinion in general. I remember that when Yeltsin died, I
was interviewed by local radio about him. Still, when I stated that many Russians had
no good feelings about Yeltsin, the interview was abruptly ended. So much for the
“free market of ideas.”
The subject of the study of public opinion has some personal importance to me. I am
a historian by training and interests, albeit I became more interested in more recent
events by the end of my academic career – I am 69 now. Still, my late father, Vladimir
Shlapentokh, a professor at Michigan State University for almost 40 years, pioneered
in the study of public opinion in the USSR. (He also published a dozen books and
countless articles in the USA.)
As in the beginning of my letter, I noted that time is quite important to the study of a
phenomenon. For present-day Russians in their 20s and 30s, not only Gorbachev but
Yeltsin also are the stuff of their parents and grandparents. They could not compare
Yeltsin’s Russia and even more so Gorbachev’s USSR with the pre-perestroika Soviet
regime.
When I noted that most people hated Gorbachev and Yeltsin I meant people of my age
range, 50s through 70s and above, those who could compare Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s
era with the late/pre-Gorbachev Soviet periods.
Life in the late Soviet Union was hardly pleasant for the majority of Soviets. The
problem was not the absence of “liberties” and “democracy” (of course free from the
“perversion” of “populism”) but for another, more mundane reason. The food supply
was not adequate – meat was in great shortage in most provincial cities – living quarters
were crowded and consumer goods, such as clothing, were often of low quality; at least
these clothes were often made without any concern for fashion.
It was these problems which concerned the vast majority of Russians, especially those
who lived in the provinces, where the supply – of course centralized by the state – was
much scantier than in the capital and, possibly, a few other big cities. While the lives
of most ordinary Russians were hardly glamorous, the West, especially the USA, was
perceived as a place of riches, glamor, and all conceivable pleasures, mostly, of course,
sensual ones. A few Soviets, mostly highly-positioned figures, who visited the West
in official positions and were treated accordingly by their also well-placed hosts, also
brought this glamorous vision of the West.
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They also might have informed their interlocutors back in the USSR that the average
Westerner, especially the average American, is quite friendly to strangers and always
smiles, quite different from the grim-looking Soviet bureaucrats and average Soviets
in the crowd.
Thus, the West and related capitalist democracies were indeed viewed by many average
Russians in the context of Fukuyamism, long before the publication of his essay.
It was not surprising that quite a few cheered at the emergence of Gorbachev, the
smiling, affable leader who promised to lead Soviets, if not to full-fledged American
capitalism to at least “socialism” in a Bernie Sanders fashion. They were as excited as
most émigrés who first saw the contours of skyscrapers in Manhattan.
Still, soon enough, the excitement was short-lived. It was not because Gorbachev’s
reforms and “openness” and “perestroika” (restructuring) slowed its course. Actually,
with each year, there was more and more “openness.” The results on the ground were,
however, hardly pleasing. Soviet food supermarkets were hardly well-stocked,
especially in the provinces. Still, they became almost empty as “openness” progressed.
Finally, they would be stocked again. Still, the prices, including for staples, rose to
unbelievably high levels, at least in relation to the average Russian salary.
Moreover, increasingly, even formally working people did not receive their salaries
and had no place to go besides being criminals. Indeed, crime, including violent crime,
became increasingly a part of daily life. Prostitution also became pandemic. All of
these processes intensified considerably when Yeltsin came to power. In addition, not
only did the USSR fall apart, but millions of ethnic Russians, actually any Russianspeaking folk, became a peculiar new edition of Sudetendeutsch, and discriminated
against in many post-Soviet republics. In addition, NATO forces moved closer to
Russia’s borders. What should have been the feeling of the majority, those whose
views were often ignored by Western media?
Of course, these people have nothing but revulsion toward both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
And many of them, those who are in their 70s and who remember well the late
Brezhnev’s Russia and the USSR, transformed the past into an almost ideal society.
They have rediscovered, retrospectively, the goodness of late Soviet rule: absolute job
security, the stability of prices for staples, miniscule payments for rent and utilities,
free higher education and medical services, etc. All problems were forgotten.
To understand the feelings of these people one needs to be engaged in Gallup polls.
One might add here that polls, even in the United States, are not always reliable when
the pollsters, like many intellectuals, are more concerned with production of
“politically correct” results rather than studying reality, as I noted in my article. One
could remember the recent presidential campaign.
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Donald Trump, the Republican contender, was clearly not just a misogynist but a rapist.
His obscenity violated all political taboos. All the pundits were sure that such a person
could not be elected as president. Thus, practically all polls predicted Trump’s defeat.
Still, he was elected.
I clearly do not agree with Prof. Hook’s statements. Still, I understand that the major
problem with my article was not so much my statements that a) Fukuyamism was the
dominant creed, at least in the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and seen as
universally applicable, and that b) hatred of Gorbachev (in the later years of his tenure)
and Yeltsin was widespread. Not even my alleged “Putinism” was the reason for this
rancor.
The reason, most likely, is different. I asserted that quite a few Western, especially
American, scholars, in a way American intellectuals in general, do not so much study
a phenomenon as it is but produce “marketable” products for “peer-reviewed” scholars
or the broader public at large. Prof. Hook clearly does not accept this notion. Still,
even critics are important, for they provide a framework for intellectual discourse and
development of social thought.
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Book Reviews
J. C. Sharman. Empires of the Weak: The Real Story of
European Expansion and the Creation of the New World Order.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019
Reviewed by Niv Horesh1
N.Horesh@westernsydney.edu.au
Division of Arts,Western Sydney University, Australia
Introduction
Warfare had undergone many revolutionary changes over the centuries. Hittite chariots,
for example, are said to have spread east and south bolstering aristocracies at the dawn
of urbanization some three thousand years ago. Then, the quality of swords and
armouries infinitely improved, as the infantry steadily took centre stage, and the Iron
Age swept across Eurasia and, later on, Africa. The Chinese invented the crossbow as
early as the 7th Century BCE, and Hannibal surprised the Romans with elephants few
centuries later.
Presaging modern conscription, the Greek city states lined up citizen hoplites in
impervious phalanxes during the Classical era, while the Caliphs later relied on slavesoldiers in no small measure. The Romans are credited, in turn, with elaborate
fortifications and catapults, and these later trans-morphed into the famous trace
italienne. Early Christianity is credited with the doctrine of just war (jus bellum justum),
and Confucianism with war aversion.
The Mongols famously used gunpowder, and the technology gradually spread from the
East Asia through the Islamic World to Europe. More importantly, they demonstrated
the importance of mounted archery skills. In the end, it was ironically gunpowder
weapons that would eradicate the danger to sedentary societies from nomads like the
Mongols themselves. What is more, the Mongols did not just impart knowledge but
learnt in fact a good deal from European siege methodology.2
On the high seas, the Byzantines famously employed oil explosives (“Greek fire”). The
Ottomans employed fast oared ships, and the Portuguese sailed fast ocean-going
carracks in the 1400s. Yet, at much the same time, the famous Zheng He fleet possessed
much bigger ocean-going ships, which was loaded with thousands of Chinese marines,
among other cargo. The seas were getting more crowded, but blue-water warfare was
rare until the 1600s.
1
2

This book review by Niv Horesh is entitled Warfare and Modernity in World History: Re-examination
Peter Frankopan (2015), The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (Bloomsbury), p. 160.
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True, by uniquely mounting cannons on ships the Portuguese were able to gain a toehold
in far-flung corners of the planet. Recall the compass here: it was needed to get to those
corners but had actually been a Chinese invention. Peter Lorge therefore concludes that
early-modern warfare was actually a Chinese invention even if European armies
markedly grew in size in that era. To be sure, China developed a centralised taxation
system with which to fund its large standing army earlier. Recall here, too, that the
Chinese had actually invented gunpowder to begin with.
Clearly, innovation was not just Western but a two-way street throughout history. Yet,
Parker famously postulated in the 1990s that European warfare had been from the outset
distinct: it was technologically superior and expensive. So it was requiring a larger tax
revenue than elsewhere. The nub of the argument on European distinction defaults to
the consistent improvement of muskets and cannons, although Michael Roberts had
earlier in the 1950s also stressed innovative tactics. And more recently, Jeremy Black
also called attention to European cartography and intelligence gathering as superior.
In sum, Roberts showed that the distinction between Europe and “the rest” started
showing up in the 1500s with the advent of gunpowder technology, mercantilism and
high taxation. And as Charles Tilly would later famously conclude his study of earlymodern Europe, ‘wars made states and states made war’.
Nevertheless, since the 2000s, a growing chorus of scholars have cast doubts on the
extent to which European polities can be seen to be distinct. At first, the research onus
was on comparative standards of living, where early modern China was seen to be just
as affluent as Europe, according to Kenneth Pomeranz for example. From another
perspective, Robert Markley ably showed the misgivings that some early modern
European writers had about the status of Europe against that of the giant land empires
of Asia.
Lately, attention has shifted to warfare whereby scholars like Tonio Andrade have
admirably detailed the tenuousness of European presence in East Asia in the 1600s. Yet
even Andrade concedes that by the early 1800s, China had fallen so far behind the West
in gunpowder technology that it was easily defeated by Britain in the Opium War. True,
as Kaushik Roy suggests, the technological gap may have been smaller in India, and
gunpowder weapons may have not mattered on the battlefield there as much to begin
with. But India was considerably colonised, and closer to Europe than China.
Situating the Book Under Review
Herein Jason Sharman intervenes with a beautifully written and cogently argued book
exhorting us against reading too much 1800s history into the 1600s-1700s. For
Sharman gets to grips with his subject matter with both historical and social-science
acumen.
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Echoing Pomeranz, Sharman posits that Europeans had no technological or institutional
advantage over Asian land empires before the Industrial Revolution even if Asian
polities were less interested in naval expansion. In other words, frequent wars in Europe
did not necessarily entail improved performance on the battleground elsewhere.
Barry Buzan and Richard Little would no doubt agree with Sharman that the
Westphalian system in Europe, created as it was as a result of the traumatic Thirty Years
War, is largely irrelevant to other parts of the world in terms of theory. That war and
modernity are conceptually so intertwined does call for a larger case-study palette.
However, as will soon become apparent, the emergence of the “national debt” economy
in Europe, which later spread around the world, undergirding an expansion of armies,
is one key dimension of the story largely absent in the book.
Sharman may also needlessly overstate the case against Eurocentrism when he writes
right at the outset that nothing interesting happened in Europe since Roman times. So
does his claim that, Atlantic slavery notwithstanding, Europeans and African rulers
were on equal terms in the 1500s (p. 49).
More to the point, Sharman also seems to be overstating the case when arguing that the
styles of warfare used by Europeans overseas were vastly different than at home, hence
whatever military revolution occurred in Europe could not matter that much elsewhere
(p. 4). To the contrary, one would be rather surprised to see Europeans using the same
methods everywhere given that they were vastly outnumbered in Asia until the 19th
Century, as he himself concedes. As late as 1740 there were, for example, only 2,000
troops employed by the East India Company (hereafter EIC, p. 87, p. 90).
Political correctness aside, is it not impressive that an organization like the EIC could
later occupy so much of India relying in no small measure on local sepoys? My own
research on British banking in Asia has led me to similar conclusions: Europe came to
dominate much of Asia relying in no small measure on Asian capital and Asian human
resources. The secret to power was thus as much institutional as technological. Ann
Carlos and Stephen Nicholas’ study is apposite here but it is not cited.
In Latin America, Europeans faced much lighter resistance, and Jared Diamond most
evocatively tells how epidemics had wiped out the Incas and Aztecs even before they
rose in arms. Vastly outnumbered, Diamond attributes the Conquistadors’ astonishing
triumph to the possession of guns and, to a lesser extent, horses. Recall, too, that no
civilization in the Americas used metal weapons. Sharman therefore infers that metal
swords and local allies mattered much more to the Spaniards than guns, drawing on the
very same Diamond (p. 5). In that sense, he is turning the Cortez and Pizarro occupation
stories on their respective heads.
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The shock-and-awe impact that Conquistador guns created cannot be erased from the
equation, precisely because – as Sharman notes – the Spaniards were so vastly
outnumbered (p. 39).
Anyone reading Diamond would agree that hand-to-hand fighting mattered too, and
here Spanish metal swords were infinitely better than obsidian or stone weapons used
by the locals. Spanish armoury was better than the cotton padding used by the locals.
The same applies once again to horses and pack animals, which the locals did not have
(outside llamas). But is all of that enough to disqualify the shock-and-owe effect?
Sharman resolutely cites John Guilmartin here to suggest the Spanish would have won
anyway even without gunpowder weapons (p. 41)!
The Muslim and Russian ‘Counterpoints’
Sharman rightly reminds us that the Ottomans were fairly adept at using gunpowder
weapons until the 1700s, and that this factor partly explains their success versus the
Mamluks and Safavids (p. 107). As Gábor Ágoston has shown, the Ottomans did
indeed not just import guns and cannons from Europe but also manufactured some
themselves. In the 16th century Ottoman mills could manufacture up to 1,000 metric
tons of gunpowder. By the end of the 18th Century imports made for the great bulk of
ordnance, however.3
Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) famously modernised Russia’s industry and army. He
newly mobilised peasants, and had experts brought from Western Europe with a view
toward acquiring the nous of manufacturing armaments independently. In 1705, the
English ambassador to Russia, Charles Whitworth, praised the quality of Russian
ammunition, and the country remained largely self-sufficient in that regard until the
1850s.4
The point, then, is that Western European military superiority over the Ottomans cannot
be established before 1750; neither perhaps can superiority be established over the
Russians before the Crimean War (p. 111-113). Modern arms cost states a lot. In
essence, Sharman asks how could Russian self-sufficiency be reconciled with its
refractory tax system and prevalence of serfdom? This is a thought-provoking question
but it remains the case that neither the Ottomans nor the Russians became ocean-going
powers, dominating global trade flows. Since the taxation of overseas trade was at the
heart of state formation in early-modern Europe, much fiscal revenue was therefore lost.

3

Gábor Ágoston (2005), Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the
Ottoman Empire (Cambridge University Press), p. 199, p. 160.
4
Walter M. Pinter (1984), “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914”. Russian Review
43.3, pp. 231-259.
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Sharman draws on Giancarlo Casale to highlight, by way of contrast, the Ottoman
“powerful” navy, sailing as it did from Ethiopia right through to Sumatra; and the
Ottoman “central” taxation system (p. 100-101). Yet, as even Casale concedes,
Ottoman naval prowess waned as early as 1600. For its part, far from being centralised,
the Ottoman fiscal system increasingly relied on tax farming in the early modern era,
as Sevket Pamuk shows.
Recall here, too, that the Ottomans did not play any role whatsoever in stemming 1700s
Dutch encroachment into Java or even Aceh, where devout Muslims ruled. Ottoman
gunpowder technology may have spread in India earlier but that may not be the case for
Southeast Asia. Drawing on Sun Laichen, Sharman argues that much of mainland
Southeast Asia had adopted gunpowder weapons presumably from China well before
the Ottomans and Portuguese arrived.
To be sure, Pamuk’s work is cited in the book, but somehow interpretations lead in
different directions. For revisionists, the Ottoman Siege of Vienna in 1683 is, despite
ultimate Ottoman defeat, a demonstration of their singular military and fiscal prowess,
right at the heart of Europe. But conservative accounts point to the fact that CatholicProtestant tensions at the time meant the Holy Roman Empire had been subverted by
other European powers, and in that sense the Ottomans had been greatly assisted.
My own work highlights banks note issuance as a form of state debt that had been
invented in Song China but re-emerged in Sweden in the 17th century, that is to say well
before the Industrial Revolution. From then on, bank note issuance diffused quickly
across Northwestern Europe but reached Istanbul only in 1840. In stark contrast to
Western Europe, the US and Japan – less than 7 % of the Ottoman money supply was
made up by bank notes as late as 1914. Clearly, in relative terms, the Ottoman financial
system was lagging behind – this is not a 19th Century story read backwards. As already
mentioned, the story has a fiscal dimension too which, according to the Parker narrative,
translates into military shortfall.
If disease helped Europeans in the Americas, it held them back until the “New
Imperialism” of the 1800s in sub-Saharan Africa. Here, in the tropics, horses and pack
animals were of less use (pp. 35-36). Sharman is absolutely correct in drawing our
attention to the late colonization of Africa, a continent that was after all on Europe’s
doorstep.
Curiously, African gold and slave markets were approached by sea. Overland,
Europeans would have had to traverse the Maghreb but there was vehement Muslim
resistance there that made the idea impossible. After all, Portugal itself was partly
occupied by Muslims until the 1400s.
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When the Portuguese did forcefully try to invade the Maghreb like in the Battle of
Alcazarquivir of 1578, they were resoundingly defeated amid heavy artillery from both
sides. What is more, the Portuguese King Sebastian was killed in battle; the Spaniards
would invade Portugal, and the Ottomans would increasingly be involved in the
Maghreb thereafter (p. 48, p. 114).
At this juncture, Sharman insightfully points to Oman as another very important spoiler
of European expansion. In 1661 Omani naval forces aided by local collaborators
wrested Mombasa from the Portuguese, and would later take over Zanzibar too. In
1668, Omanis sacked the Portuguese fort as far away as Diu (p. 54, p. 58).
In sum, Sharman shows there was a lot of gunpowder in use in North Africa. The
traditional narrative foregrounds, for example, Mamluk (and Japanese) reluctance to
embrace firearms, and in that sense Sharman provides a powerful corrective. He even
suggests Mamluk-made guns reached Western India in 1500 (p. 74). But, notably, Peter
Mundy who visited India in the 1630s, did not describe in his famous travelogue any
guns used by Mughal soldiers.
India and China Revisited: the Religious Card
Religion played its part not just in Vienna. Sharman rightly mentions the Ottomans
were tolerant of religious minorities, and in that sense they presaged perhaps social
modernity. He also insightfully shows how the Portuguese conspired from the 1500s
with Hindu principalities against Muslim attacks, as was the case in Goa in 1510.
Ottoman contact with, on the other hand, the Muslim principalities in Sumatra come
across as rather feeble (p. 58).
For revisionists, ‘Vienna on sea’ is the 1509 Battle of Diu in modern Gujarat. There,
1,500 Portuguese faced an “unlikely” but large fighting coalition of sea-seasoned
Mamluks, Ottomans and even Catholic Venetians, as well as local Indians (p. 57-58).
But the nub of the matter is that the Portuguese actually won, thus entrenching their
partial domination of the spice trade. And yet Sharman stresses what he sees as
subsequent Ottoman inroads into the spice trade, and domination of the Red Sea.
Frankopan suggest he may be right as, shorn of some revenue, the Portuguese turned
their attention also to cotton and silk import.5
If Diu was a triumph, the Portuguese lost their grip on the all-important entrepot of
Hormuz in 1622 (p. 83). Here, the usurper was the Protestant English with Safavid
assistance, which brings to mind Rhoads Murphey’s famous argument about the
English singular ability to entice the right Asian rulers to their side at the right time.

5
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In keeping with this argument, the French support for the Mughals against the EIC
during the famous 1757 Battle of Plassey came to nothing.
Sharman claims that the Ming navy drowned interloping Portuguese ships between
1521-22 (pp. 129-130). But the picture is more complicated. Actually, by 1557 the
Portuguese were able to establish a permanent settlement in Macau through kickback
to local officials and, importantly, by demonstrating their vitality to the Ming as
counter-piracy agents and as cannon makers. Macao’s survival in the face of local and
intra-European (mainly Dutch) pressures is a testament to the ingenuity of the
Portuguese sea empire. On the other hand, the Ming were defeated by the Qing even
though the latter had fewer cannons, thus reinforcing Sharman’s point about the
irrelevance of European technology on the Asia battle field.
It’s the Economics
Pooling private capital through enhanced property rights was key to European
ascendancy in the early modern era. In that sense, joint-stock trading companies like
the EIC, or its Dutch competitor the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie), were
great innovations. Yet, strangely, Sharman seems to read weakness into the EIC and
VOC precisely because of their joint-stock nature as compared with the more statist but
less dynamic colonization effort by the Portuguese (Estado do India) and the French
(Compagnie française pour le commerce des Indes Orientales). That is to say, statism
strangely equates with modernity in Sharma’s narrative but not necessarily with military
strength or profitability for that matter (p. 69).
Actually, as Sharman himself shows (p. 53), all European ‘India’ companies enjoyed
official backing to one degree or another, including the Spanish Casa de Contratación.
All enticed private capital to one degree or another, in return for limited trading rights.
And even though Sharman sweepingly deprecates the profitability of those companies,
they delivered massive revenue to their governments. The Habsburgs otherwise
creamed off much of the silver bonanza discretely scooped up by encomiendas across
Latin America by way of financing war against the Protestant Dutch (p. 66).
On its part, the VOC is said to have seen sharp decline in profits over the course of the
18th Century due to rising military and administrative costs (p.80). Yet, it is implicitly
accepted that the VOC successfully drew much tax revenue from peasants deep into
Java, not just from trade. After the Battle of Plassey, one can point to similar taxfarming success by the EIC in India (pp. 91-92) but the quantitative data are sorely
lacking in both cases. Certainly, in their The First Modern Economy, Jan de Vries and
Ad van der Woude give a very different impression about VOC and EIC profitability
compared with Sharman.
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Profits sometimes tell only part of the story anyway. The EIC and VOC apparatus in
the region helped convey the best of Asian technology to European master artisans.
Thus, both Delft and Stoke-on-Trent boasted a sophisticated china industry in the early
17th century. Lord Macartney was famously rebuffed by the Qianlong Emperor in 1793
because China was supposedly self-sufficient, and did not need British mechanical
clockwork. The British were portrayed in turn as slavishly reliant on quintessentially
Chinese imports like tea, silk and ceramics. What historians rarely appreciate is that
Macartney also brought along British-made ceramics to impress the locals. In other
words, Europeans in the early modern age copied technology faster than the other way
around even at a time when they were not sufficiently militarily strong to open the
region for trade.
The VOC and EIC adapted to local taxation norms, but paid their governments
handsomely for the chartered trading privileges they received. As argued above,
Europe came to dominate much of Asia relying in no small measure on Asian capital
and Asian human resources. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the EIC
borrowed heavily from local creditors so as to finance its military build-up in keeping
with European norms. Indeed, EIC’s debt-to-revenue ratio rose from 120 % in 1793 to
over 300 % in 1809! (p. 94) This is a marker of modernity not of weakness, as all
European governments trod a similar fiscal path of “national debt”, and the EIC was
after all a state within a state
More generally, after 1500, commercial rather than land taxes gradually became the
main source of revenue for European governments. Income tax did not become a
significant contributor until the 20th Century, while customs and duties made for the
lion share beforehand. It is no accident that Europeans set their eyes on the Ottoman
and Qing customs service later in the 19th Century.
In that sense, none of the land empires surveyed by Sharman passes muster. Of course
there were differences among them: Russia had a strong feudal aristocracy, whilst slavesoldiers were rife in the Islamic world. But apart from China, where the tax burden was
light and the levy system centralised, all those empires relied to one degree or another
on tax farming with high intermediary costs. As Gennaioli and Voth observe,
increasingly heavy tax loads underpin economic modernity. For commercial tax
receipts to grow commerce had to grow, so EIC and VOC importance also hinges on
custom payments, not just charter fees.
The costs of waging war so far away from the metropole were surely prohibitive. Here,
Patrick O’Brien comes to mind with his famous conclusions that ‘empire’ did not pay
off to the British although his focus was the 19th Century. In fact, drawing on Lorge,
Sharman rightly contends exorbitant outlays were the reason why the Ming gave up on
naval expansion in the 15th Century (p. 133-138).
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But the wider implication that the various East India companies set up by European
powers were loss making is wanting at best. As argued above, these companies’
operation yielded many largely positive externalities from a metropolitan perspective.
Concluding Remarks
The persistent rise of China and “all the rest” in the 21st Century re-positions the
conventional story of European exceptionalism. It calls for reassessment of what some
may see as a short moment in history, disconfirming hackneyed scripts of
modernisations. Indeed, why should we assume frequent warfare is a desirable setting
to begin with, where China and India offer alternative pre-modern ‘modernities’. As
we saw above, even with the best of weapons, Europeans did not always win on the
battle front. And Sharman might even add that non-Western powers who sought to
emulate Western warfare sometimes made themselves more vulnerable.
Vastly inferior in technological terms, Vietnam was able to defeat the mighty US in the
20th Century. In that sense, Sharman's caution about the suitability of technology to
local conditions seems justified. So, too, is his emphasis on learning being a two-way
street. Yet, the scholarly conversation on the so-called Military Revolution must entail
a fiscal dimension and robust quantitative analysis. The emergence of the “national
debt” economy in Europe, which later spread around the world, undergirding an
expansion of armies, is key to the story.
The Westphalian system in Europe is largely irrelevant to other parts of the world in
terms of theory because it emerged from an intense distinct warfare setting. Sharman
is right, then, to call for more non-Western historical case studies to enrich our
understanding of international relations. He powerfully observes (pp. 150-1):
A more cosmopolitan, less ethnocentric perspective, giving due weight to regions
beyond Europe, shows Western dominance of the international system as relatively
fleeting, and thus makes it much less surprising if this dominance is now being
challenged with the rise of powers beyond the West.
The book makes good on its promise by delivering precisely that perspective. In
passing, it also unpacks many historical conjunctures that have been scarcely discussed
thus far, like the role religion played in early-modern empire building. What emerges
is exceedingly cogent story, but one that often relies on narrow perusal of the pertinent
secondary sources. If Sharman’s attention to the Maghreb as a ‘counterfactual’ is
enlightening, his reconstruction of the Diamond story on the other end of the spectrum
is troubling. In between, lie for the most part the Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal and MingQing China. All willingly used guns: China invented gunpowder to begin with, and the
Ottomans copiously manufactured gunpowder weapons. Yet, by 1700 all those empires
heavily relied on Western munitions expertise. The rest is open to debate.
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Philipp Ammon. Georgia zwischen Eigenstaatlichkeit und russische Okkupation
(Georgia between Nationhood and Russian Occupation).
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2020
Reviewed by Andrew Andersen
andrewandersen.academia.edu
University of Victoria, British Columbia
The book provides detailed analysis of political, historical, religious and cultural roots
of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Georgia, which started more than 200 years
ago in what is now a strategically important area of the world – the South Caucasus.
That region, which includes Georgia alongside Armenia and Azerbaijan, serves as a
natural corridor through which Western countries can get access to the vital
hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia, bypassing Russia. At the same time, after the
disintegration of the USSR, the South Caucasus turned into one of the “hot zones”
where polar ideologies and economic interests of major powers collide. However, the
region somehow gets neglected by Western politicians and media.
As a result of such neglect, Georgia and other small nations of the Caucasus are often
left at the mercy of their powerful and ambitious neighbor – Russia. That causes
disappointment and disillusionment among pro-western Georgians and increasingly
weakens Western positions in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean including the
South Caucasus. Meanwhile, the recent Russian aggression against Georgia and
Russian-sponsored ethnic cleansings in the occupied Georgian provinces of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia serve as a grim reminder of how important it is to understand the
volcanic forces that may explode the region, with dire consequences for the whole
world.
In investigating the dramatic events of Georgian history and the origins of Georgia’s
conflict with Russia, the author of the book adheres to an original cultural-historical
hermeneutic method of analysis that makes his study different from the studies of the
majority of his colleagues, most of whom prefer sociological and structural methods.
The methodology chosen by the author allows him to sharpen his view of a number of
significant historical and cultural phenomena and, in particular, to cast doubt on the
concept of "invented nation", which many contemporary researchers of recent Georgian
history and Russo-Georgian conflict tend to adhere to.
Ammon’s book is rich in scope and offers a clear and concise (but not simplistic) outline
of Georgian history from 1112 BC to 1924 AD, with the focus on the major events of
the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries connected with the expansion of Russia in the
Caucasus in general, and in Georgia in particular.
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Those events, described in chapters II-VIII of the book, include but are not limited to
the secret agreement between King Vakhtang VI of the East Georgian Kingdom of
Kartli and Czar Peter the Great of Russia (1720), the conclusion of the Treaty of
Georgievsk (1783), the annexation of Georgian kingdoms and principalities by the
Russian empire in breach of the above-mentioned treaty (1801-1867), the national
awakening of Georgians in the 19th century, the abolition and restoration of the
autocephalous status of the Georgian Church (1811 and 1917, respectively), Georgian
role in the Russian revolution of 1905 and in World War I, the restoration of Georgian
independence (1918), the Soviet-Georgian war and Sovietization of Georgia (1921) and
the revolt of 1924.
While appreciating the detailed and meticulous research performed by the author of the
book, one should mention though that he seems to have overlooked the fact that upon
incorporation into the Russian empire, Georgia never constituted an integral
administrative unit. Historical Georgian lands were split into two separate provinces
(gubernii) – the province of Tiflis and the province of Kutais. When a few more
historical Georgian territories were incorporated into the empire following the RussoTurkish war of 1877-78, they were organized into the separate districts of Batum,
Ardahan and Olty, thus further fragmenting the Georgian cultural and linguistic realm.
The author also uses the phrase “Samachablo and Kartli,” which is rather questionable,
keeping in mind that throughout history, the feudal fief of Samachablo comprised a part
of the province of Shida Kartli.
While covering the fall of the First Republic described in Chapter VIII, the author seems
to overestimate the role of Georgian Bolsheviks in the Sovietization of Georgia in 1921.
Despite the fact that well-known Russian Bolsheviks of Georgian descent were quite
active in undermining the independent Georgian statehood which they considered
“bourgeois” and “nationalistic”, there were way more important geopolitical and
economic factors that led to the loss of Georgia’s independence in 1921. Those factors
include the inability of the three South Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan) to come to agreements regarding the disputed territories (as they clearly
demonstrated at the conference in San Remo in April, 1920), and the lightning collapse
of independent Azerbaijan. These events, in turn, resulted in the failure of Lord
Curzon’s doctrine of the “Transcaucasian palisade” against possible Russian and
Turkish expansion into the Middle East and India, and the formation of the SovietKemalist alliance and certain interests of British oil-exporters. One may also question
the author’s statement that the Menshevik-dominated government of the First Republic
of Georgia failed to create an effective army. In fact, the said government did not trust
the professional military for protection of the country. That prejudice and mistrust was
deeply rooted in the social democratic ideology of the Menshevik leadership.
Accordingly, the government of the First Republic constantly exerted moral and
financial pressure on its army and regularly conducted unnecessary personnel shifts thus
reducing its combat readiness.
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Instead, the leaders of the First Republic preferred to count on the National Guard which
in 1921 proved ineffective due to the lack of professionalism and discipline.
However, in general, most of the historical facts and events of Georgian history are
described in the book quite accurately. The contents of Ammon’s study is supported
by rich and diverse bibliographic material listed at the end of the book. The multiple
sources in four different languages used by the author in his research work include more
than 200 books and magazine articles, as well as dozens of dictionaries, encyclopedias,
websites and other reference works in a wide range of areas directly or indirectly
connected with the subject of his book.
One of the main advantages of the book by Philipp Ammon is that it not only describes
the important historical events but also examines the significant processes that have
been fuelling the political, cultural and military clashes between Russia and Georgia.
That makes it an asset for a wide-ranging readership, from students of Georgian history
to diplomats and politicians who would like to gain balanced and objective information
on the backgrounds of the long-lasting conflict in one of the sensitive regions of the
world. The significance of Ammon’s book is further magnified by the fact that the
history of Georgia still remains an under-studied and under-researched field, as there is
still not enough professional literature on this subject available in the West in general
and even less so in the German-speaking countries.
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John Vincent Bellezza. The Dawn of Tibet:
The Ancient Civilization on the Roof of the World.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014
Reviewed by Constance Wilkinson
The Dawn of Tibet: the Ancient Civilization on the Roof of the World by John Vincent
Bellezza is a unique work by an intrepid explorer-scholar who, purely from his own
inspiration, spent decades doggedly tracking down traces of the prehistoric Zhang
Zhung civilization, a Metal Age culture (famed for making iron weapons of war) and a
polity that dominated the remote northwestern plateau of Upper Tibet until the 7th
century CE.
This rich and unusual book summarizes the results of Bellezza's many expeditions into
this high-altitude, inhospitable, and often life-threateningly dangerous Changthang1
region; it presents his archaeological discoveries, informed by written records, histories,
myths, rituals. He has also collected oral histories, myths, legends, and narratives from
local narrators, nomad herders of sheep and yak who claim descent from the ancient
clans of Zhang Zhung, and whose daily lives are still impacted by ancient indigenous
rituals and beliefs.
The arising of Zhang Zhung is generally set--but not in stone--around 1,000 BCE;
whether its manifestation was more a Late Bronze age or Early Iron age occurrence has
not yet been demonstrated with precision.
What has been demonstrated with precision by Bellezza is inarguable evidence of not
merely the existence of Zhang Zhung2 as a civilization, but its power, stability, and
regional influence, reflected in Bellezza's identification of a great network of ancient
ruins, which, collectively, span "a thousand miles from west to east." (2)
Bellezza states that "this [Zhang Zhung] civilization remained a major force in
uppermost Tibet for roughly fifteen centuries3, [lasting] twice the length of time of the
Roman republic and empire combined." (76)
In the mid-700's CE, Zhang Zhung was invaded by its neighbor to the east, Imperial
Tibet, and, under its imperialist hegemony, it virtually disappeared, aided in its
destruction by an abruptly worsening climate and the near-total
annihilation/assimilation of its religious culture.

1

Literally, "Northern Plain."
"'Zhang Zhung' is used in this work as a generic appellation for pre-seventh century CE upland
civilization, including its cultural, linguistic, and political aspects." (76)
3
1200 BCE to 700 CE
2
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John Vincent Bellezza began to explore the northern plains, or, Changthang, in 1986.
He "managed to walk across a swath of open basins without a stove or tent," a journey
of 175 miles, out in the snow and sleet. Later that year, he went to Mt. Kailash, again
traveling without a stove or tent, travelling as Tibetan pilgrims do, learning the
language, even reaching the source of the Indus. (17)
In the nineties, Bellezza explored Lake Namtsho and Lake Dangra, and was guided to
certain places "where signs of a past age of greatness could still be seen."(19) On the
basis of his work, he published the monograph, "Divine Dyads: Ancient Civilization in
Tibet."
During this time, Bellezza met a number of helpful luminaries: H.H. the Dalai Lama,
H.H. Menri Khenpo, head of the Eternal Bon religion, the eminent Bon scholar Lopon
Tendzin Namdak, abbot Chado Rinpoche, and Choygyal Namkhai Norbu, providing
encouragement and information.
In 1997, he traveled to Darok Tsho, in the northwestern section of the plateau. Around
this freshwater lake, he found ruins of temples and hermitages. Most interesting on this
expedition were two islands in the lake; he could see ancient ruins on the islands, Tsho
Do and Do Drilbu, but he had no way to get to them.
In 1998, the indomitable Bellezza decided to circumambulate Lake Teri Namtsho, a
huge undertaking. He discovered two headlands that had once been islands known as
Po Do. In order to reach them, Bellezza "had to negotiate several kilometers of alkaline
flats, pockmarked with pools of quicksand." (21) There he found "traces of ancient
edifices, parts of elite cloistered communities, nerve centers of culture that in their time
drew in resources from around the region." (21)
By the end of 1998, he had located and documented over 100 sites belonging to Zhang
Zhung, hoping to document every visible ancient remain in Upper Tibet to build a
"comprehensive inventory of pre-Buddhist archaeological sites." (23)
In 1999, his Changthang Circuit Expedition braved snowstorms, sandstorms, flooded
roads, and a supply truck that "plunged off the edge of a ravine," and found "a striking
spectrum of ancient castles, temples, villages, menhirs, tombs, cave shelters, and rock
art." (22)
Bellezza's Upper Tibet Circumnavigation Expedition presented other obstacles, as "the
trails to many mountaintop citadels had long since collapsed, forcing climbs up and
down cliff faces and narrow ledges with only the most minimal of holds for the hands
and feet. It was a precarious undertaking using a tape measure on crumbling stone walls
along the edges of precipices." (22)
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In 2001, his Upper Tibet Antiquities Expedition "clocked five thousand miles in
vehicles and hundreds more on foot and horseback" to find 90 sites. In 2002, the High
Tibet Circle Expedition covered eight thousand miles by vehicle (and more on foot and
on horseback) and found another hundred sites.
It was only in 2002, after 18 years, that his work became officially sanctioned. A
bilateral agreement was signed through the University of Virginia and the Tibet
Academy of Social Sciences. Bellezza was able to organize expeditions through the
auspices of the TASS. This produced the High Tibet Circle Expedition which, in 2002,
discovered Chunak4, a large burial ground with a network of tombs, pillars, and
mounds. In 2003, the TASS/High Tibet Antiquities Expedition revealed architectural
remains that served to fix the Western geographic limit of Zhang Zhung.5
Bellezza put together the Tibet Ice Lakes Expedition in 2006 to explore ruins of stone
buildings on islands locals told him could be reached - in winter, over ice. These were
the same islands he had seen from afar when he went to Lake Namtsho nine years
before.
Approaching the frozen lake, in a warming climate, he reports, "The ice was
uncomfortably thin when we arrived at the lakeshore opposite [the island of] Semo Do.
The way across to the island was unnerving. The lake would screech and shudder every
time we tried to walk on it. There lay an abyssal black expanse below the frozen surface,
and only six to eight inches of ice separated us from it. If it were not for [my Tibetan
associates], I never would have ventured onto Lake Nam Tsho." (26)
In order to discover clues to new ruins, Bellezza needed to win the trust of local people,
the nomad livestock herders, and he did. They repaid his trust with hospitality and
information as to the lay of their land, ruins they had seen, ruins they had heard of, ruins
Bellezza had heard of, but only in texts.
In a region with an average elevation of 15,000 feet, the dauntless Bellezza survived
travelling quicksand and windstorms to document more than seven hundred separate
ancient sites: castles, temples, rock paintings, metal artefacts, monuments, ceremonial
places, yielding thousands of individual structures and pictorial compositions that have
managed to survive for thousands of years.
Exemplar ruins still remain, not only because of their locations are so remote as to be
nearly inaccessible, but also because the majority were indeed "set in stone."
4

Lit., "black water."
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Many Zhang Zhung structures rely entirely on stone, as Bellezza describes them,
designed "with sinuous ground plans and meandering walls, these edifices present a
very different appearance from structures created with wooden roofs. They contain
warrens of tiny rooms connected by short passageways, internal spaces isolated from
the glare of the sun and the brunt of the wind." (118)
Bellezza states that "the Metal Age in Upper Tibet was a time of thriving agricultural
centers guarded by a chain of mountaintop strongholds and fortified temples.
Established at over 17,000 feet above sea level, these robustly built all-stone structures
appear to have housed the chieftains and priests who ruled over Zhang Zhung....
[n]owhere else in the world did humanity construct permanent dwellings in such lofty
locations." (5)
In ruins made visible by the arid, harsh, windy climate, he finds evidence of complex
social hierarchies, inter-regional trade, irrigated agriculture, all ringed by a coordinated
chain of defensive citadels and fortresses.
Bellezza says that "the high-altitude harshness of Upper Tibet is mediated by stunning
beauty. The inherent sublimity of the landscape offsets its destructive power...glowing
with an almost otherworldly resplendence, rock formations and bodies of water assume
the richest hues imaginable. Upper Tibet is so spacious as to appear limitless...the
countryside is as vivid with eyes open as it is in dreams." (30)
He describes with fondness the people who in the present day manage to survive in this
impossible environment, nomad livestock herders (drokpas, in Tibetan) whose lives are
to this day still connected to rites and myths and texts that have come down to them
from ancient Zhang Zhung.
In a chapter called “Touching the Sky: The Citadels and Temples of Zhang Zhung,” the
reports locating and then surveying 140 archaic era castles, pointing out that "[t]he
ancient castles of Upper Tibet occupied strategic economic and military positions,
enjoying unencumbered views of the outlying terrain. Their unassailable geographic
aspect would have made attack by an enemy difficult and costly . . . [only] the most
powerful members of society would have had mastery over the mountaintop castles."
(121) Funerary sites reveal other information about Zhang Zhung: differences in site
size and intricacy suggest socially stratified communities.
What have I omitted? Detailed sections on rock art, religion, magic, mystery, history.
Truly peculiar, precious objects: agate-like artefacts called Dzi, amulets called
"Thogchak" apparently made of meteoric iron, both said to be "self-arisen;" that is,
objects found, not made by artisans.
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Detailed sections on literature, colorful, fantastical "tales of powerful magicians
controlling the elements and movements of planets, perfecti knowing everything there
is to know in the universe, saints stopping powerful armies in their tracks with mantras."
(77)
Bellezza's work is too rich for this review to do it justice. Those interested in, say, the
comparative study of civilizations, may benefit from learning of Zhang Zhung, a
singular civilization long lost, beginning to be re-found.
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Chogyal Namkhai Norbu. The Light of Kailash,
A History of Zhang Zhung and Tibet.
Translated from the Tibetan and edited by Donatella Rossi;
English editing by Nancy Simmons.
Volume One: The Early Period. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2009.
Volume Two: The Intermediate Period.
Volume Three: The Late Period.
Arcidosso: Shang Shung Publications, 2013
Reviewed by Constance Wilkinson

The Light of Kailash : A History of Zhang Zhung and Tibet is a three-volume series by
the late Chogyal Namkhai Norbu, former professor of Tibetan and Mongolian
Language and Literature at the University of Naples L'Orientale. Born in Derge, Tibet,
he spent much of his career researching the origins of pre-Buddhist Tibetan culture,
finding sources in an ancient civilization, Zhang Zhung1, and an indigenous ritual
tradition, Bon2.
The Light of Kailash presents a compelling alternative to the standard versions of
Tibetan history in which Zhang Zhung is given short shrift, and Bon nearly erased,
eclipsed by its powerful post-Buddhist 7th century successor civilization, Central Tibet
under Emperor Srong-btsan sGam-po, a perfect example of history being re-written by
the (of course!) victors.
"Great scholars and practitioners of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition have universally
proclaimed that Tibet did not have a written language, let alone a culture, before the
advent of the Dharmaraja Srong-btsan sGam-po," according to Chogyal Norbu. "They
essentially defined the country as a region of darkness." (234, III)

1

Many sources point to a civilization known as Zhang Zhung, a large area of what is now western and
northwestern Tibet, a society loosely centered around Mount Kailash, called "the navel of the world,"
(23, I) Kailash, from ancient times was said to be the sacred source of four holy rivers This was
regarded as pure myth. Western expeditions traced the sources of those rivers: the Indus, Brahmaputra,
Karnali, Sutlej eventually admitting that the myth was the truth. Likewise, the existence of Zhang
Zhung, to this day is often dismissed and regarded as mere legend, wishful thinking.
2
Bon--an ancient and complex tradition of practical rituals carried out in symbolic fashion to achieve
specific worldly outcomes; these rites are then performed by practitioners who then can pass on such
knowledge down, teacher to student. This tradition arose in Zhang Zhung; this tradition was reformed
and systematized by Tonpa Shenrab Miwo (dates uncertain) often cited as the founder of Bon.
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The three-volume work, dedicated to Tibetan youth in particular, is inspired by a desire
to reverse persistent misconceptions about the roots of Tibetan culture, in which preBuddhist Tibet is portrayed as a wasteland, "peopled" by a race descended from the
coupling of a local ogress and a hairy ape3.
The Light of Kailash initially began as lectures Professor Norbu gave at the University
of Nationalities in Beijing in 1988. Professor Norbu then elaborated upon the topics,
doing further research, adding sources after source, until a final manuscript (1,900
handwritten calligraphed pages) was complete.
To elucidate certain errors, Professor Norbu compiled a dazzling, dizzying host of
primary sources from which he quotes extensively, often comparatively, over three rich
volumes, creating a compelling vision of pre-Imperial Tibet, tenaciously reconstructing
it from the scraps and shards left after acquisitive imperialist Emperor Srong-btsan
sGam-po of Central Tibet decided it was time to usurp his richer, more powerful
neighbor, Zhang Zhung, and swallow it whole.
Ch. Norbu states, "Starting from the time in which the precious teachings of the sacred
dharma appeared in the vast country of snowy mountains that is Tibet, the majority of
scholars who were born there and become renowned have done their utmost to show
the contrast between all the good that flourished in the country with the arrival of
Buddhism and all the bad that had existed before then, maintaining that . . . Tibet was
an obscure, uncivilized place and that the ancient Tibetans living there were all dimwitted and dull." (240-241, III)
Histories and historians of Tibet still share this view: pre-Buddhist Tibet was not worth
a second glance until glorious Emperor Srong-btsan sGam-po got his hands on it.
Side note: glorious Srong-btsan sGamp-po achieved this glorious victory by arranging
the assassination of Lik-mig-kya, the Emperor of Zhang Zhung. The army of Zhang
Zhung was too powerful to defeat in a fair fight, so the glorious Emperor, adjusting to
circumstances, had him ambushed.
After the conquest, Zhang Zhung vanishes.
Bon, suppressed, goes underground.
Bring in the Buddhists.

3

Well, and we still believe in the hairy ape but not so much the local ogress, do we not? Viz. Sir
Charles Bell, "The Tibetans anticipated Darwin by claiming descent from a monkey." p.21, "Tibet, Past
and Present" by Sir Charles Bell, Oxford University Press, 1924, 1968.
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Gloriously spread the teachings of Buddha while acting as if arranging for the
assassination of your own brother-in-law, as Zhang Zhung Emperor Lik-mig-kya had
been, doesn't count as really bad karma.
Ingloriously spread new history according to the viewpoint of the new glorious
Emperor: where there had been no writing, the new glorious emperor makes it magically
appear. All that was crude is now civilized! Prior magico-ritual traditions are co-opted
or banished, almost erased, certainly replaced.
Splice in the story of the ogress and the hairy ape.4
Interestingly, this pattern of disparagement and erasure continue to this day; as Imperial
Central Tibet once dismissed, disparaged, and erased Zhang Zhung, today, Tibetan
civilization is viewed as "less than," according to eminent Central Asian scholar
Christopher Beckwith:
It is probably no exaggeration to say that all of the general books (and most of the
specialized books) about Tibet assume, and stress constantly throughout, that the
country and its people were and are abnormal. Biases unfortunately die hard.5
Over decades, the author consulted original historical texts from both the Bon and
Buddhist traditions, meticulously reviewing existing published texts, collected
unpublished texts, consulted literary and ritual sources, using narratives from scrolls
such as Old Tibetan Annals, Old Tibetan Chronicles found in caves of Dunhuang.
Prof. Norbu interprets facts and symbols gleaned from sets of ancient ritual instructions;
from a wealth of sources, in these volumes, he presents a (sacred?) mountain of
evidence, almost an avalanche of evidence: multiple versions of names and texts, side
by side (in transliterated Tibetan6), so that readers can judge patterns for themselves,
can see precisely the bases for his conclusions, a process he has adopted throughout his
career, reviewing multiple points of view in texts, "endeavoring to clarify their
fundamental characteristics."7

4

"The Tibetans anticipated Darwin by claiming descent from a monkey," Sir Charles Bell in "Tibet,
Past and Present" Oxford University Press, 1924/1968, p21
5
"The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power Among the Tibetans,
Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages," Christopher I. Beckwith, Princeton
University Press, 1987
6
Wylie transliteration is used throughout. It's a hard slog but unavoidable.
7
"Drung, Deu, and Bon: Narrations, Symbolic languages, and the Bon tradition in ancient Tibet" by
Namkhai Norbu, Translated from Tibetan into Italian edited and annotated by Adriano Clemente,
Translated from Italian into English by Andrew Lukianowicz, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives,
Dharmsala, 1995. Introduction, xix.
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Volume One begins with stories of beginnings, first describing the primordial origin of
the universe. There are many to choose from, and Professor Norbu cites several; here
he quotes a passage from an old Bon text8 "which clearly describes the arising of the
elements." (20, I)
"From totally void emptiness,
a totally clear light appeared.
That light completely transformed itself,
and came into being as a luminous wheel,
whirling spontaneously.
From the self-produced energy of the wheel,
weightless,
wind came into being." (20, I)
Whirling spontaneously9, as in evolving of itself, arising through its own arising;
moving and continuing, coming more and more into being through movement itself,
moving of itself, not from any outside force, self-existing.
Hardly the cosmology of dunces.
These illiterate yokels seem to have quite sophisticated thoughts about how the universe
came into existence, how things came to be, do they not?
Chogyal Norbu presents sections from identifiably non-Buddhist10 texts on the origin
of the universe, the origins of a number of pre-human groups, then lists the first human
generations of Zhang Zhung.
In the section transitioning, from, literally "not-men" (mi-ma-yin) to human beings,
Professor Norbu quotes from the 12th-century history written to narrate ancient events,
lDe'u rgya bod kyi chos 'byung; there is an ordered list of the appearances of various,
um, ruling groups; it distinguishes them by name and weapons of war, as things evolve
over time.
"The first to rule was the Black gNod-sbyin . . . from that time, bows and arrows were
used as weapons.
The second to rule was the mGo-g.yag dDud-yul Re-lde. . . at that time axes and
hatchets were used as weapons.
8

gSas spyi spungs kyi bshad byang, Dechen Lingpa (b. 1833) u-med ms., Chengdu
Rang gyis rang gyurpa "means originated only on the basis of movement, without reliance on any
other factor other than the power of movement itself."
10
Which are clearly non-Buddhist because Buddhists do not do cosmic eggs. Many cultures do, not
them.
9
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The third to rule was the Srin-po gNya'-ring Phrag-me . . . catapults and Srin-mo boots11
were used as weapons.
The fourth to rule was the lHa [deity] dMar-ljam; . . . from that time, goothe 3-pointed
kha tam12 was used as a weapon.
The fifth to rule were the Klu [and the country] was called Ngam-Brang Cang-Brang;
from that time, spears were used as weapons.
The sixth to rule were the 'Dre, [and the country] was called Lang-tang Ling-tang; from
that time maces [rkyug pa skog can] (an iron ball studded with iron spikes swung around
on a rope) were used as weapons." (17-18)
This account, weirdly enough, is given specific credence in an article on the ancient
history of iron from Cassier's Engineering Monthly of 1915; where writer George F.
Zimmer states that "the aborigines of Tibet" have had iron since 3,000 BCE and were
making iron swords and iron hatchets at that time. He further states that the later
Chinese "Emperor Yu received tributes from them [the aborigines of Tibet] in supplies
of iron, circa 2000 BC." 13
This suggests that way back in ancient Tibet, that backward backwater, iron war
weapon-making had already begun even before men were, even, well, men.14
From volume to volume, the literature moves in an almost perfect Zhang Zhung creation
metaphor, whirling around like the universe creating itself, spiraling back and revisiting basic topics as each round provides a deeper and richer analysis. Professor
Norbu presents the reader with ever more precise documentation: cosmologies, human
generations of ancient Zhang Zhung, early family/clan genealogies of ancient Zhang
Zhung, the early royal dynasties of Zhang Zhung, Bon priestly lineages of ancient
Zhang Zhung before and after Shenrab Miwo; the written language and scripts of
ancient Zhang Zhung; the origins of the Bonpo lineages; kings, gShen-pos, and Bonpos;
royal castles of ancient Tibet; Bonpo lineages in the later period.

11

"srin mo rkang , "ancient weapon consisting in iron boots with a pike on the front with three longer
pikes protruding from it."(18, n5)
12
Knife/khatvanga
13
"The aborigines of Tibet . . . have iron swords and hatchets at that time [the time of Tubal-Cain in
Genesis, and Emperor Yu received tributes from them in supplies of iron, circa 2000 BC." He also
states that they had iron "since the time of Emperor Fo-Hi" and Tubal Cain, earlier. "The Antiquity of
Iron," Cassier's Engineering Monthly, Vol 47, 1915 by George F. Zimmer, p 14, p88
14
See, "mi-ma-yin, p7, above.
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Painstakingly collected and presented in almost unfathomable detail, viz., The
Succession of Thirty-Four Tibetan Dynasties of the Intermediate Period According to
Twenty Different Sources (Table 8, Volume II Chapter III, The Royal Lineages of
Tibet). Twenty sources? Thirty-four dynasties? You do the math.
We learn about artifacts of its uniquely magical culture: self-created ornaments;
traditions of medicine and healing known nowhere else, certainly not mere imports from
"greater civilizations.15"
Each aspect merits further mention: distinctive methods of divination: by dice,
scapulimancy, rituals for health, wealth, averting obstacles, rituals that have been in use
over thousands of years; these are rituals considered sufficiently effective as to have
been passed down through the centuries and are still practiced, still practical and
relevant, to this day.
Every topic is addressed with such precision, fully annotated, beautifully translated by
Donatella Rossi (Professor of Religions and Philosophies of Eastern Asia at the
Sapienza University of Rome) and crafted gloriously into English by the literary genius
of editor Nancy Simmons.
The Light of Kailash: A History of Zhang Zhung and Tibet is stunning; it is inspiring
and slightly impossible.16 Its scope and depth are beyond my ability to cognize, but
well within my ability to recommend.
Perhaps with The Light of Kailash, seen in light of the archaeological findings of John
Vincent Bellezza17, the erasure of Zhang Zhung may itself become erased.

15

Of particular interest, I think, to those interested in the comparative study of civilizations is the
apparent pattern of erasure and contempt; in this trilogy, as Professor Norbu attests, the erasure by
Imperial Tibet of Zhang Zhung; as Beckwith attests, the disdain with which later Tibetan culture is still
met, its achievements still invisible, passed over.
16
The impossible part is, of course, the transliteration of Tibetan. Unavoidable, alas. No way out.
17
The Dawn of Tibet: the Ancient Civilization on the Roof of the World, by John Vincent Bellezza.
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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered
to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the
26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as
Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.
For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,”
problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the
Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and
the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the
Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press
coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.
After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and
the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the
decision to transfer the Society to the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that
transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia.
Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years
included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott,
Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf.
In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present
there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(ISCSC).
The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar
Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko,
Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee
Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and current president Lynn
Rhodes. To date, the Society has held 47 meetings, most of them in the United States but
also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland;
Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New
Brunswick, Canada; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suzhou, China.
More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual
dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its
annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons,
Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall
Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best
be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety
of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the
Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its
inaugural issue in 1979.
Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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